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General Introduction 
 
Massive human rights violations of the 1990s and partial, or inaction by the 
international community to halt these, triggered the emergence and consolidation of the 
principle of Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), which was endorsed by the United Nations 
General Assembly at the World Summit in 2005. RtoP mainly emphasises out how first 
every state has the primary responsibility to protect its population from genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity; second, the international community has 
a responsibility to assist states in fulfilling this protection role; and third, the international 
community has a responsibility to take timely and decisive action if the state has failed to 
fulfil its responsibility to protect its population from the mentioned severe harm. Such action 
may involve peaceful diplomatic and humanitarian means and if that fails, means including 
the use of force consistent with Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter.  
Most of the debate surrounding RtoP focused on the latter part, which at times is 
interpreted as legitimising non-consensual military intervention, touching upon the corollary 
of relations between sovereign states: the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of 
another state. It can be said however, that the progressive development in the international 
human rights regime over the past century has reversed the hierarchy between the protection 
of individuals over protection of state borders, in favor of the former.  
In this sense RtoP builds forth on the concept coined in the 1990’s of understanding 
‘sovereignty as a responsibility’, which was phrased to address the plight of internally 
displaced persons (idp’s), persons who are in a refugee like situations, but have not crossed 
an international border and therefore still seek protection from the same sovereign state that 
was initially unable to safeguard their protection. The case made for these populations 
involves how states to be deserving the label of legitimate sovereign, have to live up to state 
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responsibilities towards their population. Furthermore, if necessary the international 
community should have access to assist such populations, and the state in question on whose 
territory they find themselves should not invoke its sovereignty to prevent this outside 
‘interference’. 
Nonetheless, rather than being about non-consensual intervention, RtoP can be 
understood as concerning prevention and protection. In this light it is important to 
understand how in the area of international human rights the problem is not so much about 
standards but about implementation. The debate should not be about an existence of a right 
to intervene, but about the rights of the vulnerable populations in question. Also, their 
problem often is not the rights, but the vagueness of whom should take responsibilities to 
guarantees these, through what measures and to what extent. The space between rights and 
responsibilities is phrased as the gap, which needs to be bridged to safeguard protection and 
human rights. 
Far less controversial than the issue of idp’s and intervention, but very much 
connected because of evidencing a smaller or greater gap in a state’s capacity to fulfil its 
responsibility to protect its population, are international state obligations towards refugees. 
Refugees fleeing their country are a clear sign of ongoing human rights violations and 
therefore their case is connected although not directly included in the promulgated RtoP 
framework. What distinguishes refugees from RtoP populations is the individual fear of 
persecution that defines the refugee, and the massive violations that define the RtoP crimes. 
While RtoP situations often occur in relation to a territory where violations are actually (or 
perceived to be) occurring, as is also the case for idp’s, refugee situations is mainly some 
side effect of such. Affecting neighbouring, or farther away states. 
However, if RtoP seeks to prevent and protect, it does not make sense to wait until 
violations become massive, and therefore refugee protection is maybe indirect, but intrinsic 
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to the RtoP framework if it wants to be successful.  Furthermore, as stated by the UNSG:  
Not all armed conflict generates atrocity crimesand not all the atrocity crimes occur within a 
context of armed conflict. What distinghuishes atrocity crimes is the deliberate targeting of 
specific groups, communities or populations, including persons protected under the Geneva 
Convention, and sometimes cycles of reaction and counter-reaction between communities” 
(A/67/399, 2013:3). This sentence clarifies the link with refugees, and forced displacement, 
which may originate from armed conflict, but this is not a necessity, their profile however 
often does include being targeted as part of a group and being excluded. 
The international refugee regime has established and institutionalised practice to 
respond to refugees, this regime in no manner should be weakened or narrowed by RtoP 
practices. The bad taste which RtoP may give in the mouth of some, should not poison 
refugee protection advocacy. The grant of refugee status, and according the refugee his 
rights and duties as such, should not be watered down. Nevertheless, both regimes can and 
should be approached as complementary, as this thesis will argue. 
What is interesting in this light is how on the one hand increasing attention for the 
plight of vulnerable populations on a state’s territory makes the state border less asanctifact 
in terms of human rights protection and outside interference in this regard. On the other hand 
there is a redrawing or border taking place, virtual borders such as in the case of the CEAS 
and related measures and a renewed emphasis on borders, such as to pinpoint responsibility 
for a particular population or refugee. 
An RtoP perspective can be used to address gaps in the present refugee regime. Gaps 
that can be identified involve the overburdening of Southern refugee host states and 
Northern states concerns with mixed refugee-migration flows and secondary movements. 
Security concerns regarding extremists trying to appear as refugees also apply to both. For 
the individual refugee, flight in the present system often reflects a long journey and/or an 
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extended period of time waiting for a durable solution to his situation. Lives are put on hold. 
A durable solution to flight involves a reintegration into some society, with the according 
citizenship rights. 
In this thesis I will argue how RtoP can be understood as a concept with two basic 
normative underpinnings emphasizing: 1) a state’s primary responsibility and 2) the 
international community’s secondary responsibility and as such to strengthen the 
international community’s collective responsibility to protect refugees. Slightly adjusted, the 
same underpinnings of RtoP can also be found in the present international refugee regime 
and eventually emphasise commitments that states have taken upon themselves, which 
underpins also both regimes. 
Seen from this perspective, general gaps or weaknesses can be identified in refugee 
protection. To reflect on these gaps, the concept deriving from RtoP will be used as a tool to 
reflect on European Union responses to refugees since 1999, particularly measures taken in 
the process towards a Common European Asylum System (CEAS).  
The RtoP framework and the emergence of different practices in refugee responses in 
the European context both derive from an understanding of the need to learn from a memory 
of failed attempts in exercising a shared responsibility to protect. Some of the policies 
applied more so caused responsibility shifting or shirking than sharing, to the detriment of 
individual victims and lives.  
By seeing into the European practice through this concept, practical lessons of how 
applying RtoP can strengthen en weaken prospects for the international community as a 
whole to stronger commitments to share responsibilities on refugees. 
The international refugee regime builds on asylum and burden sharing. Asylum, and 
its corollary the principle of non-refoulement, appeals to international obligations of states to 
protect refugees that arrive at their territory and refrain from returning the individual to 
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territories where his or her life and freedom may be at stake. Asylum is sovereignty as 
responsibility.  
Burden sharing, refers to the need for cooperation between states to address the 
‘problem of refugees’. Burden sharing is reflected in financial assistance for example 
through for example contributions to UNHCR; assistance in hosting refugees physically 
through a shared commitment to seek durable solutions for refugees such as local 
integration, voluntary repatriation and importantly resettlement; and practical assistance in 
terms of material or knowledge. Burden sharing is responsibility sharing. 
In the European Union different tendencies are to be identified. One of the main 
instruments on the road towards the CEAS is the Dublin Directive of 2003 which seeks to 
define which EU Member state is responsible for assessing a refugee claim, to prevent 
secondary movements of refugees within the EU. Furthermore, as part of the CEAS is an 
envisioned burden sharing system for refugee responses between different Member states, 
which may be physical burden sharing, and/or financial and/or practical: responsibility 
sharing.  
On the other hand the EU looks over its borders to cooperate with other states, 
mainly (almost) neighboring states, to address the wider development-migration-security 
nexus, which may have positive effects for addressing root causes of the existence of mixed 
flows. This can be understood as assistance in capacity building, which in turn could support 
states to exercise their ‘sovereignty as responsibility’.  
Adverse policies are simultaneously applied however, such as the safe country 
concepts and containment measures to control people’s movement within the EU and 
towards the EU territories. These practices conclude in responsibility shifting rather than 
sharing.   
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The relevance of this topic is reflected by human rights violations and forced 
displacement occurring at this very moment. There is a legitimate and urgent need to explore 
how these situations can be addressed, vulnerable population can be protected and these 
situations in the longer run prevented. RtoP, even if fiercely justifiably criticised, is at the 
forefront of international politics, as evidenced by a yearly publication of a UN Secretary 
General report on an aspect of how to implement RtoP. Increasingly the concept is 
referenced to in UN Security Council resolutions as well. One can disagree with the 
framework, but not ignore it. Furthermore, even if RtoP is labeled as a Western concept, 
Southern states have promoted the UNSC resolutions in which reference is made to RtoP 
and have coined proposals for adjustments of the RtoP concept (as endorsed in 2005). 
Proposing adjustments implies recognition of the core values underpinning RtoP. One can 
criticise the concept and its application, but not deny its presence in international debates. 
 The relevance of making a connection to the plight of refugees is reflected in the 
current state of affairs where industrialised states cry out loud being overburdened by 
refugees, and claiming to be victimised, while the great majority of the real victims, the 
forcibly displaced actually finds him or herself in the global South, without near future 
prospects for a solution to their situation of being uprooted. Many put their lives at risk 
searching for different horizons, but even if arriving at further away borders, there is no 
guarantee to be admitted to become a fully acknowledged member of the host society.  
All in all the links between human rights violations, forced displacement and conflict 
are also intrinsicly in connection with the absence of peace. In his latest 2013 report on RtoP, 
the UNSG states the following: “Beyond moral and legal obligations, history has shown that 
building societies that are resilient to atrocity crimes reinforces State sovereignty and 
increases prospects for peace and stability (A/67/929, 2013:2).  
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From the foregoing follows that according to the UNSG we draw from history that 
rather than taking a topdown approach and looking at the necessity of strong state power and 
institutions to impose the sovereignty of a state over its citizens, we take a bottom up 
approach focusing on the need to build society, inclusive ones, to construct from thereon the 
state and consequently prospects for a situation with absence of direct, structural and cultural 
peace. In other words, a ‘state of peace’ originating from a peaceful society, which would 
also lead to the so seeked for ‘stability’, which for many world leaders is still a primary goal 
in International Relations and Foreign Policy. 
My interest in this topic would I trace back to experiences in Europe, but foremost in 
South America, which have left deep impression of the impact it can have on an individual 
life, if your life and dignity are not safe or guarantee the moment you go to sleep and often  
even behind your own front door. I would refer to moments lived in the Netherlands, but also 
when I was in Chile for a university exchange programme, in Venezuela for an internship at 
UNHCR, or in Colombia for travels. Traveling and getting to know different people and 
places is great, but it is not when you are forced to leave family, friends and your home 
behind.  
There is a responsibility here for governements to take measures to prevent such 
situations from happening and to mitigate impacts when gaps in protection do occur. 
Concerted action is needed within the international community to enable these measures as 
many protection problems are intertwined with many factors at different levels. Inclusion of 
different levels of governance therefore is also crucial, which would be exmplified by 
regional organisations, civil society and norm entrepeneurs.  
The debate on the implementation of RtoP in this thesis is valid as the topic is on the 
international agenda, as is the fact that emphasis should be on prevention and the exemplary 
‘failure’ of the concept as set out on paper in the case of Syria. Even if RtoP is a normative 
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progress of ital importance for the humanitarian debate and the present day foreign policy, it 
remains to be seen what effects this has in practice (DÍAZ BARRODO, 2012:3).  
How this connects to the plight of refugees is clear as the international community 
faces one of the biggest humanitarian emergencies in the records. The aspect of the thesis 
which will deal more with the stance of the European Union on refugees also comes into 
play here, as European states so far have not been too forthcoming with resettling refugees 
from the Syrian region and hosting of the displaced populations is provided mainly by 
neighbouring states which luckily increasingly do receive financial and material support 
from other states/ the international community. This is also going to be a topic high on the 
agenda of the upcoming ministerial week of the 68th session of the United Nations General 
Assembly, and therefore my thesis links in interestingly with the internship that I have been 
fulfilling the last months and at present which consists of providing support in the 
preparations (contentwise and logistically) for the Dutch delegation that will attend the 
UNGA ministerial week. 
The multidisciplinary approach taken in this thesis is justified as the causes and 
consequences of forced displacement, violence state responses and interstate relations are 
increasingly complex and interconnected.  Combining elements of politics, law, international 
relations and peace and conflict studies will provide insights from each discipline to address 
strengths and weaknesses in present day state practice to address human rights violations. At 
the same time it reflects my multidisciplinary academic background of International 
Relations; Peace, Conflict and Development Studies, combined with additional courses on 
humanitarian assistance. 
This thesis is a literature review, based on secondary resources. For the first chapter a 
foundation is made based on what may be regarded as the founding fathers of RtoP, the 
almost not to be missed authors on RtoP, particularly when the concept was still ‘emerging’ 
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and not yet so consolidated. Included here are references to many documents from the 
United Nations and well known scholars on RtoP such as Gareth Evans and Alex Bellamy. 
As these authors are advocates of RtoP, clearly critical voices are also included. The 
beginning of this chapters sets out some of the crucial ‘borders’ we deal with in this thesis, 
conceptually and literally, when dealing with the topic of refugees, state sovereignty and 
human rights.  
The second chapter more so brings a perspective from international law and sets out 
the legal framework of international protection.Here we will also distinguish the gaps in this 
framework. The latter part deals with the European Union and sets both RtoP and gaps in 
international protection in this regional perspective.  
For the third chapter more recent publications were consulted, as well as more critical 
ones, ie scholars who propose adjustments of existing concepts and frameworks which the 
international community has as parameters at present. Therefore, in this chapter more use is 
made of online resources and newer initiatives of open academic sources. 
The scope of this thesis is mainly from 1998 onwards, when RtoP and practices in the 
European Union towards the CEAS started to crystallize. However for the broader 
framework of the emergence of the human rights regime and tendencies in state responses to 
refugees, a broader picture is given, focusing on the 20th century. As RtoP and the European 
asylum framework are both regimes that are in ongoing development, also recent references 
will be used, until mid 2013.  
For the purpose of clarity a distinction will be made between the RtoP, when 
referring to the responsibility to protect as promulgated in international politics, i.e. referring 
to RtoP as endorsed in 2005 with the World Summit. When referring to a responsibility to 
protect more literally, or applied as a concept referring to the fact that states have committed 
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themselves to protect their populations, it will be fully written out, i.e. a responsibility to 
protect. 
The main question that this thesis will seek to answer is: to what extent can the 
Responsibility to Protect strengthen state commitment towards a collective responsibility to 
protect refugees? Founded on three sub questions an argument will be developed of how 
RtoP can be approached as a political instrument to remind states of the need to implement 
commitments towards vulnerable populations, particularly refugees for the purpose of this 
thesis. States have to live up to commitments made for bearing collective responsibility 
among the international community to bridge gaps in refugee protection which have emerged 
from practises that leave space between norms and their implementations, between the 
refugees’ rights and clear responsibilities of whom should guarantee those. Eventually 
collective sharing of responsibilities will result more beneficial for both the international 
community as the individual refugee in question than responsibility shifting such as at 
present results from some practices. Nevertheless, one has to be conscious that gaps will 
never disappear, but quick availability of solutions has to be provided and the individual 
concerned needs agency in this process, also in the seeking of the solution itself. 
There will be a division into three chapters, each chapter will address a part of the 
main question to eventually address the main question.  Each chapter will count with short 
chapter introduction and at the end of each chapter a chapter conclusion will sum up the 
main findings on the question that each respective chapter seeked to address. 
The first chapter will introduce some features of the main structure of the outlook of 
international politics and interstate relations in a system of legal equality and state 
sovereignty and the definition and role of the refugee and how progressive developments in 
the human rights regime are changing some of these features. Then the emergence of the 
RtoP doctrine will be explained and outlined. In the latter part of the first chapter a 
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comparison will be made to what extent the figure of the refugee is included in the RtoP 
framework, and to what extent RtoP in maybe a slightly different interpretation could be 
applied to the benefit of refugee protection and research into refugee protection. The first 
chapter will seek to answer the following question: To what extent can the responsibility to 
protect doctrine be applied to study state responses to refugees? 
The second chapter will build on the main foundations of the international refugee 
protection regime, the main guarantees and rights that play a role and the framework of 
interstate cooperation as envisioned in the Geneva Refugee Convention. Furthermore, 
insights will be given into state practises regarding (non)cooperation that affect refugee 
protection policies at different levels of analysis, the international, the regional and the statal, 
sometimes to the better or worse, situated in the latter part of this chapter in broader 
development in contemporary causes and consequences of forced displacement. The second 
chapter will seek to address the following question: To what extent are protection gaps 
attributable to a lack of a responsibility to protect refugee? 
The last chapter will go forward with concepts touched upon in the first two chapters, 
it will return to mention the dilemma that provided the impetus for the emergence of RtoP 
and then try to situate the strength of this doctrine in the sense that its presence in policy 
documents and international discussions cannot be denied but it remains a concept difficult 
to enforce its application and implementation. It may guide state practice, but not oblige 
states (yet) to act against their interests. Regarding this dilemma alternative interpretation of 
RtoP have been coined such as Responsibility While Protecting (RWP) or Responsibility to 
Prevent (RtoPrev), the question is what the value is of such initiatives, or are they redefining 
the problem without solving it., what is the role of prevention in preempting the situation 
where the international community is face with dilemmas hat are hard to respond to. The 
latter part will situate the debates on RtoP and refugee protection in the broader context of 
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the interconnectedness of different aspects that possibly lead to risk human rights guarantees. 
Solutions cannot be found in isolation and therefore nor RtoP nor refugee protection can be 
approached in isolation. The third chapter will seek to address the question: to what extent 
can RtoP strengthen the protection offered by states to refugees? 
The expected outcome based on the answers found to each question will form an 
argument of how aspects of RtoP can be regarded as an approach to research protection gaps 
in the international refugee regime, contradictions in state policies may be identified a well 
as good practices. However, the author is aware of how in social sciences and literary 
research clear cut answers are quite illusionary and will build on interpretations. Available 
time and linguistic limitations also always limit to a certain extent the opportunity to make 
valuable comparisons and gain insights from different contexts. 
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Chapter One - The responsibility to protect and the refugee 
Chapter Introduction 
In this part we will explore the relation between the individual refugee and the 
sovereign (nation) state, actors that simultaneously constitute and undermine each other’s 
meaning. We will shortly discuss the basic understanding of the sovereign state, and of the 
refugee, and then look into the tension between the territorially bound sovereign state and 
the progressive development of universal, thus cross border, human rights. On the one hand 
the border becomes more transparent and blurred, but meanwhile remains crucial to the 
refugee and the sovereign state. 
Subsequently we will discuss the emergence of the concept of Responsibility to 
Protect (RtoP), a concept that emerged in the late 1990s and was adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in 2005, which draws upon this tension that arises when a sovereign state is 
unwilling or unable to halt massive human rights violations on its territory, triggering a 
prospective duty for the international community to act.   
In the latter part, it will be tried to connect the RtoP framework to the plight of 
refugees. First will be considered to what extent refugees so far have actually been included 
in the mainstream RtoP framework. Then an understanding of RtoP as a concept will be 
developed, bringing it down to the most basic underpinnings, in order to devise a research 
framework to build on in the following chapters. The answer which we will seek to answer 
in this chapter is the following: To what extent can the responsibility to protect doctrine be 
applied to study state responses to refugees? 
 
 
 
13 
 
A) The refugee in a society of sovereign states 
 
1. The sovereign state 
 
The State, defined through territory, population and administration is what captures 
our political imagination (BIGO and GUILD, 2005:49). If we compare this characterisation 
with the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the definition of rights and duties of states, we see 
how statehood involves a permanent population and besides territory and an administration, 
also adds the ability to enter into relations with other states. Building upon this last aspect, in 
interstate relations states are considered equal (legal) sovereigns. When entering into 
relations with another state, this is a sign of reciprocal recognition of such sovereignty 
(WHEELER, 2000:22). State sovereignty in turn refers to the right enjoyed by states to 
territorial integrity, political independence and non-intervention (BELLAMY, 2009:8). State 
sovereignty can be understood as a principle (GOODWIN GILL, 2007:2), as a norm 
(EVANS, 2008), or as a concept. 
The reciprocal recognition of sovereignty between states has been labeled as a basic 
rule for coexistence (BULL, 2002:35). Depending on one’s take on interstate relations, it can 
also be said that such coexistence is founded upon (unequal) military power, or (limited, 
economic) cooperation, or shared understandings of some sense of community of states. 
These underpinnings have repercussions for the prospects of interstate cooperation and 
compliance with negative (refraining from) and positive (create) state duties, which in turn 
affects the prospects for international order and justice, or security and peace. 
An important aspect of authority in statehood is the credible claim to monopoly over 
the legitimate use of violence within the territory of the state, which equals the capacity of 
the state to determine and enforce its internal order. National order in turn can also be 
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understood as sovereignty (GUILD, 2009:177). In a Hobbesian society, order equals security 
and the individual person sacrifices its natural freedom in return for such security as given 
by the sovereign. The sovereign was entitled to take whatever means necessary to preserve 
the peace (BELLAMY and REIKE, 2010:271). Therefore, sovereignty includes the capacity 
to decide on the state of exception that gives legitimacy to the norm (BELLAMY and 
REIKE. 2010:306).  
The outer limits of the power of a sovereign state over a population on a specific 
territory are its borders (BIGO and GUILD, 2005:54). It is taken for granted that the state 
has the right to control these borders, to monopolize the regulation of movement of people, 
opposed and superior to the right of the individual to move freely. In this process citizens 
and foreigners are differentiated (BIGO and GUILD, 2005: 49). The monopolization process 
by states of legitimizing movement is crucial to comprehend how modern states actually 
work (BIGO and GUILD, 2005: 53).  
The emergence of the modern European state system as we know is often traced back 
to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 (BETTS, 2011:6). Nevertheless, it has been argued that 
the idea of effective enforcement and control of the national state since that point in history 
is only a suitable fiction for IR theory specialists. Effective border control has only appeared 
in the nineteenth century (BIGO and GUILD, 2005:55). The state was a territorial state 
before being a population state (BIGO and GUILD, 2005:54). What is meant here is how 
states increasingly define themselves not through defending the physical state borders, but 
rather by controlling their populations, its insiders and outsiders, a process that becomes 
detached from the actual territory, and borders, of the state.   
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2. The refugee 
The key legal definition of a person considered to be a refugee is to be found in the 
1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and its 1967 Protocol (from 
now on, Refugee Convention). The term ‘refugee’ applies to any person who: “owing to a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality or 
habitual residence, and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself to the 
protection of that country. It is clear that being outside of one’s country of nationality, or 
habitual residence, in other words, the crossing of an internationally recognized state border, 
is a crucial component of this definition.  
In crossing such a frontier, the individual fleeing persecution becomes an 
international concern (HADDAD, 2003:311). The movement represents an example of 
failure by the state of origin, forsaking on protection of this person. The refugee is the 
consequence of an incomplete monopoly on violence, evidenced by insufficient protection, 
in the state of origin. The refugee embodies this lack of order, and is therefore sometimes 
accused of possibly exporting the disorder from one state to another, creating potential 
problems for other states. Particularly in case of moving in larger numbers, these persons are 
seen as representing a possible threat to international order, due to a destabilizing effect on 
the state system (HADDAD, 2003:311). The situation is slightly different in the case of 
persecution by the state, where precisely a strong monopoly on violence is what creates fear, 
and flight. 
Refugees have been described as being the side-effect of the creation (and 
consolidation) of separate sovereign states (HADDAD, 2003:297). Processes of inclusion 
and exclusion are important in the formation of solid nation states, their borders are 
designated lines with people either belonging on one side or the other. The system of modern 
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states, the Westphalian system as mentioned before, builds upon the assumptions that every 
individual would be assigned to a territory, a state, and protected as a citizen (HADDAD, 
2003:297). The refugee however, can be seen as a victim of exclusion in the state of origin, 
and crossing the border does not automatically lead to inclusion on the other side. The border 
has a double meaning for the refugee, it can guarantee safety, but when access is denied, the 
border becomes an obstacle. 
Upon crossing the border an individual makes use of its human rights of freedom of 
movement; the right to leave any country, including its own; and furthermore; the right to 
seek asylum. When claiming the need for asylum, the individual calls upon a need for 
international protection and international obligations of states, either by treaty or 
international customary law are triggered.. Particularly, we have to make reference to the 
principle of non-refoulement, which means that an individual cannot be returned to a place 
where there is reasonable doubt that his life or dignity might be at stake. 
Convention obligations regarding the treatment of refugees ultimately fall upon 
states, or representing these states, upon the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR). The international refugee regime represents the set of norms, rules, 
principles and decision-making procedures that regulate states’ responses to refugees. It 
compromises two main norms: asylum and burden sharing (HURRELL, 2011:56-57). The 
refugee regime was envisioned to ensure that all states would make a collective contribution 
to overcoming a shared humanitarian and political problem, initially in the aftermath of 
World War II. 
The concept of the refugee since its inception has been formalised and normalized 
through regime activities by intergovernmental activity, depending on agreement and co-
operation (HADDAD, 2003:316). The regime is founded upon the underlying concern with 
international order, i.e. the individual that has lost connection with territory has to be 
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reterritorialised, be reintegrated into order. On the other hand there is the concern with 
justice, i.e. human rights (BETTS, 2011:8).  
Nonetheless, the right of states to grant asylum takes precedence over any right of the 
individual to be granted asylum. Sovereignty remains a reciprocal relationship between 
states as states (HADDAD, 2003:320). The many clear examples of protection gaps in the 
refugee regime show this. With gaps are meant the weaknesses in the present day refugee 
regime that is supposed to offer solutions to the situation of the uprooted. Therefore, 
refugees have been defined as victims of the international system made up of modern states 
that brings them into being and then fails to take responsibility for them, as a consequence 
they fall into the gaps and spaces between states, between borders, outside the normal 
citizen-state-territory hierarchy (HADDAD, 2003: 297).  
 
3. The dilemma of the state and the human rights of the refugee 
 
The state and the refugee are mutually constituted (BETTS, 2011:15). They are 
concepts that bring each other into being and at once they challenge each other. Controlling 
territory and population movement is part of what defines our historical notion of the 
sovereign state. The state is connected to a designated territory, while the refugee is a person 
who has de facto lost its connection to a territory, or has ceased to belong to a political 
community.1The person fleeing persecution evidences a lack of protection by the home state, 
creating the need to cross the state border to be eligible for international protection. It also 
shows of how some persons are excluded from their home societies due to different race, 
1 De jure, many refugees are still connected to a territory, because of their nationality.  Such nationality 
becomes ineffective however if the person cannot count with protection by his state. Therefore, refugees at 
times are also called de facto stateless persons. 
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ethnicity, nationality, political opinion or social membership. On the flip side, the granting of 
asylum is again a demonstration of state sovereignty by the host state.   
However, state sovereignty is not a physical object that we can touch, feel or 
measure. It is conjured into existence by intersubjective meanings (WHEELER, 2000:22). It 
is not something permanent or static, but changes with history and varying practices 
(HADDAD, 2003:317). Former Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros 
Ghali wrote in his 1992 Agenda for Peace: “The theory of sovereignty never matched 
reality” (WEISS, 2007:12). Furthermore, International Relations scholar Stephen Krasner 
called sovereignty ‘organized hypocrisy’ referring to the fact that the common ignorance or 
violation of Westphalian sovereignty has always been a fact (WEISS, 2007: 12). While often 
is said how (maybe rather recent) processes of globalisation has been responsible for the 
erosion of sovereignty, in the Westphalian system, states never could completely be immune 
for what was happening in neighboring states and the rest of the world and interference has 
been a fact, either motivated by colonial conquest, or ‘spillover’ of for example epidemics of 
sicknesses. For now we just have to keep in mind that if we understand state sovereignty as a 
concept, it can be reconceptualised. 
In more general terms population movement has become a very different political 
problem in the second half of the twentieth century. This is due to the changing notion of 
political community and the broader transformation of the role of the state. Legitimacy of 
governments has become to depend on the capacity to meet a vastly increased range of 
needs, claims and demands. This development has sharpened questions of what is owed to 
self and others (HURRELL, 2011:91). It is claimed that the concept of a state defined as: 
having some success of the monopoly of violence upon a population on a defined territory, is 
in danger. Practices of control persist, but professionals of politics cannot implement what 
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they pretend, namely, controlling the movement of persons (BIGO and GUILD, 2005:90-
91). 
Also within the refugee regime, state responses to refugee situations, changes took 
place. In the 1970’s the existence of refugees became to be understood as potentially a 
permanent problem, rather than a purely post Second World War consequence. It turned out 
how many refugees did not eventually repatriate to their countries of origin, as was 
envisioned, but seeked local integration into their host societies. From this development 
emerged the approach that solutions to refugee situations were rather to be found outside 
states, i.e. in the international community, and refugee protection became closely connected 
to growing field of human rights legislation and the emerging principle of individual rights 
(HADDAD, 2003:319).  
The decade of the 1990s drew attention of the international community to causes and 
consequences of internal armed conflict rather than purely intrastate conflict, and to the role 
of nonstate actors in such conflicts (GOODWIN GILL and MCADAM, 2007:3). The state 
border no longer was sufficient to keep scrutiny from the international community out, due 
to the progressive development of universal human rights across borders and the 
understanding that respect for these are in the interest of the whole of international society.  
Human rights guarantees and compliance are intrinsically inked to refugee flows and 
displacement. Today’s human rights abuses are tomorrow’s refugee movements (UNHCR, 
1995:57). Or the other way around: refugees are prima facie evidence of human rights 
violations and vulnerability (BETTS, 2011:1). The human rights crises of the 1990s, showed 
flaws in terms of inaction on part of the international community, just as well as there were 
flaws when action was undertaken to halt these violations.  
To any extent, the right to seek asylum from persecution or any other right that falls 
upon the refugee, is no substitute for the fullest protection of human rights at home 
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(GOODWIN GILL and MCADAM, 2007:4). The vulnerability of forcibly displaced persons 
not able to leave their home state gained recognition over the 1990s. Internally displaced 
persons (IDP’s) find themselves in refugee like situations, thus they have left their home 
because of a lack of protection, but these persons have not crossed an international border.  
 Therefore, they still seek protection in the same state where they suffered the initial 
fear or persecution, and the same state that was unable or unwilling to protect the individual. 
If an inability to protect is the case, aiding displaced populations only adds even more strain 
on limited statal resources. If the state is unwilling or even itself persecuting the individual, 
the person’s life is at clear risk. Such a situation would be considered an internal matter of 
sovereign states, where other states shall not interfere. However, increasingly these situations 
have become an international concern. Insights regarding the vulnerability of IDP’s resulted 
in the conceptualizing of (state) sovereignty as a responsibility. Sovereignty becomes linked 
to legitimacy, which involves respect for the basic human rights of a state’s population.  
From the aftermath of the 1990’s and the understanding that non-interference in 
internal affairs of a state cannot be a permissive condition for a state to commit massive 
human rights violations on its territory, nor can the international community use it as an 
excuse to turn its back on such situations when occurring, emerged the concept of the 
responsibility to protect (RtoP). RtoP as envisaged in the 2005 Outcome Document of the 
World Summit mainly reconfirms existing obligations of states towards their populations. 
Most importantly however, it also seeks to strengthen the commitment of the international 
community, either by consensual or by non-consensual measures to halt situations where 
mass atrocities are occurring, or prevent them before occurring. 
Nonetheless, even if circumstances, the causes and consequences of refugee flows 
might have altered, as have some of the solutions and measures taken by states, the essential 
ontology of the refugee, and the preferred solution of reterritorialization has not changed. 
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The advent of some future global society where the borders of the individual sovereign state 
are not longer significant is a possibility, but for now not a reality (HADDAD, 2003:321). 
Non-statist possibilities of solving the refugee “problem” are inconceivable in a world of 
sovereign states, just as the refugee is inconceivable outside a world of sovereign states 
(HADDAD, 2003:321). Therefore, for the time being, we have to work within existing 
frameworks. Even if is argued that states still prefer the solution of reterritorialization, it is 
important to note that precisely because refugees are supposed to fall into the gaps as 
mentioned before, the reterritorialization process at times takes a very long time, no to say 
years, if it will take place at all. If the individual refugee does not belong to any state, it may 
be tempting for states to forsake on taking responsibility for this person. Even more so, we 
have seen how states have a legal obligation to support refugees on their own territory, they 
have no legal obligation to support refugees on the territory of other states (BETTS, 
2011:19).  
The recognition that refugee flows might be a permanent phenomenon in 
International relations between states unfortunately was not accompanied by more readily 
available solutions. On the contrary, increasingly attention is drawn to the ways and means 
of preventing refugee from arriving at a state’s borders, or from even leaving their state or 
region of origin. Many initiatives for more international cooperation on providing solution 
for refugees have met with the absence of will, or inability and therefore, other ways of 
regulating people movements have taken prevalence (GOODWIN GILL and McADAM, 
2007:3). These other ways refer to the policing of borders. Although we have become 
accustomed such control, some authors state how states do not have the right, but simply the 
habit to control population movements. Freedom of movement should be the norm and 
control the exception (BIGO and GUILD, 2005:57). 
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Closer convergence between the refugee regime and the international human rights 
regime on the one hand might strengthen visibility of the vulnerable position of certain 
populations before flight, and thus, before crossing the border, and thus before becoming 
refugees, or maybe during flight. Increased visibility would have to equal more measures by 
the home state to safeguard protection, assisted by the international community. Stronger 
human rights protection at home, might lessen the need for a person to take lengthy and 
dangerous journeys crossing international borders, to claim its need for international 
protection in him being a refugee. Nevertheless, a common and still persistent problem of the 
human rights regime is the gap between theory and practice and the difficulties of 
guaranteeing compliance if states are unwilling or unable. The right to have (human) rights 
still depends on statal guarantees. Therefore, we need to recognize how for some persons 
access to international protection is crucial, and how the well established institution of 
asylum must not be undermined by blurring the distinctions between different regimes. 
However, if we return to the emergence of the before mentioned RtoP concept, it 
becomes clear that there is an ever stronger recognition that no longer we can turn away 
from massive human rights violations, regardless of whether they have come to our borders 
as refugees or are still within their home states. As a concept, RtoP tries to allocate 
responsibility for preventing and halting mass atrocities; to strengthen accountability in the 
international affairs of states, for states towards their populations and towards other states. It 
seeks to create prospects for collective action and shared responsibilities by states as part of 
the international community. To some extent however, the international community still 
needs to define what protection involves. It has been argued that the manner in which states 
have collectively responded to refugees, serves as a barometer of wider change in the state 
system (BETTS, 2011:6).  
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For the purpose of this thesis we will use an understanding of the international 
community as forming an international society of states.  An international society approach 
stresses the multiple roles played by norms, rules, institutions in international life. These 
serve as the parameters within individual actors can pursue their own interests (HURRELL, 
2011:87). Interests and identities of actors are not granted and it is important to understand 
the processes by which they change and originate (FINNEMORE and SIKKINK, 2001:394). 
Norms and rules help to define who can act and through what forms of social and political 
action (HURRELL, 2011: 88).  
For the study of ideas, it is argued how one should to look at their emergence, how 
they become institutionalized and why they matter in any particular circumstance. Such a 
vision goes against the contention that ideas are imposed by those with political, economic, 
military power, but rather involve processes of learning (FINNEMORE and SIKKINK, 
2001:405). A principled idea, the believe of an individual about what is right and wrong, 
may become a norm,  and create collective expectations about proper behavior for a given 
identity (RISSE and SIKKINK, 1999:7). An interesting contention is that international 
organizations can ‘teach’ states new forms of behavior (FINNEMORE and SIKKINK, 2001: 
401). 
We will now seek for a better understanding of the emergence and institutionalization 
of the idea of a collective responsibility to protect persons from harm and particularly of 
RtoP, what I have chosen to label a concept and apply it as such. Then we will see to what 
extent refugees are actually included in the main interpretation of RtoP. In the final part we 
will see how RtoP could be used to address refugee situations, where we will see how the 
concept of RtoP can be understood as a political tool to seek commitment by states to fulfil 
their existing obligations towards their populations, including refugees and for commitment 
by other states to assist and encourage a state in fulfilling these obligations, including 
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cooperation on finding durable solutions for refugees, i.e. the reterritorialization and 
financial support. 
B) The Responsibility to Protect 
1. Antecedents 
In the before going we have set out the debate surrounding the contention that the 
principle of non-interference in internal affairs of sovereign states at times may yield to the 
safeguarding of universal human rights. With the ending of the Cold War, armed conflicts 
became a concern of their own, no longer placed within the greater political power 
dynamics. The same accounted for action taken on behalf of the international community in 
instances of conflict, no longer had actions to be balanced with the broader divisions. Human 
rights gained stronger presence on the international political agenda. The tension between 
the protection of human rights and the concept of the sovereign state in the international 
system can be explained as the sovereign state being concerned with the protection of its 
borders, and thus its internal jurisdiction, while on the other hand, the rules making up the 
protection regime, i.e. the human rights regime, are fundamentally concerned with protecting 
not state borders but individuals (WELSH and BANDA, 2010:216).   
When sovereign states are either unwilling or unable to protect the fundamental 
freedoms of their citizens, sovereignty and human rights come into conflict (BELLAMY, 
2009:8). This tension in interstate relations between privileging either the protection of 
borders or of individuals can be explained by different understandings of order and justice in 
world politics and brings up the question whether sovereignty, and the basic order it brings 
to world politics, should be privileged over the rights of individuals (BELLAMY, 2009: 10).   
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Justice and order are two values to which international conduct can be shaped. By 
international order is meant a pattern or disposition of international activity that sustains 
those goals of the society of states that are elementary, primary, or universal (BULL, 
2002:16). In the 1970’s International Relations scholar Hedley Bull argued how the 
framework of international order is inhospitable to demands for human justice. He stated: “If 
the priorities at the UN would be reversed while there is no agreement upon what human 
rights are, or in what hierarchy of arrangement they should be placed, the result would be to 
undermine international order and thus coexistence” (BULL, 2002:85). Furthermore he 
stated: “Justice is realizable only in a context of order” (BULL, 2002:83). Such an argument 
has become criticised however, the decade of the 1990s arguably have shown how “the norm 
of nonintervention has softened and that of human rights has hardened” referring to the 
possibility of a new hierarchy between these norms (WEISS, 2007:18).  
Nevertheless, if a reversing of hierarchy has come about, this came at great costs. 
Particularly cooperation through the UN and the balancing of order and justice has been 
difficult when faced with crisis. Apologies expressed by the UN, after the Rwandan 
Genocide were a tacit acknowledgement of how this organization had forfeited on its 
responsibilities (quote). The late 1999s and the NATO campaign in Kosovo renewed the 
debate on the legitimacy of humanitarian military intervention. These cases strengthened the 
awareness of the impact on civilians of conflict. Increased participation of nonstate actors 
blurs the lines between civilian targets and combatants, and according to some, therefore 
increased the number of victims. The cases of Bosnia and Kosovo brought the recognition 
that forced displacement of populations was not only a form of collateral damage, but 
actually applied as instrument of war (BETTS, 2011:15).  
In 1999 Kofi Annan in his function as Secretary General of the UN proclaimed his 
reading of two conceptions of sovereignty: the traditional one, which involves a people’s 
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right to self determination,2and a second one, sovereignty as responsibility, which considers 
sovereignty only as legitimate on the condition of fulfillment of state responsibilities towards 
its population and builds forth on the ‘sovereignty as a responsibility’ as coined by Sudanese 
diplomat Francis Deng expressing his concern with the vulnerability of IDP’s. Annan 
pointed out how the UN Charter was devised to protect individual human beings, not to 
protect those who abuse them (BELLAMY, 2009:17-19).  If a state does not live up to its 
responsibilities as a sovereign, that sovereignty might be suspended and therefore 
accompanying corollaries such as the principle of nonintervention becomes suspended too, 
or may be overruled.  
Annan made a call upon the international community to unravel means of aligning 
sovereignty and responsibility. In 2001 this resulted in the creation of a report by the 
International Commission on State Sovereignty (ICISS) and the coining of the phrase: the 
responsibility to protect, reflecting the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to 
protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe (…) and if they are unable or unwilling 
to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states (ICISS, 
2001:VIII). The report challenges what it calls, the intervention dilemma of the 1990s, and 
recognizes how new realities and challenges have emerged since the founding of the UN, as 
have likewise expectations for collective action and new standards of conduct in national and 
international affairs (ICISS, 2001:1-3). In this report different elements of RtoP were 
distinguished, which are: prevention, reaction and rebuilding. Actions within each category 
were to be applied simultaneously, not sequenced.  
The ICISS report has been championed and criticized. On the one hand it represented 
an important brick stone in placing the understanding of such a thing as a responsibility to 
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protect populations on the international agenda, as did it coin this term which now seems 
there to stay.  On the other hand, his report has been criticised because it overly focuses on 
the principle of non-intervention, and does not address on what grounds there is a 
prospective international responsibility to protect, for example deriving from our common 
humanity (WELSH and BANDA, 2010:217).  Furthermore, the report is lacking in terms of 
proposals, sanctions and innovation by taking in many of the already developed responses in 
broader conflict studies (HUISINGH, 2013:15). 
The presentation of ICISS the report in 2001 was overshadowed by the events of 9/11 
and the implications for international politics. Due to the proclaimed War on Terror, the 
responsibility to protect lost momentum (HUISINGH, 2013:). Nevertheless, the term RtoP 
and the basic preoccupations and urge for solutions behind the idea gained ground and 
support. At the 2005 World Summit, the UN General Assembly unambiguously recognized a 
collective international responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity (BARBOUR and GORLICK, 2008:1). The 
respective articles state the following: 
 
“138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This 
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, 
through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act 
in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage 
and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in 
establishing an early warning capability. 
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“139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, 
in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this 
context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, 
through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, 
on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as 
appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are 
manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly 
to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, 
bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to 
commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to 
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and 
conflicts break out. 
 
“140. We fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General 
on the Prevention of Genocide.” 
(A/63/677, 2009:4) 
 
This version of RtoP was narrowed down from the one envisioned by the ICISS and 
has therefore been labeled RtoP lite. Rather than an obligation to act in case of massive 
human rights violations, the international community pledged to stand ready to react, and 
29 
 
furthermore, it was established that action has to be authorized by Security Council 
resolutions. On the other hand, this tying to the UN system, and to particular cases and 
defined crimes such as the four mentioned, bears the strength to transform moral 
commitments into political ones.  
The World Summit interpretation of RtoP has been reaffirmed by the UN Security 
Council at various instances in resolutions. Explicit references to the responsibility to protect 
appear in the UNSC resolutions on Libya (in UNSC res 1970 and 1973) and Ivory Coast 
(UNSC res 1975) (HUISINGH, 2013:4). In practice however, some opportunities have been 
missed to actually live up to this commitment. Missed opportunities between 2007 and 2009 
include Kenya, Darfur, Burma, DRC, Somalia, Sri Lanka. 
The situation as presented in Libya and Syria represent important test cases for the 
duress of responsibility to protect. With regard to the upheaval in these states it has been 
concluded that the responses by the international community have been conditioned in their 
scope and nature and the institutions involved by considerations of international politics and 
geopolitics, than by the severeness of the crimes being committed against the civilian 
population (MARRERO ROCHA, 2013:130). This could be interpreted as undermining the 
RtoP principle itself, states moulding the concept to their own interests, intervention in 
Libya, political solution in Syria.  
A still weak duty to protect is demonstrated by the inaction regarding Syria. On the 
other hand, one could also understand the different stance of the international community 
towards these situations as evidence of the importance given to context and the need to treat 
different situations distinctly, on a case-by-case basis. Intervention is not necessarily the best 
solution, or even a solution. RtoP may be considered a universal principle, but for its 
application institutional and cultural differences have to be respected (MARRERO ROCHA, 
2013:141-142). Seen in this light the absence of application may also be application of RtoP. 
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Nevertheless, it is pertinent to take note that while the number of instances rises in 
which the application of R2P would be appropriate, the greater the uncertainty about its 
nature and content becomes (MARRERO ROCHA, 2013:145). So let us see what is this 
exact nature and scope of RtoP? 
2. Characteristics 
New ideas often emerge in response to crises, and therefore make old ideas lose 
influence. Regarding the content of new models that are adopted, what makes an idea 
persuasive is the way the idea relates to the economic and political problems of the day 
(FINNEMORE and SIKKINK, 2001:406). The challenge therefore, is to seek how an RtoP 
framework, as an idea, would respond to the current challenges faced by the international 
community. Is it so controversial, because it proposes a new model and will it make old 
ideas lose influence?  
We have seen that sovereignty as an ordering principle in International Relations is 
not becoming less relevant (WEISS, 2007:22). Nevertheless, there are already widely 
accepted limits on state sovereignty, flowing forth from the UN Charter, international 
customary law and treaty obligations (WEISS, 2007:16-17). In this sense RtoP is not 
necessarily an assault on the current state of affairs in the relations between states. 
Furthermore, there is no intrinsic competition between sovereignty and collective protection 
of human rights, because sovereignty can exist without the nonintervention rule 
(BELLAMY, 2009:12). As we have seen above, state sovereignty could be reconceptualised, 
without undermining the whole of international order. 
RtoP does not create new legal duties, but is more so to be understood as a political 
commitment to implement existing ones, to act upon shared moral beliefs (BELLAMY and 
REIKE, 2010:267). The concept of RtoP, as set out in the World Summit Outcome report 
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rests on three equally important and no sequential ‘pillars’. First, there is the responsibility 
of a state to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity, and from their incitement.  Second, there is the international community’s 
duty to assist the state to fulfill its responsibility to protect. Third, the international 
community has a responsibility to take timely and decisive action, through peaceful and 
humanitarian means and, if that fails, other more forceful means, in a manner consistent with 
Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter in situations where a state has manifestly failed 
to protect its population from the four crimes (BELLAMY and REIKE, 2010:270).3 
Many authors coincide that RtoP actually is a way to reaffirm existing commitments, 
particularly if making reference to the first pillar. Nevertheless, the possibility of a 
responsibility of the international community towards populations in other states, is a far less 
established doctrine (BELLAMY and REIKE, 2010: 267). States have legal obligations to 
protect endangered civilians, while the international community’s responsibility is more of a 
moral nature (BANDA, 2010:218). Nevertheless, legal responsibilities falling upon the 
international community do exist, for example in international humanitarian law, and are 
evolving, particularly in relation to genocide and war crimes, and to a lesser extent regarding 
crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing (BELLAMY and REIKE, 2010:275-276).  
The controversy around RtoP has most strongly focused on the third pillar, either a 
right/responsibility/obligation for the international community to intervene by economic, 
diplomatic or military sanctions and measures in the internal affairs of a state to halt massive 
human rights violations. This debate builds forth on the legacy of debates surrounding the 
legitimacy of (humanitarian) intervention, and considerations of what constitutes a just war. 
On the one hand, the fact that authorization for such coercive measures has to be given by 
the UN Security Council, as established in the World Summit Document, is supposed to give 
3 Divisions into pillars are usually devised to indicate how all pillars are necessary at the same time in order to 
maintain the edifice, in this case of RtoP. 
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legitimacy to the measures taken. On the other hand, the legitimacy of the UN Security 
Council itself is under scrutiny for more than one reason.  
A well known difficulty is the risk of deadlock in its deliberations because of the veto 
power of 5 of the permanent members. Nevertheless, even if authorization takes place 
through the UN system, this still does not guarantee the eventual fulfillment of the executive 
action (WELSH and BANDA, 2010:225). Any resolution in turn also has to be executed, 
which in turn asks for financial, material and physical commitment of states. 
Opposite to concerns of those who believe RtoP is all about humanitarian 
intervention, are those who argue that it is about prevention and protection (BELLAMY, 
2009:33). The latter align with some thoughts as spelled out in the ICISS report: “Prevention 
is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect” (ICISS, 2001:XI). 
We will now explore on a deeper level the controversy surrounding RtoP. 
 
3. Controversy  
The responsibility to protect nowadays is often described as being a principle 
(BELLAMY and REIKE, 2010:267). Gareth Evans, co-chair of the ICISS, affirms the RtoP 
principle as a new international (emerging) norm, well on its way to becoming a rule of 
customary international law (EVANS, 2008:286). At times RtoP is labeled a ‘concept’ as 
said by Edward C. Luck, the former Special Advisor to the Secretary General on RtoP: “The 
Responsibility to Protect is a concept in search of a definition, in search of consensus.” 
(BARBOUR and GORLICK, 2008:5). Often it is also written responsibility to protect, 
without further qualifications.  
Either way, the debate regarding RtoP holds strong,  not just on how to qualify this 
policy, but more so on its substance. For some RtoP either does not go far enough, for others 
it goes too far, is useless, or just nothing new. The narrow interpretation of RtoP as set out in 
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the World Summit Outcome document has been most commonly endorsed because it tries to 
draw the attention away from the discussion on a right of states to intervene in other states, 
rather to give prominence to the persons that are actually in need of protection. Military 
interventions over the past two decades have been controversial both when they happened 
and when they have failed to happen (ICISS, 2001:85). Debating RtoP was a chance for the 
international community to take deliberations away from the hardened debate on 
humanitarian intervention, which was a legacy of the nineties.  
Nonetheless, much of the initial criticism on RtoP kept emphasizing precisely the 
third pillar and the possibility of (humanitarian) intervention. RtoP would be an open 
invitation for intervention by the powerful states against the weaker states, under the banner 
of humanitarian intervention but actually willing to serve their own interests. RtoP would 
erode sovereignty, particularly a concern to countries that are former colonies and seeked to 
defend their hard gained independence (EVANS, 2008:21). Without a further elaboration on 
the legal framework and operational application, the R2P concept can be interpreted in many 
ways to fit any political agenda (BARBOUR and GORLICK, 2008:13).  
Not only is this a very limited take on what RtoP involves, it also contradicts the 
exact underpinnings from which the concept emerged, i.e. the problem of partial action, or 
inaction by the international community when confronted with mass atrocities. Returning to 
the origins of the concept, it can well be argued how it was intended to avoid inaction by the 
international community when massive human rights violations are occurring (WELSH and 
BANDA, 2010:215). The problem was not too many interventions, but too less commitment. 
RtoP is envisioned to strengthen state sovereignty. Compliance with the RtoP framework 
contributes to a state’s legitimacy, and will lessen the need for foreign intrusion, or 
intervention, by other states ((A/63/677, 2009:6). Eventually, the overall aim of RtoP is to 
reduce the frequency with which the protection of civilians is dependent on nonconsensual 
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force by outsiders, as force is a very unreliable means of human rights protection 
(BELLAMY, 2009:). Therefore, human rights interventions are justified only when human 
life is at risk, thus only in strictly defined cases of necessity (IGNATIEFF, 2001:18). 
There is nothing in the RtoP principle that expands the rights of states to interfere 
coercively in the domestic affairs of other states. The question should be whether the 
principle creates a legal duty for states to take coercive measures in cases of massive human 
rights violations (BELLAMY and REIKE, 2010:282). Such a development fits within 
emerging trends spearheaded by the International Law Commission and the International 
Court of Justice which may see the evolution of a legal duty to respond decisively to 
genocide and mass atrocities that inheres on member states in general and the UN Security 
Council in particular (BELLAMY and REIKE, 2010:286) Some authors connect such a duty 
to protect, to moral considerations, deriving from common humanity. Seen in this light this 
duty may be even that strong to overrule the right of other states to stay disengaged (WELSH 
and BANDA, 2010: 218).  
Along these lines precisely it is argued how the RtoP lite version, and thus the 
absence of a real duty to protect, does not go far enough in creating real commitments. It is 
an imperfect duty to protect as it does not specify exactly who is responsible to take 
measures and what kind of measures would be required in terms of action. These ambiguities 
limit its capacity to entrench new obligations for states in terms of protection (WELSH and 
BANDA, 2010:214).  
Principles, norms and rules of customary law reflect different degrees of legal standing in 
international relations between states and non-state actors, as well as different levels of 
support and in turn, compliance in practice. Endorsement of General Assembly resolutions 
may provide evidence of customary international law when accompanied by general practice 
and opinion juris, but they cannot create new law in themselves (BELLAMY and REIKE, 
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2010:268). Once political commitments would become legal ones, chances become greater 
to hold one responsible for his actions, or in this case, inaction and therefore the international 
community has been cautious to consider RtoP as a legal norm.  
The heterogeneity in interpretation and enforcement of RtoP makes that it changes 
little in the behaviour of states compared to other periods in history (MARRERO ROCHA, 
2013:145). The application of RtoP in practice has been limited, inconsistent, and in the few 
instances that it has been applied, incomplete (MOONEY, 2010:77).  
The question is also, who is exactly the international community, the sum of all 
individual states, or the UN as its representative of the collective? (BARBOUR and 
GORLICK, 2008:19).  
The unallocated responsibility to protect rather encourages inaction on part of other 
states than rampant interventionism (WELSH and BANDA, 2010:219-222). When it is not 
clear who should act, and what the actor should have done, it becomes difficult to hold 
anyone responsible for staying disengaged. Even when it is argued that it is not the nature of 
responsibility that changes, but the means (DAVIES, 2010: 5). We have to remember, that at 
present time, the means, in other words, the money and material often are lacking in terms of 
putting into practice the international community’s political, or even moral, commitments. 
The international community often promotes universal values, but chooses risk averse means 
to defend them (IGNATIEFF, 2001:43). 
RtoP, as set out in the World Summit Outcome Document, has been qualified as an 
instance of soft law, which means that it can be accepted as an authoritative interpretation of 
the UN Charter ‘s provisions on sovereignty, human rights, and the use of force, but so far 
cannot bind unwilling states to norms to which they have never consented (WELSH and 
BANDA,2010:230). Soft law can signal the direction of future legal developments, act as a 
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precursor to binding treaties, or harden into custom. This last aspect is why some states 
prefer to deny the existence of soft law (WELSH and BANDA, 2010). 
Regardless of a wide array of controversy and debate surrounding many aspects, 
namely status, scope and the attribution of RtoP, there is little doubt that RtoP has become a 
central piece of the vocabulary used by members of international society in debating the 
appropriateness of an international response to humanitarian crises. It can be said that it has 
become a social fact (WELSH and BANDA, 2010:231). Social facts things such as money, 
sovereignty, and rights, which have no material reality but exist only because people 
collectively believe they exist and act accordingly. Understanding how these social facts 
change and the way these influence politics is the major concern of constructivist paradigm 
within International Relations studies (FINNEMORE, 2001:393). Therefore, the concepts of 
state sovereignty, international law, or war are not given by power politics, such as scholars 
within the realist paradigm of International Relations studies would argue, but rather are 
founded on shared and historically grounded understandings, and how these shape the nature 
of the game of interstate relations, and how this has changed and evolved (HURRELL, 
2011:87). 
The purpose of the responsibility to protect is not to impose a legal doctrine, or to 
justify a right to intervene, but to commit states to no longer pursue internal power and 
authority through practices of violence and exclusion. The essential is to align sovereign 
statehood with responsibility to safeguard the rights and needs of all citizens (DAVIES, 
2011:11).  
The ICISS report divided prevention efforts into the following elements: early 
warning, root cause prevention efforts (including addressing political, economic, military 
and legal needs) and direct prevention measures. Prevention would be focused on internal 
conflict, or more broadly, unrest. Support in the area of prevention can come in the form of 
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development assistance and assistance to local efforts to advance good governance, the rule 
of law and human rights, and mediation. Such an international commitment to supporting 
local initiatives arguably would add credibility to broader international efforts in terms of 
advancing human rights (ICISS, 2001:19-23). It has been argued however, how in terms of 
prevention, the international community rarely commits resources to a problem before 
violence breaks out (IGNATIEFF, 2001:45).  
We have mentioned before how RtoP can understood as being about prevention and 
protection. Prevention involves creating conditions that safeguard against any possible 
commitment of human rights violations. Protection involves to be safe from human rights 
violations. Furthermore, the idea underlying RtoP is to support and assist states in fulfilling 
such an obligation. Existing obligations in international protection come into play. Therefore 
we deal with the prevention of creation of refugees in the first place, and also, with 
strengthening the capacities of states to receive and host refugees, i.e. provide protection. In 
achieving protection and prevention more solidarity and burden sharing is needed. The 
current framework of responses to refugee situations evidence many gaps or weaknesses.  
Thus, RtoP can be understood as a catalyst for reform and innovation to the 
international architecture for protection (WELSH and BANDA, 2010:215). In any sense, the 
need for collective responsibility and cooperation is only more emphasized and more 
legitimate because of the gaps that are exposed of its weakness and flaws.  
C. The responsibility to protect and the refugee 
1. Refugee protection as part of RtoP 
Ban Ki Moon in his report implementing the responsibility to protect, mentions how 
the protection of refugees and the internally displaced is a goal related to RtoP (A/63/677, 
2009:29). Others state that refugee protection and IDP protection is peripheral to the RtoP 
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doctrine (HARRIS RIMMER, 2010:15). We have to explore therefore, to what extent the 
way refugee protection is included into either narrow or wider interpretations of RtoP.  
RtoP as derived from the World Summit Outcome document does not directly 
mention refugees, or displacement. Derived from the manner in which RtoP has been 
endorsed by the international community, it applies to genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. Furthermore, it has been argued that RtoP can, or 
should, only be triggered if murder or extermination is committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack against the civilian population. Seen in this light only the most serious and 
extensive of violations would come into reach of RtoP (BELLAMY and REIKE, 2010: 277). 
The four crimes as mentioned are recognized as international crimes entailing 
responsibilities under both treaty and customary law for states to prevent and punish their 
occurrence, by way of the 1948 Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime 
of Genocide, the Geneva Red Cross Conventions of 1949 and their 1977 protocols, and were 
reaffirmed in the 1998 Rome Statute of the ICC. The precise nature of acts constituting these 
crimes and the scope of the state’s responsibility to prevent them and protect vulnerable 
populations is still debated however (BELLAMY and REIKE, 2010:276). 
If we try to connect the characteristics of these crimes to the issue of forced 
displacement and refugee movement, we can see some overlap. Ethnic cleansing is 
associated with forced displacement of civilians (BELLAMY and REIKE, 2010: 278). For 
example ethnic cleansing itself is a rather recent label, and involves actions that more 
broadly would also fit in the category of crimes against humanity.  
We can find a definition of crimes against humanity in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, it includes: “persecution against any identifiable group or 
collective on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender (..), but as such 
must be part of systematic or widespread attack which is directed against a civilian 
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population. The definition of crimes to humanity has been broadened, as the necessary link 
to the occurrence of an armed conflict has been removed (BARBOUR and GORLICK, 
2008:12).                                                                                                                                           
However, one can also argue that additional requirement has been added in terms that the 
violations have to be systematic or widespread. Also we have to keep in mind that the Rome 
statute only binds signatories as there exists no specialized convention on crimes against 
humanity. There is a responsibility to refrain from committing these crimes, but no duty to 
prevent their commission (BELLAMY and REIKE, 2010:279).  
Regarding genocide, legal standard are more strongly established. States have a legal 
duty to take peaceful measures to prevent genocide whenever they have relevant influence 
and information. (BELLAMY and REIKE, 2010:281).4 Also there is a doctrine regarding 
war crimes which has a long tradition, although clearly, this connects the crime to the 
occurrence of armed conflict. It is not difficult to connect displacement to human right 
violations, or ongoing war. Situations of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity 
almost invariably will result in mass displacement. With ethnic cleansing this is the very aim 
(MOONEY, 2010:65). 
As mentioned before, the definition of a refugee is based on a well-founded fear of 
persecution on grounds of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or social group. This 
definition is based upon an individual fear, and there is no necessary connection to human 
rights violations on a wider scale, or the occurrence of armed conflict.  
There are however also broader definitions of what constitutes a refugee, where for 
example generalised violence in a particular state can also be a valid reason to be recognized 
as refugee or at least receive temporary protection. Moreover, the ground ‘social group’ if 
4 Referring to Bosnia vs. Serbia ICJ ruling that Serbia had political, military and financial influence over the 
Bosnian Serb army and yet took no action to prevent the genocide in Srebrenica (BELLAMY and REIKE, 2010: 
281). 
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often broadly defined and thus could for example include gender and cultural practices, such 
as included in the definition of crimes against humanity. Implications of a certain identity or 
belonging in refugee status determination are evidenced by country of origin information. 
Individual refugees are not necessarily part of broader flows and a signal of broader 
occurring or imminent mass atrocities. Protecting a refugee also may not directly help 
halting such violations. But at least consequences may be mitigated, and potential victims 
may receive protection. The cases of Rwanda, and the ‘safe heavens’ in Former Yugoslavia 
emphasize the need of guaranteeing effective protection for potential victims.  
It has been brought up how the word ‘asylum’ or discussion of the grant of asylum as 
a preventive element to the R2P framework does not feature in the core R2P documents, nor 
does it feature in the emerging literature on the subject (BARBOUR and GORLICK, 
2008:22). Refugees are often still considered a side effect of greater politics. Even if there is 
the tendency that states increasingly are held responsible to refrain from committing either of 
the four RtoP crimes, and at some instances, an obligation to prevent them from happening, 
there is a contradiction in interpreting RtoP narrowly, especially when focusing on 
prevention. The occurrence of these crimes can only be established after the fact, which is 
precisely to be prevented.  
Nonetheless, if RtoP is about prevention and protection of mass atrocities, it has been 
raised how the grant of asylum is, or would be, in many cases the most practical, realistic 
and least controversial response to assisting victims of mass atrocities. In many cases the 
absence of, or inadequate response to, asylum-seekers fleeing genocide and human rights 
atrocities has resulted in significant loss of life (BARBOUR and GORLICK, 2008:23).  
On that note it has been argued how such wide scale atrocities, and for example 
instances of ethnic cleansing, at times more easily trigger measures of temporary protection 
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or other humanitarian assistance, directed at what is termed ‘mass influx’ rather than 
recognition as Convention refugees (GOODWIN GILL and MCADAM, 2007:342).  
The RtoP agenda has been separated from the civilian protection agenda by the 
General Secretary of the UN, emphasizing how civil protection is a legal concept founded 
upon international humanitarian law, human rights norms and refugee law, while the 
responsibility to protect is a political concept (MARRERO ROCHA, 2013:145).  
Also the need for Security Council authorization of measures implies a quite high 
threshold for RtoP action and does not seem to point in the direction that refugee issues are 
to be included directly under the RtoP banner on a permanent basis. The actual displacement 
of populations has been seen as a threat to international peace and security, or as contributing 
to such as threat and therefore has come to the attention and authority of the Security 
Council. Even the situations triggering Security Council deliberation and resolutions would 
include drastic and case by case measures, fitted to halt mass atrocities but arguably not 
adapted to address refugee situations, especially on a more long term basis. Also at times it 
has been cautioned how widening its scope, would undermine the 2005 consensus 
(A/63/677:8). 
However, as mentioned above, RtoP was built on the antecedent of ‘sovereignty as 
responsibility’, a concept envisioned to address the plight of IDP’s, and thus forced 
displacement of populations. 
2. RtoP to protect refugees 
Despite of the above, the fact that at first sight refugee protection is not directly 
included in a more narrow interpretation of RtoP, there is a widely shared expectation among 
advocates of the plight of refugees and IDP’s that RtoP will be beneficial, even revolutionary 
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in enhancing the protection of people who are forcibly displaced (MOONEY, 2010:62). 
Forced displacement should be the central focus of RtoP (HARRIS RIMMER, 2010:20). 
The Secretary General report ‘implementing the responsibility to protect’ points out 
how refugees and IDP’s are populations most often seeking protection from the four RtoP 
crimes and that mainstreaming the protection of refugees and the internally displaced among 
the priorities of UN agencies and programmes will make an important contribution to the 
elimination of mass atrocity crimes (A/63/677, 2009:29). Therefore, they would indirectly 
but logically be part of the RtoP framework. Refugees are often the persons most at risk for 
genocide and mass atrocities (DAVIES and GLANVILLE, 2010:2). Implementing and 
operationalising RtoP should therefore, include measures for the protection of refugees. 
When a state commits himself to protect IDP’s and refugees, he is exercising his 
responsibility to protect. The adoption of the African Union Convention for the protection 
and assistance of internally displaced persons in Africa, also known as the Kampala 
Convention, has been qualified by UN High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR) Antonio 
Guterres as a demonstration of how RtoP is fully compatible with national sovereignty 
(DAVIES and GLANVILLE, 2010:1). 5 
The RtoP framework would be apt for improving the refugee regime, as we have seen that 
the system of state sovereignty is here to stay at least for a while more, and thus solutions 
have to be sought within this system. RtoP and the refugee regime more or less fall back on 
the same considerations, not higher moral or humanitarian imperatives, but protecting the 
international system of states that is threatened when states fail to fulfill their roles 
(DAVIES, 2010:14). Both would therefore be compatible. The quest is to bring sovereignty, 
political will, mandates and resources into alignment with better protection (DAVIES and 
GLANVILLE, 2010:2). Regional organizations are seen  as potential partners of the UN for 
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the implementation of RtoP (MOONEY, 2010:81), which also could be a good level for 
implementing measures for refugee and IDP protection, as evidenced by the Kampala 
Convention..  
It is important to note that RtoP in no way is envisioned to reemplace, nor undermine 
the existing international refugee framework. If RtoP is connected to the four crimes, in no 
manner it covers the situations of all (potential) refugees. Refugees have a special place in 
international law, they are at risk because of who they are, or what they believe (MARTIN, 
2010:29). Nevertheless, it has to be recognized how protection gaps currently exist in the 
system of international refugee protection and how this system is facing many challenges. To 
explore emerging new concepts are therefore valid and there is a need to deploy all available 
tools and resource, without the intentions however, to replace tried and true measures. Even 
if new concepts that focused on prevention of displacement may prove useful, ensuring and 
granting asylum may still be the best, and necessary, protection option (BARBOUR and 
GORLICK, 2008:). Prevention and protection for the displaced can be focused on the region 
or state of origin, but the opportunity to seek and be granted asylum remains crucial. 
Measures taken under different frameworks have to been seen complementing each other 
and RtoP can ensure and strengthen accountability, particularly of the international 
community to fulfill its own responsibilities (MOONEY, 2010:83). Still there will be gaps 
left,  
Making a connection to the interest to protect people inside their borders, i.e. their 
basic human rights, is linked to preventing refugee flows. This effort can reflect good 
intentions and bad intentions however. Again, UNHCR Refugees Antonio Guterres argued 
how attempts by the international community to devise policies to preempt, govern or direct 
population movements, have been erratic. New patterns of movement have emerged, 
including forms not envisaged by the Refugee Convention, for example when we speak 
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about persons that are displaced because of environmental factors. Therefore, it is argued 
that RtoP will at best offer a partial response, because it does not capture the range of 
scenarios in which displacement occurs (MARTIN, 2010:17).  
Success of RtoP for strengthening protection for refugees is not guaranteed. Another 
issue to consider is how RtoP may be invoked not to protect refugees, but to protect the 
actors own interest and security, when great numbers of refugees may create a danger for 
regional instability, noting here particularly the case of Libya and its geographical cercanity 
to Europe (MARRERO ROCHA, 2013:132). Refugee protection may be used as an excuse. 
Nevertheless, while there is still controversy whether the international community 
has the right or duty to enter a state’s territory when it is failing to protect its own citizens, 
the duty is quite clear and unequivocal when those people have crossed an international 
border (HADDAD, 2010:86) States have a principal obligation to refrain from forcibly 
returning persons to countries in which they would face persecution. However, there is no 
obligation to grant asylum, or to admit them for permanent settlement. Relocating refugees 
in safe third countries that are willing to accept them is not irregular. 
The validity in RtoP lies in strengthening the positive obligations inherent in the 
concept of sovereignty, as well as the positive obligations of the international community to 
ensure international protection. Furthermore it focuses on the protection of potential victims 
rather than the rights of one sovereign to another, although we have seen how the decisions 
taken within the refugee regime still depend on the sovereign state, emphasising the victim, 
the refugee, fits within the progressive development of human rights regime. RtoP can be 
seen as a concept that requires implementation of certain measures, imposes rights and 
duties, places emphasis on certain obligations and fills protection gaps (BARBOUR and 
GORLICK, 2008:18).  
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Broadly set out by UNSG Ban Ki Moon, again in the report implementing the 
responsibility to protect, the four elements of RtoP are: encouraging states to meet their 
pillar one responsibilities; helping them to exercise this responsibility; helping them to build 
their capacity to protect; assisting states under stress before crisis and conflicts break out 
(A/63/677:). Phrased this way, RtoP seems easier to implement than a strict focus on either 
the pillars as envisioned by the ICISS, or Articles 138-140 of the World Summit Outcome 
Document. 
For the purpose of this thesis, to apply RtoP concept in a beneficial way for refugees, 
we will approach it conceptually, mainly focusing on the normative underpinnings, beliefs 
and its political strength to gather commitment for implementation. Conceptually there exists 
a notion of a responsibility to protect that is much broader than the officially endorse RtoP 
(MOONEY, 2010:67). It is argued how trying to devise some kind of morally satisfying 
general theory which will delineate our duties to and responsibilities for refugees is almost 
certainly a waste of time. Rather a political approach is advocated to focus on the problem 
that actually exists (BROWN, 2011:162-166). The problem that actually exists are the 
weaknesses in the present day refugee regime, where states are failing to fulfill their 
responsibility to protect refugees and the need to design solutions for such situations. As we 
have seen, in the international community, as a collective, the problem often is not standards, 
but implementation. The power of RtoP is political, not legal (MOONEY, 2010: 72). 
The collective responsibilities to protect refugees are at least twofold: first, not to 
‘create’ IDP’s and refugees, and second, to protect refugees arriving at one’s border. Stated 
differently, it is first about states complying fulfilling their obligations towards their own 
populations, including refugees6, and secondly, about the international community assisting, 
supporting and encouraging states in doing so. I can be argumented how these are similar 
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norms to those underlying the international refugee framework, namely asylum 
(responsibility of states to comply with international obligations towards refugees, i.e., 
asylum seekers), and burden sharing or cooperation between states  in receiving and 
protecting physical numbers of refugees, support to build protection capacity and the 
financial aspects.  
The R2P doctrine could be more important if it moved beyond the concept of passive 
protection needs to a focus on the rights of those affected by conflict to design solutions for 
its resolution. This may be the real test of R2P (HARRIS RIMMER, 2010:16).  
Chapter conclusion 
We have seen in this chapter how in the international system of modern states, the 
sovereign state has been concerned with the protection of its borders, and thus its internal 
jurisdiction, protected by the principle of non-interference. Nevertheless, over the past 
century a human rights regime developed, which rules are fundamentally concerned with 
protecting not state borders but individuals. When sovereign states are either unwilling or 
unable to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of their populations, state sovereignty 
and human rights come into conflict. 
As internal practices of states are increasingly subjected to international scrutiny, the 
state border seems to becomes less important. However, slightly contradictory, for the 
refugee the crossing of the state border is imperative and is what brings the figure of the 
refugee into being and hopefully into safety. Traditional statal solutions to the problem of the 
refugee, a person that de facto has lost connection to the territory of his or her former state or 
origin, have involved to re-territorialize a person, either through local integration, 
resettlement, or (voluntary) repatriation. However, there seems to be a tendency in 
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international responses to increasingly focus efforts on managing population movements, 
rather than providing solutions for the refugee. 
The impact of mass atrocities in the 1990s gave way to the endorsement of the 
concept of the responsibility to protect over the first decade of the new millennium. It was 
envisaged to coin state sovereignty as involving responsibility to fulfill obligations deriving 
from international law and custom towards the population. Such behavior within limits set 
by international agreements is what strengthens sovereignty and creates legitimacy. It also 
seeks commitment of the international community to support and assist states in upholding 
their obligations. Most of the controversy regarding RtoP has surrounded whether the 
international community has the right or duty to enter a state’s territory when that state is 
failing to protect its own citizens. The concept of RtoP is connected to the crimes of war, 
crimes against humanity, genocide and ethnic cleansing, and acting through the UN system. 
RtoP also involves prevention and rebuilding aspects, added to reaction. 
Strictly defined, the persons involved in situations that would trigger RtoP, i.e. 
persons at risk of the mentioned four crimes, and the refugee are not fully of the same 
category. The definition of RtoP crimes involve references to either ongoing armed conflict, 
or widespread and systematic human rights violations, while the definition of the refugee is 
individualized and grounded in a fear of persecution because of nationality, race, religion, 
political opinion or belonging to a particular social group.  
Another important distinction is how the refugee is constituted by crossing an 
international border, while RtoP is often invoked to assist populations within their country of 
origin. Nonetheless, refugees are often an indication of (massive) human rights violations 
and on the flipside (massive) human rights violations result in refugees. Furthermore, forced 
population displacement has come to the attention of the UNSC as possible threat to 
international peace and security.  
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Also instruments in the matter of prevention, which is meant to constitute an integral 
part of RtoP, thus protection of refugees after flight and addressing root causes before flight, 
link refugee protection and the prevention pillar of RtoP. Although norms and practices of 
refugee protection are well-established, RtoP instruments could enhance additional refugee 
protection and diminish emerged gaps between standards and implementation. Furthermore, 
the granting of refugee protection (asylum) can be a rather straight forward less controversial 
manner or putting RtoP into practice.  
Along broader lines, the underlying norms of the international refugee protection 
regime and of RtoP are similar. In the latter part of this chapter I have set out how RtoP can 
be understood as a concept to be applied to research the collective international 
responsibility to protect refugees. In broad lines this concept can be divided into two parts:  
A) States have obligations towards (potential) refugees, which are at least twofold: first, 
not to ‘create’ refugees7, and second, to protect refugees arriving at one’s border. The 
duty of states towards refugees is well-established and quite clear and equivocal when 
people have crossed an international border fleeing persecution. Stated differently, RtoP 
can be understood to be about states fulfilling their obligations towards their own 
populations, including refugees8.  
B) RtoP is about creating a commitment or duty for the international community in 
assisting, supporting and encouraging states in fulfilling obligations stated under A, for 
example within the framework of the current refugee regime. We recall how states have 
no legal obligation to support (potential) refugees on the territory of other states, but the 
human rights regime and RtoP’s underpinnings try to bring internal human rights 
violations on the international agenda. 
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What makes a new idea persuasive is the way it relates to the economic and political 
problems of the day. The current refugee regime definitely faces protection gaps, 
weaknesses, which are mostly to be borne by the individual refugee him or herself. These 
individuals have a problem that urges for durable solutions. An important weakness we have 
identified in the application of RtoP is the fact how the framework fails to create a 
commitment on behalf of the international community to assist states in upholding their 
human rights obligations. Rather than devising morally satisfying general theories to 
delineate our duties to and responsibilities for refugees, RtoP can offer a political approach 
to address a problem that actually exists. 
Therefore, what answers the question we posed at the beginning of the chapter is that 
at this point we cannot conclude that RtoP will strengthen the protection of refugees, 
however RtoP can be approached as a concept to research tendencies in state responses to 
the problem of refugees. In the following chapter we will use the devised conceptual 
understanding of RtoP as consisting or two norms to further explore the existing obligations 
of states (A) and the international community (B) towards refugees, and how assistance and 
cooperation is coming about, and may offer or complicate solutions. 
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Chapter Two - The international protection of refugees 
Chapter introduction 
In the foregoing chapter we have seen the characteristics of the RtoP framework, it’s 
endorsement by the international community, and also the ongoing criticism. Furthermore, 
we addressed the way in which refugee issues are considered part of RtoP, and in turn how 
RtoP could be applied to refugee and displacement issues.  
We chose to frame the debate around RtoP away from revolving around the debate of 
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention but rather to focus on prevention and protection of 
civilian populations from mass atrocities and to apply it as such a concept to research 
broader trends in state responses to refugees, broadly to be divided into A) Strengthening 
basic human rights obligations of states towards their populations, including refugees and 
including the assertion of not creating refugees, and B) strengthening support to states from 
the international community to fulfill A.  
Along broad lines this is the same divide as the underpinnings of the refugee regime, 
built upon the norms of A) asylum (existing obligations that fall upon states to protect 
refugees) and B) understandings of cooperation between states in addressing the problem of 
refugees, of burden sharing within the refugee regime (working towards collective 
responsibility). Such cooperation involves for example strengthening the capacity of states to 
host refugees, financial cooperation, but also importantly, cooperation in term of finding 
durable solutions to the situation of refugees, as most refugees are actually being hosted in 
the global south.  
Therefore, in the first part of this chapter we will set out the existing obligations at 
present for states towards refugees. Here we will consider the current international refugee 
regime, deriving from treaties and conventions, such as the Geneva Convention on the status 
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of refugees; principles of established practice such the principle of non-refoulement. After 
that we will look into established mechanisms of cooperation and the strengths and 
weaknesses of the present refugee regime. We will look at cooperation through the UN 
system, via UNHCR, and the measures that are being applied to solve a person’s status of 
refugee, mainly opportunities to integrate into the local host community, voluntary 
repatriation to the country of origin, or resettlement in a third country. Here we will see the 
dilemma’s in cooperation that are present between the world’s industrialised states and the 
global south where most refugees are hosted.  
Some problems and protection gaps will already become clear from these parts, 
however in the latter part of this chapter will place findings within the broader international 
context of peace, conflict and North-South relations, and the problems actually faced by the 
individual refugees, and seek to distinguish trends in state responses. Focus on existing 
problems, which is clearly connected to prevention, but prevention itself is too broad. 
To eventually consider if RtoP may contribute to strengthening the protection of 
refugees, and the prevention of forced displacement, we will seek to address the following 
question: To what extent are protection gaps attributable to a lack of a responsibility to 
protect refugee? 
 
A) State obligations towards the refugee 
1. Antecedents 
(a)  Hospitality 
We have already seen how the emergence and consolidation of the international system 
of nation states went hand in hand with processes of inclusion and exclusion. Universal 
human rights come into tension with the principles of self-determination of national 
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communities as represented in the form of sovereign (nation)states. The way in which 
sovereign state defends its right to control its borders, and control the quantity and quality of 
those admitted is at times at direct contradiction with universal human rights declarations 
(BENHABIB, 2005:14).  
This has not always been the state of affairs at different points in history. Seyla Benhabib 
explained how Kant wrote on the right to hospitality for a visitor to another territory, which 
can be understood as a right to temporary stay. Such temporary stay cannot be refused in 
case such rejection would represent the destruction of the visitor involved. The right to 
hospitality is reflected in not receiving hostile treatment, however, it does not involve any 
additional rights such as to be treated as a guest (BENHABIB, 20054:31). The right to 
remain is to be separated from being granted a residence permit (HURWITZ, 2009:134). 
Benhabib therefore considers this right to hospitality as an imperfect moral duty to help 
and offer refuge, stating that the duty is conditional, exceptions may exist. The right to 
hospitality can be seen as subordinate to considerations of self-preservation for the receiving 
community (BENHABIB, 2005:36). According to Benhabib this perspective of Kant derives 
from a consideration of a shared earth surface. She cautions how the territorially based, statal 
perspective is very limited to address present day human and global interdependence 
(BENHABIB, 2005:37).  
Temporary hospitality is not sufficient; from our shared common humanity we should 
derive a right to enter societies, to become part of them.  In this light, Benhabib builds 
further on the thinking of philosopher Hannah Arendt, emphasizing the importance of 
belonging to a community, and to be judged within such a framework based upon your 
actions and opinions, rather than the condition you obtained at birth (referring to nationality). 
Not so much the right to freedom should be primary, but the right to action (BENHABIB, 
2005: 46-52).  
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A right to freedom here refers to the freedom of the visitor to visit different societies and 
enjoy temporary stay. The right to action is more encompassing, upon visiting the individual 
should have a right to enter into a dialogue on why he or she should be, or not be, allowed to 
remain in the community. The ‘right to have rights’ was also phrased by Hanna Arendt to 
refer to the need for recognition as a citizen and statal guarantees of human rights, such as 
we have also seen in the first chapter. Even if human rights are inherent to our being 
humans, if no entity guarantees us these rights, they are worthless.  
The primacy of the need for statal guarantees rather than having faith in the human right 
that naturally would be inherent to the human being, is reflected in the example of how 
colonialized groups, and minorities often seeked statehood of their own rather than relying 
on protection of the international human rights regime (IGNATIEFF, 2001:15). The 
challenge ahead for the international community in terms of responses for persons that have 
left their home communities, either as a migrant or a refugee, as envisioned by Benhabib is 
therefore to develop an international regime that separates ‘the right to have rights’ from the 
national condition of the individual (BENHABIB, 2005:58).  
(b) Underpinnings 
Above was stated how the international refugee regime represents the set of norms, rules, 
principles and decision-making procedures that regulate states’ responses to refugees. It 
compromises two main norms: asylum and burden sharing (HURRELL, 2011:56-57). 
Asylum is governed by a strong normative framework, underpinned by the principle of non-
refoulement. Burden sharing however, is governed by a weak normative and legal 
framework (HURRELL, 2011:57).    
The norms of the refugee regime have also been defined as concerning not only asylum 
and burden sharing but in addition to those also assistance. Assistance according to this 
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author refers to material assistance, and repatriation or resettlement which can be seen as 
physical assistance. Burden sharing in this definition refers to the imperative to keep in mind 
some distributional equity so that no state bears overwhelming political, legal and financial 
responsibility (SKRAN quoted in UCARER, 2006:222). Defined as such, a principle of 
burden sharing is thus to be applied to asylum and to assistance alike, rather than assistance 
in terms of resettlement and repatriation being an example of burden sharing in itself. As the 
permanent solution of local integration is left out among examples of assistance, this likely is 
covered by asylum in this definition. This definition seems to move towards the acceptance 
on checks upon sovereignty through imposing burden sharing also upon the notion of 
asylum, which essentially is an obligation upon states, as the notions of assistance and 
burden sharing still are at the discretion of states. 
Assistance on different terms could also be seen as a different category, and arguably 
constitutes an additional norm, but often more defined as responses in times of mass influx 
and humanitarian emergencies. Repatriation however, could be a valid element here in this 
light as it represents cooperation between states in readmitting their own citizens. In 
consenting and cooperating in repatriation are more elements reflected of assisting in solving 
a refugee situation by restoring the situation before a crisis broke out, rather than burden 
sharing which more so refers to solving a problem that has emerged by creating a new 
situation as solution.  
The fact that this definition when referencing to burden sharing  distinguishes between 
legal and political and financial responsibility is also interesting, as often the separation is 
made between physical, financial and material responsibility. Although political 
responsibility could refer to physical sharing, and legal in this case to the assessment of the 
asylum claims. In theory resettlement would take place after a claim has been assessed, but 
initiatives have been coined to transfer persons before processing of claims. For now, 
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however we will work with the separation in two norms, asylum and burden-sharing and 
consider assistance as a very much connected but somewhat separate rule. 
We will now first focus on the norm of asylum, setting out the definitions of the 
refugee and the main rights and obligations that are at the core of refugee protection, such as 
non-refoulement, the right to seek and enjoy asylum; the right to leave any country, 
including your own; and in more general terms, the freedom of movement. We will work 
towards an understanding of a trend of shifts in state responses to refugees, such as the 
concept of safe third countries, situated within the broader political context and debates 
surrounding causes and consequences of forced migration and the interconnectedness with 
state’s concerns in the areas of security, migration and development.  
(c) Emerging refugee regime 
The question posed by refugees to the international community emerged as an 
international legal issue in the nineteenth century with the development of extradition 
treaties and the non-extradition of political offenders. Extradition refers to the institution we 
now commonly known as political asylum (HURWITZ, 2009:10). The aftermath of World 
War I with the large number of displaced persons motivated the development of new 
international instruments of protection that further developed during the interbellum period, 
in between the two World Wars, eventually leading up to the establishment of the Office of 
the UNHCR in 1950, the signing of the Geneva Convention Relating the Status of Refugees 
in 1951, and the later 1967 Protocol (HURWITZ, 2011:10-13). Gradually the practice of 
asylum became codified as refugee law. 
The 1951 Geneva Convention was characterised as emerging from a dual concern in 
post-Second World War Europe. Previous ad hoc norms of protection were turned into 
international law (UCARER, 2006:222). On the one hand there was concern with 
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international order. Response to the refugee problem was a means to contribute to stability 
and security. On the other hand there was a concern with justice. The establishment of a 
refugee regime could be a way of promoting human rights within the context of the 
emerging United Nations system by ensuring collective statal contributions to overcome 
common humanitarian and political problems (BETTS, 2011:8).9 Stated in this manner, the 
Geneva Convention starts from the premise to align statal interests with human rights and 
the insight that common problems have to be overcome by collective contributions. On the 
other hand, it has also been characterized as: “evolving out of humanitarian desire to 
improve the fate of the dispossessed” (UCARAR, 2006:222). The development in terms of 
the emergence of an international refugee regime has been posed as: “the international 
community’s recognition of its collective responsibility to protect refugees” (HURWITZ, 
2009:9).  
The Office of the UNHCR was established by the UN General Assembly to provide 
international protection, and “to seek permanent solutions for the problem of refugees”, as 
defined in the annex to the Statute of this agency (GOODWIN GILL and MCADAM, 
2007:20-21). The wording ‘the problem of refugees’, may imply how refugees are a (the) 
problem to the international community that UNHCR should tend to. Otherwise, it could 
have stated: “seek permanent solutions to the problems of the refugee”. Permanent solutions 
include voluntary repatriation, or assimilation in new national communities, which can 
involve either local integration in the host country or resettlement to a third state. 
Importantly, the work of the UNHCR agency should be of a non-political character 
(GOODWIN GILL and MCADAM, 2007:1).  
Developments within the United Nations system and the emergence and consolidation of 
a human rights regime base for protection have had an impact on the scope and extent of the 
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mandate of UNHCR (GOODWIN GILL and MCADAM, 2007:20). Situated in context, the 
second half of the twentieth century witnessed a transformation in ideas about the nature and 
possibilities of international order and justice. Progress in the field of human rights is 
exemplary (HURRELL, 2011:93). It is important to note how prior to 1973 international 
human rights treaties had not yet entered into force. Accordingly, after 1985, the world 
began a process of what has been called a international ‘norms cascade’, as the influence of 
international human rights norms spread rapidly (RISSE and SIKKINK, 1999:21). Although 
interpretation and application of agreements in this field are debated, they are vanguards of 
the acknowledgement of the limits and conditions of sovereign states power over individuals 
(BENHABIB, 2005:18). In this context and for sake of the following of this chapter, it is 
important to mention the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 1948 
Genocide Convention, the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the 
1984 Convention Against Torture, and other Cruel, Degrading or Inhumane Treatment 
(CAT).  
2. Guarantees 
(a) Definition of the Refugee 
As mentioned in the foregoing chapter, according to the Geneva Convention, a 
refugee is a person who is outside his country of origin and who lacks protection by his state 
of origin or habitual residence. In addition, there is the condition of a well-founded fear of 
persecution on grounds of nationality, religion, race, political opinion, or membership of a 
social group. The determination of refugee status is carried out by state parties which are free 
to institute procedures as they consider appropriate for this purpose (HURWITZ, 2009:14). 
This determination should occur on an individual, case by case basis, examining a 
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combination of subjective and objective elements (HURWITZ, 2009:23). Subjective 
elements for example can be the element of membership of a social group, which can be real 
membership, or perceived membership, as seen here from the perception of the persecutor. 
The contention of fear also has an subjective element and therefore usually the check of 
well-founded is considered, which is based on objective information about the country of 
origin. Furthermore, the Geneva Convention lays out the legal grounds for exclusion of 
refugee status, and also the rights that shall be accorded to the refugee, based solely on his or 
her presence on the state’s territory (HURWITZ, 2009:14). One should think here of social 
and economic rights. If the state determines that the person does not fulfill the requirements 
to be recognized as a refugee, or falls into one of the elements eligible for exclusion, he or 
she becomes irregular, unless finding a different category to legalize his status (GUILD, 
2009:70). 
As the Geneva Convention was drafted to address the post World War II refugee 
problem in the geographical region of Europe, it therefore contained limits in time and space. 
These limits were ‘removed’ by way of the 1967 Protocol, signalling the recognition that the 
problem of refugees was not ‘solved’ that easily, nor was solely a European phenomenon. 
Instruments to address refugee situations drafted in and for the purpose of other regions also 
became devised. Some of these instruments at times broaden the elements that define the 
refugee, such as the 1969 Organisation of African Union (OAU) Convention Governing the 
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, which refers to: “those compelled to leave 
their country of origin on account of external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or 
events seriously disturbing public order in either part, or the whole of his country of origin or 
nationality”; the 1984 Cartagena Declaration drafted for Latin America, which includes 
generalized violence and massive human rights violations.  
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For Member states of the EU, the treaty of Amsterdam, adopted in 1997 and entered 
into force in 1999, moved asylum and immigration into the area where legally binding 
instruments of harmonisation can be legislated by the Council of Ministers, and a measure of 
judicial control can be exercised by the European Court of Justice. In the 2004 EU 
Qualification Directive incorporates and interprets the 1951 Convention/ 1967 Protocol 
refugee definition. It provides for subsidiary protection for persons who do not qualify as 
refugees, but would face serious harm if returned to their country of origin. Individuals also 
receive additional protection against removal under the European Convention on Human 
Rights. The EU Qualification Directive can be seen as the most ambitious attempt to 
combine refugee law and human rights law…to date (GOODWIN GILL and MCADAM, 
2007:37-41). 
In the definition of the refugee, the fact of having crossed an internationally 
recognized border is a crucial element. If a person has not yet left the country of origin, but 
the host state cannot secure his protection, the foremost human rights instrument to derive 
protection from would be enshrined in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights that declares the human right to seek and enjoy asylum. The terminology of ‘enjoying 
‘asylum’, could refer to temporary stay, but also the granting of a recognition of the status of 
refugee. However, contrary to the right of individuals to seek asylum, there is no 
international legal obligation upon states to grant asylum to any refugee who seeks it. It has 
been argued how the phrasing of freedom from, rather than freedom to is what makes human 
rights universal (IGNATIEFF, 2001:75). however 
The reference to asylum in the context of a refugee regime might appear a little bit 
muddy, but is inescapable. Part of the practice within the refugee regime derives from earlier 
state to state practice as regards asylum. European countries continue to use the term asylum 
seeker to describe a person who has made an application for international protection but 
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whose application has not yet been determined (GUILD, 2009:82). The difference between 
asylum and refugee protection can be explained as the granting of asylum being a 
discretionary act of states, reflected in domestic law, more so than in international law. 
Therefore, the notion of asylum seeker is commonly used to identify refugees whose formal 
status has not yet been recognized. It can be described as a: “semantic slip, which originates 
from domestic legal systems, reflecting an approach where asylum remains the primary 
institution” (HURWITZ, 2009:16-17). This recognition of the status of a refugee for many 
domestic legal systems is constitutive; it brings the refugee into being. On the other hand, 
from a perspective of international law such a recognition is declaratory, acknowledging a 
condition that was actually obtained upon leaving one’s country because of the fear for 
persecution.  
The Geneva Convention’s first point of reference is the individual, as a rights holder 
(GOODWIN GILL and MCADAM, 2007:10). The rights bearer is the state. We have to 
keep in mind how was argued that UNHCR was supposed to solve the problem of refugees, 
not the problems of the refugee. It reflects the original thinking of how refugees can be seen 
as destabilizing international order. Nowadays there is a tendency of state practice that tends 
to move away from emphasizing the individual in need of international protection, towards 
focusing on the state of origin and its capacity, actual or supposed, to provide protection 
(GOODWIN GILL and MCADAM, 2007:10). States seek to define the individual as part of 
a group or flow, framed by the state’s definition of belonging or foreignness (GUILD, 
2009:68). The concepts of safe first country of asylum and safe third countries mark this 
trend, which will be further explored below. 
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(b) Non refoulement 
The main normative underpinning of the international refugee regime is the principle 
of non-refoulement, which is set out in Article 33 of the Geneva Convention. It prohibits the 
expulsion or return (refoulement) in any manner whatsoever of a refugee to the frontiers of 
territories where his life or freedom would be at risk on the grounds stated in Article 1, to be: 
race, nationality, religion, political opinion, membership of a particular social group. 
Refoulement includes summary refusal of admission at the state border (HURWITZ, 2009: 
174 ).  
Other human rights instruments also enshrine this principle which has thus passed to 
become a broader principle of human rights, creating window opportunities as they add 
grounds on which account a person cannot be returned or removed. We can mention the 
1984 Convention against Torture, proscribing the return of persons to territories where there 
is a likeliness of being subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or other degrading treatment or 
punishment (GOODWIN GILL and MCADAM, 2007:354).  
The safeguard against refoulement is also included in the 1966 ICCPR, and regional 
instruments such as the 1950 ECHR and fundamental freedoms, which bind states not to 
transfer individuals to another country where they would be exposed to serious human rights 
violations (HURWITZ, 2009:188). The principle of non-refoulement thus applies to all 
refugees, but not all persons to whose situation applies the principle of non-refoulement are 
refugees. 
Non-refoulement is now widely recognized as a principle of customary law, meaning 
that among states there is an acceptance of the legally binding character of the rule, as 
evidenced by state practice and demonstrated by declarations, statements, and agreements. It 
therefore binds all states, not only signatories to the treaties and convention mentioned 
(HURWITZ, 2009:204). Furthermore, the principle applies to situations of mass influx and 
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individual cases alike (HURWITZ, 2009:209). The principle can be understood as an 
application of a preventive tool to the protection of human rights (HURWITZ, 2009:188). 
By not returning the persons to a situation of risk, the human rights violation is prevented. 
State practices undermining this principle often involve either the state questing the 
status of the individuals in question (and thus duties and obligations towards him or her), or 
involve invoking exceptions to the principle regarding the situation at hand, most often 
invoking the argument of the individual posing a possible threat to national security, and 
therefore excluded from the non-refoulement principle (GOODWIN GILL and MCADAM, 
2007:224).  
That states feel that they have to legitimise themselves and invoke exceptions, rather 
than question non-refoulement in itself, can be understood as exemplary of the strength of 
the principle. Such behavior is common for actor’s stance towards international human rights 
norms. In cases where an actor allegedly is violating one of these norms, the actor in its 
reaction can either accept the validity of the norm, but claim that violation did not occur 
because the situation is defined differently (i.e. not a situation where the norm would be 
invoked), or challenge the validity of the norm itself (RISSE and SIKKINK, 1999:13). 
At times states interpret life and liberty according to their purposes, particularly the 
concept of safe third countries undermines the principle of non-refoulement (BENHABIB, 
2007:36). Non-refoulement involves direct return (to the country of origin) and indirect 
refoulement (to a third state). Indirect refoulement is the case when a person is returned to a 
state where effective protection is not guaranteed, or where the risk exists of eventually 
being returned to the country of origin (HURWITZ, 2009:180-181). Non refoulement only 
concerns the country where a refugee cannot be send to, not where a refugee may not be 
send from (29). 
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The principle of non-refoulement reflects some of the thinking of Kant as set out 
above, emphasizing a right of a visitor to visit a territory. Particularly, Kant stated how such 
a right may not be denied in case this may result in the destruction of the person involve. 
Such destruction, in the wording of the principle of non-refoulement is translated as ‘the 
existence of a threat to life and freedom’. In Kant’s considerations again, this right could be 
denied for reasons of self-preservation of the receiving society. The is also reflected in 
Article 33 of the Geneva Convention: if a person represents a danger to the security of the 
receiving community or the host state, the person may not claim the benefit of this provision.  
Besides the Geneva Convention there are other instruments that also implicitly or 
explicitly prohibit refoulement, as mentioned CAT and for example Article 3 of ECHR states 
that the prohibition of removal is absolute, no matter how dangerous or undesirable an 
individual’s conduct (GOODWIN GILL, 2007:211). Article 33 of the Geneva Convention 
has been instrumental in the development of complementary forms of protection at the EU 
level, although there is a high threshold (HURWITZ, 2009:191).  
It has been argued that the principle of non-refoulement might constitute a de facto 
right to asylum (HURWITZ, 2009:190). Even if the individual does not fulfil the 
requirements to be recognized as a de jure refugee, he cannot be returned based on the fear 
for his life and freedom. This may result in problematic situations, because when an 
individual is not recognized as a refugee, but receive only some subsidiary protection on the 
condition of being not returnable to his state of origin, the person is not accorded the 
additional economic and social rights enshrined in the Geneva Convention, as such rights are 
not specified in for example the CAT, or ECHR (GUILD, 2009:84). Only recognizing the 
person as refugee, or some other type of regularization, or a change of circumstances in his 
or her state of origin would change this. 
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(c) The right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution 
As provided for in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights it is a declared 
human right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. Unless, the 
exceptions enumerated in 14.2: “This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions 
genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations”.  
We have noted how this human right is not complemented by a right to be granted 
asylum. It is not specified where the refugee should file the asylum claim, or which state is 
responsible for addressing the claim. A valid question is therefore, whether refugees have a 
choice of their country of asylum. Should a person go to the authorities in the first state 
where one could possibly claim asylum? Under International Law there is no such obligation 
(HURWITZ, 2009:211). Not every state offers similar conditions and accessibility for 
presenting an asylum claim. Nevertheless, states should not abuse their right to (not) grant 
asylum (HURWITZ, 2009:212). 
There is a close connection between the right to seek and enjoy asylum and the right 
to leave any country, including your own, as enshrined in Article 13 UDHR. Reading Article 
13 and 14 UDHR together with the right to freedom of movement (UDHR Art 13.1) and the 
totality of rights protected in UDHR and ICCPR implies an obligation for states to respect an 
individual’s right to leave his or her country in search of protection (GOODWIN GILL and 
MCADAM, 2007:370). The right to leave any country, including one’s own, is restricted if 
considered necessary for protection of national security, public order, public health or 
morals, or the rights and freedoms of others (GOODWIN GILL and MCADAM, 2007:381).  
Nonetheless, as the UDHR is a declaration rather than a convention or treaty, therefore this 
guarantee has somewhat limited force (BIGO and GUILD, 2005:36).  
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Also, it has been argued however how many of the states which contributed to the 
drafting of the UDHR saw no contradiction between endorsing international norms abroad, 
while continuing oppression at home (IGNATIEFF, 2001: 6). 
It is not guaranteed that states will allow citizens to leave their home country in order 
to seek refuge and it is not easy for other state to oblige a state to do so. Interesting is the 
argument therefore, that one could interpret a right to leave one’s country to seek asylum as 
imposing a duty on other states, or in case the international community as a whole, than the 
state of origin, precisely because we speak about persons who cannot claim the protection of 
their home state and these persons are thus are the responsibility of the international 
community (HURWITZ, 2009:214).  
During the Cold War, border closures not allowing citizens to leave their country, 
and the international community concerns for these populations where connected to 
ideology. There has been a tendency however the closure on part of the state of origin 
towards closure on part of receiving states. This is connected to a fear of states neighbouring 
a state where is instability to mass influx of refugees as a security concern. On the other 
hand, the progressive development of human rights and RtoP may induce a necessity for the 
international community when a state facing massive human rights violations, closes his 
borders, to broker a solution, with at last instance intervention to end the situation. We have 
seen however how military measures are not the best way to address human rights violations.  
Barriers imposed on the freedom of movement, such as interception, visa restrictions, 
carrier sanctions, may breach the obligation set out above, and more generally, demonstrate a 
lack of good faith in implementing treaty obligations (GOODWIN GILL and MCADAM, 
2007:370). These practises lead to situations where refugees are de facto prevented from 
seeking asylum (HURWITZ, 2009:211). 
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B) International cooperation in the refugee regime 
1. UNHCR 
The preamble of the Geneva Convention emphasizes how refugee concerns are to be 
addressed through collective endeavors and international cooperation (HURWITZ, 
2009:183). The decision by one state to grant or deny a person the opportunity to enter its 
territory, or to grant or deny the status of asylum, has consequences for the individual, but 
also for other states, and is thus not a unilateral act.  
UNHCR is an international actor in its own right, but also represents the states as an 
intergovernmental agency. It has to balance the interest of the individual refugee, its 
responsibility as  deriving from its mandate, with the interests of states. UNHCR is governed 
by the UN General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The 
UNHCR Executive Committee (EXCOMM), consisting at present of 87 states, approves the 
agency's biennial programmes and the corresponding budget (UNHCR). UNHCR is not an 
fully autonomous actor because the agency depends for 98 percent on voluntary 
contributions from states and other donors. This institutional setup was chosen to ensure 
long term relevance and survival of the agency, but also limited powers (LONG, 2012:3). 
We have seen how UNHCR is entrusted the responsibility to find durable solutions to 
refugee situations such as for example through resettlement. The provision of resettlement is 
based on double voluntary rule urging for a consent on part of the receiving state and the 
individual, UNHCR works as the contact person in between. Consent in voluntary 
repatriation is also important, and consent ideally also comes into play in local integration. In 
2003, UNHCR’s mandate was extended by the General Assembly "until the refugee problem 
is solved." (UNHCR). 
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Alongside refugees with a well-founded fear of persecution, in practice, persons that 
are eligible for protection and assistance by the international community (and thus UNHCR), 
often include persons who lack protection of their state of origin when reasons of flight can 
be traced to conflict, human rights violations, breaches of international humanitarian law or 
other serious harm resulting from radical political social or economic changes in their own 
country. The main trigger of the international protection regime remains violence, or risk of 
threat of violence (GOODWIN GILL and MCADAM, 2007:49).  
It has been noted how most states want the UN to assume responsibility for a broad 
category of persons obliged to flee countries for a variety of reasons. Particularly, UN 
endorsement of UNHCR activities in situations of complex humanitarian emergencies can be 
explained as a response to protection gaps in the existing international refugee regime 
(GOODWIN GILL and MCADAM, 2007:427).  
Considering its broadening mandate and growing population of concern and 
dependency on voluntary contributions, UNHCR needs to be aware of the broader political 
context of its work and recognize and channel states’ interests into a commitment for 
protection (BETTS, 2011:77). In the past, the cooperation problem has been overcome by 
what have been called substantive cross issue area linkages, this in combination with an 
important role for UNHCR in making states recognize the relationship between burden 
sharing in terms of refugees and their interests such as immigration, security and trade, even 
if these connections are uncertain and ambiguous (BETTS,2011:64-65). Thus the role of 
UNHCR was considered crucial to point out how these different areas could be positively 
linked. 
Between 2002 and 2005 UNHCR launched the Convention Plus initiative, which is 
an example of how the agency tried to enhance the quality of protection, and achieve 
responsibility sharing between Northern donors and Southern host states. Convention Plus 
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focused on the themes of resettlement, targeted development assistance, and irregular 
secondary movements (BETTS, 2005). The initiative appeals to state’s interest in the areas 
of containment, security and development, building upon the understanding that forced 
migration cannot longer be seen in isolation from the broader context of North-South 
relations and other areas of national and global  governance, given the extent to which 
asylum and refugee issues have become politicised. In this light it is important, not only to 
find solutions for the uprooted, but also to solve the crisis that caused the movement in the 
first place (BETTS, 2005).  Eventually, this initiative resulted in limited new commitments, 
but it has been innovative in creating new norms for extra-regional commitments to 
protection, and thus the envisioned North-South cooperation, which is important in a regime 
dominated by the principle of proximity, Furthermore, it has been successful in appealing to 
state interests in the mentioned areas (BETTS, 2005).  
Deriving from UNHCR’s mandate and responsibility to oversee the application of 
refugee law, the agency is assumed to act on behalf of the international community. 
Therefore, if individual states do not protest directly against certain (object able) acts of 
others states, but acquiescence in the protest channeled through UNHCR, they indirectly 
signal their consent with the criticism voiced by UNHCR (GOODWIN GILL and 
MCADAM, 2007:228). 
 
2. States 
We have seen how the refugee regime places an obligation on states to protect 
refugees who reach their territory, but sets out few obligations on states to protect refugees 
on the territory of other states. This is not solely worrisome in terms of the ‘burden’ or 
responsibility of hosting refugees falling upon a few states, geographically close to states of 
origin of larger numbers of refugees, but also resulted to have had the adverse effect of 
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inducing other states, mostly industrialized states, to devise measures to make it more 
difficult for refugees to reach their territory. Particularly, because it extremely difficult to 
remove these persons from the state territory once they are there present. Although debated 
 If every single state would effectively protect the life and dignity of all persons on its 
territory, there would not be refugees in the first place, so much is clear. Civilian populations 
are to be protected by constitutional guarantees, and secondly by international human rights 
obligations of the state in question (GUILD, 2009:74). If this protection cannot be upheld, a 
person will see himself obliged to flee. After international flight, if every host state would 
treat every single refugee arriving at his territories in a fair manner, offering effective 
protection and supporting durable solutions, these refugees would not pose a problem 
(anymore) to other states. However, not all states can offer such effective protection for 
every single case, even less so if refugees arrive in greater numbers.  
Furthermore, geographical proximity to the state of origin arguably reflects how the 
initial source of persecution is still close. The first neighbouring host country where a 
refugee flees to therefore cannot always guarantee safety. This is reflected in some of the 
legal instruments regarding refugees state how refugees should be hosted not too near to the 
state border.10 Insufficient or ineffective protection induces onward movement, also known 
as secondary movement. Cooperation rather than containment is necessary to find solutions 
to such situations. 
The dilemma in refugee protection deals with the fact that the majority of the world’s 
refugees are originating from and are hosted in the global south, namely 72 percent, and the 
existing regime places no clear obligations on the northern states to engage in burden sharing 
to support protection in the south (BETTS, 2011:54). Primary territorial and jurisdictional 
responsibility for refugee protection is designated to the states often least economically, 
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politically and socially capable of assuming this role. This can be seen as an accident of 
geography (BETTS, 2011:77).  
At times refugees in host countries are confined to camps or settlements. Due to a 
lack of available solutions, their situations can become long term and come into what is 
defined as protracted refugee situations (prs). PRS occur when 25.000 persons are counted 
who have been in a situation of displacement for five years or longer, without the immediate 
prospects for implementation of durable solutions (quote). The lives of these displaced may 
not be directly at risk, but their basic rights and essential economic, social, and psychological 
needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile (LONG, 2010). In 2011, more than 7.2 million 
refugees were trapped in prs (LONG, 2010).11 Not only are the lives of these people put on 
hold, for the hosting state, these camps may represent a security threat for the host society as 
it can be a place for rebels groups to be grouped or hide, or post 9/11 terrorist concerns, a 
source of environmental degradation, a drain on scarce resources.  
The consequence is that in some regions the presence of refugee settlements have 
become a permanent reality that has also been defined as “accidental cities”. UNHCR High 
Commissioner Antonio Guterres, noted this in 2012: "The number of asylum claims received 
across all industrialised countries [in 2011] is still smaller than the population of Dadaab", 
Dabaab is Kenya's largest refugee settlement (quote!!). The approach to the problem of 
refugees still reflects an emphasis on it being a temporary problem, and the preferred 
solution by states is voluntary repatriation. The lack of solutions such as integration into the 
host society or availability of resettlement is reflected in the argument how the average 
length of a refugee or IDP’s displacement is now approaching 20 years (LONG, 2010). 
11 It has been proposed however to exploit the economic possibilities. In the case of Dabaab,  if counted as a 
city, it would be Kenya's third largest, the current situation is unsustainable and returning the inhabitants is 
also not an option, within international norms, but also logistically (teff,2012). Furthermore: “A 2010 study 
commissioned by the Kenyan, Danish and Norwegian governments showed that the Dadaab camps bring 
about $14m into the surrounding community each year. The study also found that the annual turnover of 
refugee-run, camp-based businesses in Dadaab is around $25m. Continuing to run these camps as emergency 
operations after 20 years is not in anyone's interests”(Teff,2012). 
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Capacity sharing or responsibility or burden sharing for the protection of refugees 
can be understood as financial aid, as practical and material assistance, and in terms of 
physical numbers of persons that are granted refuge. Of importance here are the asymmetric 
power relations within the refugee regime. There are no legal norms on responsibility 
sharing within the international community on refugees (BETTS, 2005:1-2). Moreover, 
states will not altruistically contribute to refugee protection (BETTS, 2011:77).  
In a broader sense this account for the human rights regime in a broader sense. In 
international politics as has been said: pure idealism begets idealism. To establish binding 
international commitments, much more is required (MORAVCSIK, 2000:249). 
Nevertheless, to an extent burden sharing does take place by way of states financial 
contributions to UNHCR, and by states accepting repatriation for examples in mutual 
agreements, and by states offering refugees to be resettled from their first country of asylum. 
However, commitments are not sufficient. The global regime is weak in terms of capacity to 
enforce and finance protection. Moreover, burden sharing objectives are vaguely 
conceptualised and likewise not enforceable. There are difficulties in assuring resettlement. 
It this light one should note how disbursing funds is often easier accomplished than moving 
people (UCARER, 2006:235). 
3. The European Union 
The Geneva Refugee Convention emerged out of collective concern to solve the post 
WWII refugee problem in Europe. At present the Convention has 145 state parties, against 
146 for the 1967 protocol.  Between 2008 and 2012 the 27 EU members received 64 percent 
of all asylum applications in industrialized states (UNHCR).  
Often it is pointed out how regional burden sharing arrangements could and should 
be complementary to global burden sharing. Therefore, the EU provides a good case study of 
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how concepts of protection and responsibility are evolving in a world of increasing political 
and economic integration (HADDAD, 2010:86). Like the UN, and perhaps more 
successfully, in its policy the EU is engaged in innovation, rule articulation and rule 
diffusion.  International governmental organizations have a policy pushing agenda 
(UCARER, 2006:220). The EU as a specific regime is nested in a ‘superstructure’ which has 
been (and continuously is) negotiated in a multilateral setting. The specific regime is 
constrained by norms, principles and at times the rules and decision making procedures of 
the superstructure (UCARER, 2006:221). Changes in the superstructure would therefore, 
shift the boundaries between which the specific regimes can devise their policies. 
Human rights and humanitarian principles are considered the foundation of the EU 
and respecting them is a condition for new membership. Activities to safeguard human rights 
have been progressively increased with the adoption of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (VANDVIK, 2008:34) 
Nevertheless, it is argued how the EU is developing practices that signal departure 
from the global refugee regime and norms, as part of the attempts to create a common 
European asylum framework. These efforts have received the label of responsibility shirking 
and responsibility shifting, rather than commitment to the sharing of responsibilities. 
Shirking responsibilities, because of collectively implementing exclusionary policies for 
eligibility as refugees; responsibility shifting refers to the shifting of financial, physical or 
material burden to other member states, or states outside the EU; in terms of responsibility 
sharing in the EU there are limited (additional) commitments that indicate as such 
(UCARER, 2006:236). We will now turn to the practices that might have led the author to 
these contentions. 
Differing visions of responsibility in recent years have been played out regarding 
burden sharing in the EU. The Southern EU Member states seek shared responsibilities on 
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the physical presence of refugees, while Northern members prefer an emphasis on the 
provision of practical assistance to the Southern states in order for the refugees to remain 
hosted in the South.  
These stances of the Northern vs. the Southern states are connected to different types 
of protection and responsibility as promoted by the EU. On the one hand, there is the 
inwards turned vision focused on the development of the Common European Asylum 
System (CEAS) and the relocation of those granted international protection within the EU. 
On the other hand, there is a outwards looking vision, over EU borders, with an emphasis on 
addressing root causes of refugee flight (HADDAD, 2010:86). There is a recognition that 
responsibility should be shared, but there is uncertainty whether this is best done by moving 
people around within the EU, or to promote protection in situ either at the place of arrival in 
the EU or before doing do so, thus en route to the EU (HADDAD, 2010: 90). There are five 
elements to the EU policy: fair and fast asylum systems, returns, practical assistance, 
financial assistance, and the external dimension (HADDAD, 2010:88-89).  
Therefore, different responsibilities to protect can be identified within the EU policy, 
first whether the mechanism of responsibility sharing should be through physical burden 
sharing or through practical assistance, secondly, whether there is debate about the way in 
which the EU should provide protection to refugees, through the CEAS, or  based on an 
external relations approach on engagement with countries and regions of origins. The latter 
approach is argued to be more so in line with what has been termed the interventionist 
principle underlying the Responsibility to Protect (HADDAD, 2010:98-99).  
However, the question that can be asked here is whether engagement with countries 
and regions of origin should always be equaled to intervention as they would interfere with 
understandings of non-interference in internal affairs of other states. Especially if such 
cooperation takes place based on cooperation based upon mutual consent, which points more 
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in the direction of phrasing sovereignty as responsibility, which includes a responsibility of 
the sovereign to recognize a need for assistance from external actors in certain matters at 
certain moments. 
Antecedents of present understandings and dilemma’s within the EU policy towards 
refugees can already be found in the late 1980s and in the 1990s. In the Schengen agreement 
a principle of ‘responsible state’ is present, and the Dublin Convention of 1990 builds forth 
on this understanding of ‘responsible states’. Also regarding the Schengen agreement 
(devised to respond to refugee inflows originating from Eastern Europe, it contains the 
premise that the decision of one member state is valid for all member states. 
The Dublin Convention involves a pooling of responsibilities in the EU in refugee 
matters and in the determination of which EU member state would be responsible for 
assessing an asylum claim (GUILD, 2005:36-37). Under the Dublin Convention, a decision 
upon a claim taken by another member state, is a final decision, and therefore a new claim 
cannot be filed afterwards by the claimant in another member state. This may lead to 
practices where the asylum seeker does not have a choice of where to seek asylum and file a 
claim. Recalling the Dublin Convention of 1990 is relevant as its provisions and the 
provisions of its sequel, the so-called Dublin Regulation, adopted in 2003, rely on the same 
principle (HURWITZ, 2009:3).  
At the 1999 meeting of the European Council in Tampere, Finland, the establishment of a 
CEAS was elaborated and a commitment was made by the European Union members states 
to respect the right to seek asylum by the European Union Member. Besides the phrase of a 
‘responsible state’, also in the late 1980’s a plan for harmonized asylum had already come up 
(VANDVIK, 2008:38). The Conclusion of this meeting was that it would be contradictory to 
EU tradition to deny freedom , which is founded on human rights, democratic institutions 
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and rule of law, to those whose circumstances lead them justifiably to seek access to 
European territory (VANDVIK, 2008:34) 
From that point on, advancing towards a CEAS would include the adoption of Dublin 
II. Cooperation with countries of refugee origin would be intensified and common standards 
for fair and effective protection would be established, as well as minimum conditions for the 
reception of asylum seekers and harmonization of the rules applying to recognition of 
refugee status. Furthermore, there was a call for the adoption of a measure on temporary 
protection (UCARER, 2006:230). Temporary protection arises as an alternative option for 
refugee response in times of greater crises. The focus on temporary protection can be seen as 
a protection measure which is oriented towards return to the state of origin for the individual 
concerned and thus sets limits on time and space of protection. 
At the Thessaloniki meeting of the European Council in 2003, came the 
understanding round of how a reduction in asylum seekers in the EU, does not necessarily 
represent an overall reduction in asylum seekers on the international level (LEVY, 2010:93). 
In response to protection gaps, i.e. the space between norms on protection and their 
implementation, the ideas of managed entry procedures and regional protection areas were 
coined as instruments to offer protection to those in need as promptly and as close to home 
as possible, avoiding the need for dangerous border crossings in the bid to reach Europe. 
(LEVY, 2010:94).  
Among the EU practices emerged in response to these gaps, measures can be 
identified which are an extension from earlier emerged national practices in refugee 
responses. Many states, especially those who establish the borders of the EU have 
established bilateral cooperation with non-EU member states in terms of managing entry into 
the EU of non-EU citizens and such national practices have been adapted to the regional 
level.  
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However from bilateral readmission agreements on returns of asylum seekers or 
denied asylum claimants may surge the practice of receiving states to  turn their back on 
neighbours and do the same thing, i.e. chain refoulement. 
In this practice  a shifting occurs of responsibility to review claims away from the 
core of the EU and the main critique voiced is how undocumented migrants and 
undocumented asylum seekers in need for international protection fall in hands of private 
actors (226). The practice of security is ever more often being outsourced from the state to 
private actors, which yet have to be subjected to norms and obligations under human rights 
and other treaties.  
A consequence has been that the borders of the European Union have become ‘de-
territorialised’ (VANDVIK, 2008:28). As such border control, is no longer confined to the 
physical borders of the EU, but entrance procedures and checks have become virtual, 
monitored through advanced identification technologies and databases, in order to stem 
flows towards the EU border at their source and let people remain as close to their country or 
region of origin. As such the effects of these practices are in contradiction with basic human 
rights such as the right to leave one’s country, which is central to the right to seek asylum.  
Furthermore, it creates the risk of effective refoulement through absence of access to fair and 
efficient asylum procedures that are judged on their substance (VANDVIK, 2008:27-28).  
Control on entry takes place on entrance by airline flights, over land and by sea. In 
this light, irregular entries by sea are less important in terms of numbers than by land, but 
still considerable, as is the death toll of those who try to arrive at European borders by sea 
but do not manage to reach land safely (VANDVIK, 2008:37). This could however be 
interpreted as violating Article 2 of the ECFR on the right to life. Responsibility for people 
intercepted, rescued, or rejected is often unclear (NAZARSKI, 2008:41). Public discourse 
addressing migration by sea considers this movement of persons as a menace to the receiving 
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society rather than taking a perspective from of the people whose lives are actually in 
jeopardy (VANDVIK, 2008: 31).  
Eduard Nazarski argues how in-region-protection is de facto already in place as only 
a small percentage of refugees eventually reaches Europe, and ‘protection elsewhere’ 
understandings by the EU have induced many refugees en route to Europe to remain in 
neighboring countries, even though the international protection levels provided by states as 
Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Egypt and Ukraine can be questioned (NAZARSKI, 2008:41-42).  
The dilemma surrounding control at the European borders can be phrased as 
promoting either the protection of, or protection from, refugees and the following question 
may be raised: “Does Europe have the intention and will to protect refugees, or is it 
organizing things in order to protect itself from refugees?” (NAZARSKI, 2008:42).  
Importantly, the same author reminds us of how the fact that some people do not 
have the proper documents to  stay or travel in a certain country does not mean that they do 
not have rights. Therefore, he calls upon the media to use more apt language when 
addressing these issues and calls for more transparency in state practices (NAZARSKI, 
2008:42). 
 
C) Refugee protection gaps in context 
1. Contemporary refugee flight 
The agenda of international politics has been broadened over the last decades. 
Processes of increased integration and cooperation can be distinguished but also processes of 
protectionism and discourses of threat and insecurity. Globalisation at once urges for a need 
to ‘disattach’ the state from the vulnerability that may come with it, as is a facilitating factor 
for many positive and constructive developments. Furthermore, other actors have come to 
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play a role, or more important roles. To consider state policy responses to international 
phenomena it is imperative to see to what extent not only responses but whether also the 
nature of the problem and maybe the context has changed. It was argued that it is utopian to 
look to an era beyond state sovereignty and how the chief threat to human rights nowadays 
comes not from tyranny alone but from civil war and anarchy (IGNATIEFF, 2001:35). 
Ignatieff further argues here how the sovereign state is exactly the building brick for 
maintaining order. We will now further see into the relation between the state and the 
challenges it faces to uphold human rights and the consequences for the forced displacement 
of populations. 
In the debate surrounding the changing characteristics of warfare, the effects of 
globalisation and the argumentation how states are losing their power to influence outcomes 
of their policies, there has been the well-known new wars discourse, advocated by Mary 
Kaldor.  This line of argumentation mainly refers to changed characteristics of war in terms 
of goals, methods of warfare and way in which they are financed (KALDOR, 1999:7). The 
distinctions between war, organized crime and large scale violations of human rights have 
become blurred (KALDOR, 1999:2). War does not revolve anymore around the capture of 
territory, but about political control of population (KALDOR, 1999:9). The tactics applied to 
achieve this, consisting of sowing fear and hatred, result in high levels of refugees and 
displaced persons (KALDOR, 1999:11). 
The understanding of how contemporary wars are more so (not necessarily declared) 
internal and often protracted conflicts, thus involving different intrastate parties, implies how 
they do not culminate easily in victory or conquest. Although usually internationalized, these 
conflicts differ from interstate declared wars. Internal conflicts often last until a shared 
exhaustion with conflict comes about. Such mutual exhaustion has been coined a mutually 
hurting stalemate, with which may come in addition, a dawning mutual respect, joint mutual 
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recognition and a common commitment to moral universals for agreement (IGNATIEFF, 
2001:21). Conflicting parties often will remain sharing the same state after the peace 
agreements are signed. After signature these agreements importantly still have to be 
implemented, which is not always guaranteed nor successful. 
It is debated whether civilians are nowadays proportionately more targeted in conflict 
than before. Nonetheless the disagreement surrounding this contention, it is clear how there 
is more information available on casualties. Furthermore, some figures are inflated and thus 
show a distorted picture. Population displacement figures may be cumulative for example, 
including repeatedly displaced persons. Aspects such as advanced technology and increased 
interconnectedness, which can be ascribed to available means of transport and 
communications, also play a role in the actual displacement of populations and the visibility 
of such (KALDOR, 1999:214). Regarding the strong criticism that the new wars paradigm 
has received, Kaldor herself explained how her primary goal was to emphasize the 
illegitimacy of present day wars and how individual rights and importantly how the rule of 
law should be placed at the center of any response (KALDOR, 1999:3). 
Alongside a new wars discourse there is a weak state/ failed state/ fragile state 
discourse, referring to states that according to the entities labeling them have difficulties 
fulfilling the requirements of a full-blown sovereign state. As such, weak states could be or 
become instable, and therefore endanger international order and stability. In terms of rule of 
law, stable states provide best possibility for national rights regimes and these remain the 
most important protector of human rights (IGNATIEFF, 2001:23). National rule of law is 
important as the liberties of citizens are better protected by their own institutions than by 
well-meant interventions from outsiders (IGNATIEFF, 2001:35).  
On the international plane, naming and shaming is an integral part of the international 
human rights regime and with a not so good human rights record, for states it becomes 
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harder to secure international loans and military help (IGNATIEFF, 2001: ). At times these 
measures become contradictory as exactly populations that need support from the 
international community become subjected to the consequences of sanctions imposed on 
their national leaders or government. Therefore, the exercise of being part of the 
international community is to some degree conditional on the observance of proper human 
rights behaviour. When states fail, they render themselves subject to criticism, sanction and 
as a final resort intervention (IGNATIEFF, 2001:17).  
Refugee flows are corollaries and the physical appearance to instability as 
represented by human rights violations. Refugee flight has also become of the securitization 
discourses and post 9/11 terrorist threat. The characteristics of contemporary refugee flows 
have been enumerated as mixed flows, irregular secondary movements, and protracted 
refugee situations, from these perspectives states have tried to seek responses. 
2. State practice to address contemporary refugee flight 
International refugee protection depends at a basic level, on the freedom of 
movement. Geography, poverty and conflict may make it impossible to leave a country of 
origin. (LONG, 2012:1). Added to such constraints, measures are taken by states to limit 
population movements. Often applied, or explained in discourse, as an anti-immigration 
measure, or in a different context, to prevent spill-over from ongoing armed conflict in a 
neighbouring country. 
These types of limiting measures have far reaching repercussions for the individual 
refugee. People trying to flee will, if unable to cross the state borders, become internally 
displaced persons. Higher numbers of IDP’s in the world in comparison to lowering numbers 
of refugees as a trend, could thus be understood as a self-fulfilling prophecy (GUILD, 
2009:74-75). The broadened group of persons of concern to UNHCR, particularly in 
81 
 
countries of origin has been seen as a recognition of the consequences for the international 
community when internal displacement becomes external displacement (GOODWIN GILL 
and MCADAM, 2007:27). External displacement thus has to be avoided, and providing in 
country assistance can be a tool to prevent this. 
The situation of IDPs is often one of hardship and vulnerability, and may have 
destabilizing effects on the host state. The fact that the individual still depends on the same 
state that was not able to safeguard initial protection creates uncertainty (GUILD, 2009:76). 
The international community has made efforts to reach agreement on how to respond to 
IDP’s. These initiatives were premised on the idea that protection for IDP’s is part of 
national sovereignty (GUILD, 2009:79). Commitments therefore reflect an affirmation of 
already existing ones under the UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR setting threshold for behaviour 
towards all persons, not just citizens (GUILD, 2009:79). Some progress has been made by 
the international community on creating more safeguards for the position of IDP’s, as 
evidenced in the guiding principles for internally displaced persons, the Kampala 
Convention signed by African States, and codified in a number of national laws. However, 
as with many documents in this area, the problem is not in standards but in implementation 
(GOODWIN GILL, 2007: 229). 
An ultimate measure to mitigate external displacement is through border closure, 
which can be applied as response to humanitarian emergency (mass upheaval), or as anti-
migration policy. In cases of humanitarian emergency, Katy Long showed how border 
closures in the face of mass refugee influx give insights into the political calculations that 
shape states’ and UNHCR responses to refugee crises. She refers to situations that occurred 
in Somalia, Iraq, Kosovo, Rwanda and Afghanistan. Rather than pressuring for an opening 
of the border, the answer of the international community has been the establishment of 
alternative safe zones to host displaced populations, who in turn where dependent on the 
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provision of humanitarian assistance (LONG, 2012). Besides depending on the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, their safety also became dependent on the international 
community’s capacity to keep safe havens safe. There is a contradiction to be discerned 
however in how shifting understandings of sovereignty have opened up space for additional 
protection of IDP’s, and allow for easier delivery of humanitarian aid within conflict settings 
(LONG, 2012:17). On the flipside however, through containment policies to an extent the 
need for in country, or in region protection is first created by the same states that in turn 
deliver aid. Provision of humanitarian aid clearly is needed when such situations arise, but 
asylum should not be reduced to such aid. The right to refugee protection cannot be replaced 
by refugee charity (LONG, 2012.15).  
Even in situations of mass influx of refugees, other states might not step up in large 
numbers to come to the aid. Industrialized countries have often advocated solutions that 
would keep the would be refugees in their place of origin or close to it while attempting to 
remedy the situation through political means (UCARER, 2006:223).  
In a broader context it if often stated how states increasingly place emphasis on the 
containment of armed conflict within the territory or region where it is taking place. Limiting 
movement of persons can be considered part of this practice of containing armed conflict, if 
population movement is understood as possibly creating instability. The turn of the cold war 
saw a shift from communist policies for exit control, fiercely criticized by Western states, to 
a new emphasis on border control from host communities (LONG 2012: 5). 
A great concern for industrialized states states are (irregular) secondary movements, 
by which they mean, the onward movement after the initial movement of flight or migration. 
In terms of refugee flight, for prevention of such secondary movement, the protection 
conditions and capacity of the first country of asylum, or any other state that might be on the 
trajectory of the fleeing person, is important. Another concern regards mixed refugees flows, 
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concerning populations where it difficult to distinguish economic motivations for movement 
from flight due to fear of persecution. Some of those travelling in these mixed migration 
flows will have valid claims to international protection as refugees (LONG, 2012:16). The 
latter may be overlooked if these persons, and thus also the measures to address these 
situations, are considered migrants, particularly, irregular migrants. 
As mentioned above, over the past decades, the international community came to 
terms in realizing how the problem of refugees would not be solved and would therefore 
have to be approached as something permanent. A collective responsibility as envisioned in 
the Geneva Convention became to be considered a collective burden. On a broader level 
politics and processes of globalization changed, and at the same time causes and 
consequences of forced migration differentiated and responses of states to refugees adapted 
too.  
International cooperation in the refugee field has changed from an emphasis on 
collective assistance and protection, to transnational policies on containing refugee flows 
(HURWITZ, 2009:2). Over the 1970s, the era of generous asylum policies reached an end 
and the international attention became progressively focused on restricting access to the 
asylum system (HURWITZ, 2009:23). But also importantly the success of preventing the 
asylum seeker from having access to procedures, and from reaching the territory has driven 
official numbers down. Containment practices include the imposition of visa restrictions, 
carrier sanction, interception on the high seas and expedited procedures for manifestly 
unfounded claims (HURWITZ, 2009:2). Others simply die en route. Media outlets have 
informed us of the erection of physical walls etc. Containment policies increasingly forced 
refugees to travel over land, and have also placed the decision making capacity in hands of 
private actors such as airline officials and security companies.  
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There was a registered increase in asylum applications in the industrialized world 
from late 1970s until its peak in 1992. Then numbers decreased (HURWITZ, 2009:1). Partly 
this decline can be explained by the cessation of conflicts. Given the uncertain and perhaps 
unpromising legal situation that follows flight, increased attention is now focused on ways 
and means to prevent refugee outflows (HURWITZ, 2009:3). We have seen this to some 
extent above. A focus on prevention could achieve positive and negative results for the 
individual and state in question. All in all, even the best refugee protection is no substitute 
for human rights protection at home. Prevention can be geared towards containing refugee 
flows, but can also involve addressing the underlying causes of flight, also known as root 
causes. 
Long argues how the lines between preventative protection and coercive containment 
have frequently been blurred. (LONG, 2012:2). She distinguishes a wider interest among 
states in moving away from the obligations of asylum towards a more fluid and more 
minimal understanding of ‘safety’ (LONG, 2012: 15).  Many of the issues at stake within the 
more general human rights regime also account for the gaps between promise and practice in 
refugee protection. Human rights are one of the three universal languages of globalization, 
with money and the Internet. Human rights have gone global because it has advanced the 
interests of the powerless, not because it serves the interests of the powerful (IGNATIEFF, 
2001:7). Nevertheless, for money, internet and human rights alike, the main difficulty may 
be ‘access’.  
 
3. Safe country practices in context of Europe 
In Europe there seems to be a contradiction between economic integration and in that 
light vanishing borders, and on the other hand stronger guarded national borders in terms of 
migration and asylum policy (86). Furthermore, Bigo has called it the myth of political 
85 
 
discourse that European controls are linked with the place where borders of the EU actually 
run (BIGO, 49). Border controls have become disconnected to some extent from the physical 
borders, through controls at sea, airports and neighbouring countries before reaching EU 
territory. Ever since Tampere and Kosovo greater coherence between the EU’s internal and 
external policies is seeked for, however not always with success. 
We have seen the different types of protection as promulgated by EU, internally the 
CEAS and externally the imperative to address root causes of migration. The tendencies to 
increasingly provide temporary protection, rather than full blown asylum, and advocating for 
in-country or in-region protection could be examples of how the international community 
stands for universal values, nevertheless, applies risk averse means to defend them 
(IGNATIEFF, 2001:43). 
The attempt of western countries, particularly EU countries to evade obligation by 
ensuring that refugees are removed ever farther from the borders of the EU, challenges the 
very foundations of the international refugee regime. In the foregoing chapter we saw other 
gaps that have become increasingly visible between the international standards of refugee 
protection and the implementation of these. The humanitarian considerations regarding the 
refugee seem to have become overrule by the security agenda. One of the initiatives that 
have arisen to address state concerns regarding mass influx of refugees, but at the same time 
in theory to an extent seems to address weakness in the present refugee protection regime, is 
the safe country concept.  
Safe third country practices have become increasingly widespread in the last 15 years 
(HURWITZ, 2009:170). The safe third country concepts contravenes the principle of 
solidarity and burden sharing, particularly when applied unilaterally and on the sole basis of 
transitory passage (HURWITZ, 2009:171). Moreover, the EU is supporting policies to 
encourage neighbouring countries to adopt readmission policies towards their own 
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neighbours (HURWITZ, 2009:167). In this light it was argued how the EU in the case of 
those looking for international protection, the policy of the EU to keep them trapped in the 
region or country of persecution.The internal flight alternative is anther policy example in 
this light. 
On the other hand it could be argued how safe third country practices in conjunction 
with safe first country of asylum understandings, alleviate the ‘unallocated responsibility’ 
dilemma in international relations. In other words, these practices seem to simplify 
determination of the responsible state for dealing with an asylum claim and rule out how 
such responsibility cannot just be transferred or be left to deal with by another state. If the 
refugee reaches state A, which in turn does not address his claim, therefore the refugee 
decides to move on to state B, state B can move the refugee back to state A and tell this state 
to take responsibility. Clearly the issue is not this straightforward however, as we shall see in 
the following part. 
The safe country concept seeks to allocate international legal obligations. According 
to Hurwitz safe third country practices are instruments of containment, limiting States’ 
obligations to examine an asylum claim; restricting the refugee’s choice of asylum country; 
hindering movements from the region of origin, and increasing the protection burden on first 
asylum States and those States situated near to the country or region of origin of asylum 
seekers (HURWITZ, 2009) 
Safe third country practices are used by states to dismiss an asylum claim when the 
asylum seeker has transited through or has other connections with another country so long as 
that country can be regarded as safe (HURWITZ, 2009:173). The concepts of safe country of 
origin and safe third country concepts were adopted by the European Community in 1991 in 
response to perceived misuse of asylum claims and to function as a deterrent measure (228). 
From UN declarations it results how asylum shall not be refused solely on the grounds that it 
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could be sought from another state. However, where it appears that a person requesting 
asylum already has a connection or close links with another state, the contracting state may, 
if it appears fair and reasonable, require him first to request asylum from that state 
(HURWITZ, 2009:21). The concept of safe country is grounded on a presumption however. 
Conditions of safety do not have to be the same for every individual and could 
change rapidly. Determination needs extensive and exhaustive information gathering 
systems on local conditions to make sound judgments. If standards of treatment in third or 
first country of asylum are inadequate, they push asylum seekers to look for better 
conditions.215.  
The understanding of ‘safe countries’, departs from an interpretation of the Geneva 
Convention reading that only return to the country of persecution is prohibited. However, 
return to any other country is permissible (GUILD, 36). Such policies create an obligation to 
seek asylum in the first safe through which one passes. The practices are problematic for 
many reasons. What constitutes a safe state has to be defined, country information has to be 
maintained up to date, and most importantly, what represents a safe state in general terms, 
not necessarily is safety for all. Individual assessment is crucial to the refugee case. 
Moreover, the closer a first safe state of asylum is to the country of origin, geographically 
speaking, the greater the chance for a continuing threat. Hurwitz argues that: “safe third 
country practices challenge the very foundations of the international refugee regime, which 
is based on a collective endeavor and commitment to protect refugees, a collective 
responsibility of states as members of the international community which results from the 
unwillingness and/or inability of the country of origin to provide such protection 
(HURWITZ, 2009, :5).  
This concept raises questions whether refugees (should) have a choice of their 
country of asylum, and whether the asylum claim should be filed in the first country that is 
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reached and considered safe. Refugees are under no such obligation in international law and 
the existing exceptions are spelled out (HURWITZ, 2009:211). Safe third country practices 
not only limit the options available for the refugee but also is it questionable to send back 
asylum seekers to countries where the opportunity to seek and receive asylum is limited or 
even non-existent (HURWITZ, 2009:211). 
The European Union has attempted to define out of existence asylum seekers who are 
nationals of a Member state (GUILD, 2005 32). Each Member State shall be regarded as a 
safe country of origin as regards applications made by their nationals (GUILD, 2005 32). EU 
members are considered democratic enough as not to create refugees as defined by the 
Geneva Convention (226).  
In such cases however, the risk of threat to the individual in case’s freedom and life 
could be lessened by ensuring that the third state in question is a party to human rights 
instruments, importantly the Geneva Conventions. Accession to international treaties and 
domestic legislation is not sufficient to guarantee effective protection however. Furthermore, 
individual assessment is necessary (HURWITZ, 2009:198). Nonetheless, removal of 
refugees to third states is common practice, and seems accepted by UNHCR. Such actions 
preferably should also be based mutual agreement between the third state and the removing 
state. (HURWITZ, 2009:218-219). 
The international refugee regime is premised upon the principle of cooperation and 
collective responsibility of states. In the protection of refugees, although it seems tempting to 
make states responsible to include direct, and indirect, breaches of international obligations, 
the latter may be a bridge too far (HURWITZ, 2009:216-217). To a certain extent 
developments in international law are working towards the possibility of indirect, and 
rejected by one state may not in principle influence adjucation in another state party 
(HURWITZ, 2009:182). The court argued how the operation of the Dublin Convention and 
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of safe third country practices does not affect states’ individual responsibility for the breach 
of human rights obligations, such responsibility cannot be contracted out. Therefore, in case 
that a state decides to return a asylum seeker to the third safe country or first safe country, 
effectively it must be determined that in the third country the individual would enjoy 
protection against refoulement (HURWITZ, 2009: 197).  
 
 Chapter conclusion 
In this chapter we seeked to address the question to what extent responsibility allocation can 
bridge refugee protection gaps. Are the differences between standards of protection for 
refugees and the way in which they are implemented or work out attributable to unclear 
divisions of responsibility and this  the main weakness of the international refugee regime? 
We first focused on some philosophical foundations of the essence of refugee 
protection. From Kant we derived a right to hospitality for the peaceful visitor to temporary 
stay in foreign territories. According to more contemporary thinkers such a territorially 
constituted right to temporary stay and freedom is not sufficient to address our present day 
interconnectedness. The human being needs belonging, a right to enter societies, to receive 
recognition and to act. Furthermore, the presence of  some effective (statal) mechanism is 
that guarantees these rights is pivotal, otherwise rights are worthless. 
The international refugee protection regime represents the set of norms, rules, principles and 
decision making procedures which regulate state responses to refugees. We identified two 
norms that underpin this regime: asylum and burden sharing. Under the institution of asylum 
falls the quite clear cut responsibility of states towards refugees arriving to their territories. A 
set of norms and human rights falls under this header, most notably the norm of non-
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refoulement which prohibits the return of a person to a territory where his or her life or 
freedom would be at risk. 
Increasingly the problem of the refugee became considered by the international community 
not as a temporary post war readjusting measure, but as a more permanent feature of 
international affairs. It became regarded as a burden. The statal commitment drawing forth 
out of recognition of a collective responsibility to protect refugees became an approach of 
how to share the burden. 
Unfortunately, state responsibility is weakly defined toward refugees present at other 
territories and international cooperation between states in this matter exists, but is weakly 
instituted. The fast majority of refugees are hosted in the global south and willingness of 
states to provide durable solutions is limited. To a certain extent the UN Refugee agency 
(UNHCR) has managed to broker some commitment by channeling state interest in terms of 
concerns with irregular secondary movements and mixed migration. However, UNHCR 
remains an intergovernmental agency and needs to balance between the interests of its 
donors with the needs and plight of the refugee. 
Cooperation between states increasingly has focused on containment rather than seeking 
solutions State practice has come to put asylum norms under pressure and refugee protection 
gaps become very visible. Especially practices are applied hat curb the freedom of 
movement of persons, endangering guarantees for the right to leave any country including 
one’s own and the norm of non refoulement. Such measures may de facto deprive people 
from the right to seek asylum. States focus on prevention in positive and negative ways, 
addressing root cause of flight and preventing persons from leaving either their home state or 
region, while trying to broker political solution to the violence that triggers flight.  
However, such practices are based on emerging different understandings of safety, 
preferably providing temporary humanitarian assistance, providing protection elsewhere. 
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Addressing root causes is positive as there is no better than human rights protection at home, 
but refugee protection must not be turned in to refugee charity. It is important to keep clear 
how the refugee has an individualized fear of persecution and deserves to make use of its 
rights to action and rights to cross the border to seek asylum. Reconceptualising border and 
state victimising themselves 
Regional organisations are subscribed a crucial role in present day issues of 
international politics. The Refugee Convention was devised to address post WWII refugee 
problem in Europe, and the European Union considers human rights guarantees as its 
foundation. However, also within the EU between Northern and Southern Member states the 
notions of how to safeguard refugee protection and share the responsibility to host these 
persons is a matter of tension. Measures taken towards achieving a Common European 
Asylum System, such as the Dublin Convention and Regulation have not yet effectively 
achieved a sharing of responsibilities towards refugees between EU member states.  A notion 
of labeling states of origin or transit of refugees as safe country of origin, places guarantees 
for refugees at risk. In public discourse states are represented as victimised by who are the 
real victims, the refugees. 
Underlying these processes is a reconceptualising of the state border. Incurring state 
responsibility slowly becomes disattached from territory toward different understandings of 
jurisdiction linked to control. However, controlling people’s movement is rather 
unsuccessful. And rather than devising ways of how to pass on responsibility to another 
state, the first step is for states to take responsibility themselves for persons arriving at their 
territory, but also those who are under their control before they do so and for example when 
they present themselves at a virtual border.  
If additionally cooperation will be stepped up to return to take collective 
responsibility for addressing refugee situations rather than cooperating on containment and 
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approaching the issue in a negative phrasing, as a burden, where one has to distance itself 
from. This will bridge refugee protection gaps. But currently many practices work the other 
way. 
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Chapter three – A memory of failed attempts the way forward 
Introduction 
In the foregoing we have seen the underlying norms of the international refugee regime, 
to be asylum and burden sharing, we went over the standards of refugee protection, but also 
touched upon emerging protection gaps, gaps usually defined as the inconsistency between 
standards and implementation, resulting in ineffective protection for refugees.  
Furthermore, we referred to emerging practices and tendencies in refugee responses, 
within a changing context i.e. contemporary forced migration, more so focusing on the 
implementation of responsibility (sharing), with special attention for the European Union. 
Initiatives for responsibility sharing, if coined with good intentions may result in adverse 
effects.  
From the first chapter we recall how in terms of human rights protection, the lack of 
clear allocation of a responsibility to protect has severe consequences for the effectiveness of 
this doctrine, the foregoing chapter laid out the standards in refugee protection, how the 
refugee problem was to be collectively addressed and the burden of the refugee problem was 
to be shared.  
However, gaps emerged or remain, and (not always so) new practices arise that to 
allocate responsibility; in the end do they as such strengthen protection and bridge gaps? The 
question to be addressed in this last chapter is: To what extent can RtoP strengthen the 
protection offered by states to refugees? 
 
 
 
 
94 
 
A) A memory of failed attempts 
Ocarer mentioned how the push forward towards CEAS arose in response to the 
aftermath of the Kosovo crisis and a memory of failed attempts to protect populations at risk 
(UCARER, 2006 234). Such a memory of failed attempts fits within the larger developments 
as we have also seen regarding the responsibility to protect doctrine and the initial passes of 
the international refugee regime, which were prompted by a consciousness of the hardships 
of persons fleeing persecution initiated at the turn of the 19th century and gained especially 
momentum after the Second World War with a resonance of ‘never again’.  
In terms of the emergence of the responsibility to protect concept, failed attempt at 
protecting populations from mass atrocities have been at the forefront as was mentioned in 
the first chapter such as occurred in the nineties.  
The Kosovo crisis has been an important impetus for the European Union to revise its 
protection framework as these atrocities happened on the European continent. Not only was 
considered that after the Second World War such atrocities were not to be repeated on the 
continent, also there were important implications in terms of persons fleeing to European 
Union Member states, some were over disproportionately overburdened and  this revealed 
the lack of burden sharing.  
However, at current nor the envisioned CEAS, nor the responsibility to protect 
doctrine is effectively addressing the causes and consequences of before mentioned crises, 
and forsaking on the protection of populations. Particularly, the latter is risking to become 
the next in line of these failed attempts, with the events occurring in Syria every day.  
Therefore, what contribution has the emergence and to a certain extent consolidation 
of RtoP spurred at various levels and how may this have had repercussions for the related 
agenda on refugee protection? What is gained and where is it lacking? 
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1. Development of the responsibility of states as a norm 
In the before going we have seen the standards that have been established for states in 
terms of their responsibilities towards vulnerable populations, particularly emphasising 
refugees for the purpose of this thesis. We have also seen however, how the understanding of 
incurring responsibility, likewise the possibility of looking the other way or forsaking on 
responsibilities, a tendency seems to evolve from sharing responsibilities to shifting burdens.  
However, even if in declarations and at times treaties such collective responsibility is 
recognized, in the implementation phase protection gaps appear and there is still a lot to 
gain.    
At times it is not clear what responsibility involves and for whom, also other 
considerations may eventually prevail over the fate of the victims. RtoP tries to strengthen a 
sense of responsibility allocation and to create a duty to protect for the international 
community. Such a duty to protect has political, legal and moral aspects. Where does the 
international community stand on this topic? What guides state behavior in this respect and 
how has this evolved, or may be, evolving? Is it politics, law or morals? 
There is a growing interest in soft law as an element of modern international 
lawmaking in present day international relations. General norms or principles are more often 
found in the form of nonbinding declarations or resolutions of international organizations. 
Such principles are important as they may influence the interpretation, application and 
development of other rules of law (HURWITZ, 2009:163). Also are they helpful in the sense 
that they wish to promote some degree of predictability, create some expectations, and a 
framework for future action, helping to define a standard of good behavior. This conception 
is similar to that of regime theory (HURWITZ, 2009:164). We referred to regime theory 
before which was defined as a set of rules, norms and decision making procedures regulating 
state responses regarding particular topics and situations. 
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Furthermore, after the signing and/ or ratification of treaties, subsequent state practice 
has a high value in the interpretation of treaties, as is clear from Article 31 of the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. State practice may reveal common intention, a 
nascent objective of the treaty, and may modify a conventional rule in order to adjust to new 
circumstances which may differ from the conditions at the time of drafting. Eventually state 
practice may lead to the formation of a new customary rule. Practice then however, must be 
common to, or at least accepted by all of the parties to the Treaty and be consistent and 
concordant (HURWITZ, 2009:131). 
In assessing the role of norms in interstate relations first we have to further define 
what a norm is. Constructivists define a norm as a collective understanding of a standard of 
appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity (HUISINGH, 2013:7). The theory of 
interactional international law as developed by Brunnee and Tope, provides the step between 
political norms as studied by constructivism and international legal norms. They argue that 
norms will lead to a sense of  legal obligations if they are based on shared understandings, 
fulfill the internal requirements of legality and are supported by a practice of legality 
(HUISINGH, 2013:6).  
In the theory of interactional international law the certain conditions are studied that 
make a rule or norm a legal obligation, as opposed to common international law where 
compliance is difficult to explain (HUISINGH, 2013:10). The question is thus under what 
conditions may political norms become legal ones, whether as soft law or even eventually as 
legally binding ones. 
Norms do not operate alone but complement each other in a broader normative 
framework. Only the law created through an interactional framework can be considered as 
legitimate and as derived from insights of social constructivism, the perceived self interest of 
states is not based on a rational cost-benefit analysis, but on social norms. International law 
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is created through interaction and reciprocity which has to be maintained by actors 
collectively (HUISINGH, 2013:10). Also is it argued that normative frameworks prefer 
stasis to change (HUISINGH, 2013:9). The extent to which international politics really is 
guided by social norms is debatable however, as will further be addressed below. 
When discussing the emergence and status of RtoP in the international arena, Gareth 
Evans was cited who argued that RtoP is a new emerging norm. Evans can be considered a 
norm entrepreneurs, persons or organizations that try to propose and  promote a certain mode 
of behavior in IR in line with a (emerging) norm or principle. Norm entrepreneurs need to 
act from an organizational platform that provides them with access to information and 
important audiences. To support new norms so that they can successfully compete with old 
norms, the norm entrepreneurs have to use language to reframe the debate and create a new 
way of understanding an issue (HUISINGH, 2013:7).  
There is a necessity of clarification of the stage norm has achieved in order to analyse 
its likely political effects. Specificity, durability, concordance contribute to robustness of a 
norm. Specify has to be balanced with simplicity (HUISINGH, 2013).  
Norm tipping, which happens when the balance shifts from being an emerging norm 
to a cascading norm, i.e. more rapidly spreading and adoption, rarely occurs before one third 
of the total states in the system adopt the norm. Furthermore, some states arguably have 
more weight in the process of what is called international socialization. If a norm gets 
adopted by a state, it becomes part of the state’s habit and subsequently taken for granted. At 
that stage, the norm and practices in line with it are not part of public debate anymore, the 
norm has been internalised, and therefore becomes hard to discern (HUISINGH, 2013:8). 
 The redefining of responsibility of states towards their populations has already been 
set out above. State sovereignty increasingly is defined and explained as sovereignty as 
responsibility, in which light the developments in terms of responsibility to protect and IDP 
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protection needs can be placed. Human rights and needs are framed as being above 
preoccupations of pure state sovereignty interests.  Non-indifference to human suffering 
gains prevalence over non-intervention in internal affairs of sovereign states. In this sense 
the physical border of states becomes less so a barrier to human rights protection.  
Although human rights violations become more visible and the necessity of access to 
vulnerable populations is raised, still there are protection gaps, especially when states cannot 
safeguard human rights guarantees on their own. The responsibility to protect reminds and 
emphasises states of their commitments and obligations towards their populations but it is 
oftentimes precisely states that lack the capacity to provide effective protection where 
populations are at risk. 
This is where support of the international community should step in. However, this is 
an unallocated responsibility in terms of defining who and in what manner. In terms of 
allocating responsibility, in the context of the responsibility to protect with (as last recourse) 
intervention, the following factors have been proposed as contributing to identify who 
should bear responsibility to act: geographical proximity, special capacities in terms of 
expertise or strength, existence of special ties (WELSH and BANDA, 2010:223).  
It is important to indicate how proximity cannot be the ultimate trump in terms of 
distributing responsibility (WELSH and BANDA, 2010:226). Here is of importance the 
implications of strengthening responsibilities under the second pillar of RtoP, i.e. support 
from further away states, the international community to help states to uphold their 
obligations, as neighbouring states are often  natural bearers of consequences of human 
rights violations and violence in other states. 
From an ethical perspective it was argued that the international community’s 
remedial responsibility needs to take some account of the existing allocations of international 
responsibility in international society as they may be considered to be guiding the 
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expectations and actions of both those who are vulnerable and those who are in a position to 
help (WELSH and BANDA, 2010:226).  
However, competing rights claims do not occur in the abstract kingdom of ends but 
in the kingdom of means 21. Here is referred to what in other words is stated as that it is 
often not about standards but about implementation. Also could it be explained as how 
human rights in itself do not have to be competing, but rather the means available to achieve 
them. Generally, we all want to achieve the ‘good’ . It is a question o who has to provide and 
who has to pay. RtoP even as a norm would with difficulty change this situation. 
Ignatieff argues how we, as mankind, are making moral progress, even if progress is 
a contested concept, because we have an increased ability to see more and more differences 
among people as morally irrelevant. Human rights is the language of this moral progress, 
based on historical and pragmatic grounds, drawn from the experience of understanding that 
when human beings have defensible rights and individual agency is protected and enhanced, 
they, we, are less likely to be abused and oppressed. The diffusion of human rights 
instruments counts as progress even if there remains a gap between human rights instruments 
and the actual practice of states (IGNATIEFF, 2001:4).12 
Ignatieff further argues how human rights activism like to portray itself as an anti-
politics, in defense of universal moral claims meant to delegitimize political justifications for 
abuse of human beings. He argues how impartiality and neutrality is impossible and such 
activism is bound to be partial and political, in turn disciplined by moral universals. In 
human rights activism the representation of universal values should not be taken for granted 
(IGNATIEFF, 2001: 10)  
Since Helsinki Final Act of 1975 the capitalist rights tradition emphasizing political 
and civil rights lost counterweight of communist tradition giving primacy to economic and 
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social rights. This implies the danger of that this tradition may overreach itself. 
(IGNATIEFF, 2001:19). The global south may provide a new balance however.  
Here one touches upon the broader debate on the universality of human rights. Again, 
Ignatieff f argues that the political failure to enforce and apply human rights principles 
consistently and impartial caused non-western cultures to conclude that there is something 
wrong with the principles themselves (IGNATIEFF, 2001:48).  
Limits must therefore be placed on human  rights language, because means are 
limited even if moral ends are universal, to be less vulnerable to disappointment. The 
purpose of these limits is to protect and enhance individual agency in defining human rights 
issues and respect the agency of these agents. Therefore the human rights practice is obliged 
to seek consent for its norms (IGNATIEFF, 2001:8). 
For advancing a responsibility to protect this means that not all rights can be included 
under the banner of what RtoP wants to achieve and the matters it can be applied to. There 
must be limits, as said, precisely to avoid disappointment with the effectiveness of the 
concept. The above mentioned concerns regarding the western human rights tradition all In a 
certain way can be translated to an advancement of RtoP.  
In terms of advancing human rights guarantees, one can agree at the very least upon 
the right to life, in dignity. As interdependent components to the right to life we may 
understand questions regarding health, work and housing (CER). Although the validity of 
discussing the extent human rights are universal or not exists, this debate can happen 
elsewhere from situations where a human beings life is immediately at stake. 
 
2. Fine tuning the responsibility to protect 
We have seen in the first chapter the origins and characteristics of the responsibility 
to protect and also have been set out some signs of consolidation and contestation of the 
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responsibility to protect as an emerging principle in international relations. Furthermore, we 
identified two basic principal underlying norms that the responsibility to protect seems to 
share with the foundations of the international refugee protection regime: sovereignty as 
responsibility (a state has the responsibility to live up to obligations of protecting basic 
human rights that has committed itself to) and the sense of a collective or shared 
responsibility with other states to assist and support each other in fulfilling these obligations, 
i.e. the second pillar of RtoP. 
In recent years norm entrepreneurs on RtoP have tried to move emphasis in the 
debate surrounding the responsibility to protect away from the discussions about the 
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention and of whether the responsibility to protect shall 
defend human rights as considered universal and deriving from morality towards a 
discussion about how to practically implement a responsibility to protect. Meanwhile, an 
annual UNSG report on the responsibility to protect has become a tradition since 2009. 
The notion of committing states to obligations they have taken upon themselves (i.e., 
by signing a treaty for example) is an example in this case.  By signing a treaty the state 
shows commitment in future acting in the light and purpose of this treaty, and from this is 
legitimacy may be derived to remind states of this commitment. The responsibility to protect 
itself is not sustained by its own treaty obligation, however obligations to abstain from 
committing mass atrocities are .  
The limited successful application so far of RtoP spurred the elaboration of some 
alternative concepts. In the 2011 UNGA Ministerial week address, Brazil brought up the 
necessity of looking at responsibility in protecting. From the initial coining of this idea, it 
was then further developed into the Brazilian concept of responsibility while protecting 
(RWP). New ground was broken, first of all because Brazil had been critical of the 
responsibility to protect as so far has been developed but now explicitly acknowledged its 
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importance, furthermore it was the first time that Brazil was so outspoken on a contested 
debate, showing intention to be a global player and thus engaged as a norm entrepreneur. 
Also the timing was significant, right after the controversy over Libya (BRENNER, 2013:1-
2).  
An intention was identified of Brazil to live up to the responsibilities of a rising 
power in terms of being a full-fledged democracy looking for respect and support for human 
rights in its foreign policy. Furthermore, Brazil connects to the orientation of an attitude of 
non-indifference, rather than the principle of non-intervention (BRENNER, 2013:3). It is 
significant also for the North-South deadlock that to a certain extent has been at the core of 
the debate surrounding the RtoP concept. 
Regarding UNSC authorized interventions in Libya and Ivory Coast that explicitly 
mention a responsibility to protect is notable how the constellation of the SC at that point 
included all BRIC members and they voted in favor or abstained from voting to make the 
resolution possible. The Cote d´Ivoire and Libya debate focuses more so on the manner of 
response in implementation, rather than on the concept itself. RWP can be seen as 
consideration of issues related to the operationalization of the responsibility to protect, not 
necessarily an alternative to RtoP (BRENNER, 2013:4). The Brazilians framed the RWP as 
having the potential to bridge the gap between the West, the proponents of absolute 
sovereignty (Russia, China) and possibly the in between powers (BRENNER, 2013:4-5). 
However, subsequent implementation of the resolutions and NATO’s actions in Libya might 
have given R2p a bad name (BRENNER, 2013:4) 
RWP sits in the middle ground between modern humanitarian principles and strict 
state sovereignty (AVEZOV, 2013). Modern humanitarian principles would differ from the 
traditional ones of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and obtaining state consent before 
providing humanitarian aid to victims and vulnerable populations towards placing the needs 
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of the human beings at risk above other considerations. In creating humanitarian space and 
negotiate access, modern humanitarians would argue that at times taking sides is necessary 
and overstepping the necessity of sovereign consent to enter a state’s territory as well. 
Intervention under the banner cannot be taken in the name of universal rights and values, but 
should be partial and take the side of the victims. 
The concept of Brazilian coined RWP was critiqued by the argument that it would 
delay action, as it requires that “all possible diplomatic solutions must be pursued and 
exhausted and a ‘comprehensive and judicious analysis of the possible consequences’ carried 
out”. Moreover, RWP may “even back-pedal on R2P’s fundamental principle of a collective 
responsibility to protect populations by any means necessary, stipulating that situations must 
be ‘characterized as a threat to international peace and security’ before any coercive 
measures can be used.” In this regard the need for SC consultation adds difficult for effective 
rapid response to emerging situations of (possible) mass atrocities.  
In addition to these identified weaknesses of the concept, the lack of success of the 
RWP is also attributed to what has been called the Western political imagination that sees 
itself as the sole dominant and relevant player in the politics of global norms, with little 
room for agency for non-Western actors in the stages of the norm cycle. The role of non-
Western countries involves only implementing or rejecting the norm (BRENNER, 20136).  
Therefore, it is important especially for the development of the responsibility to 
protect and the RWP to understand the importance of constructive engagement with non-
Western proposals and initiatives in shaping critical norms (BRENNER, 2013:6-7). It would 
be interesting to look into such constructive non-western proposals of addressing refugee 
problems and see how they could strengthen refugee protection. 
The endorsement of non-indifference replacing the doctrine of nonintervention shows 
that sovereignty as responsibility is not a western concept but a shared commitment 
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(BRENNER, 2013:13). This argument can be contested however. The notion of non-
indifference may be gaining ground, but is definitely not yet implemented in all interstate 
relations and more importantly not regarding all matters. Speaking of non-indifference 
replacing non-intervention may be a bridge too far. 
Nevertheless, it is crucial if the responsibility to protect should develop into a widely 
shared and therefore effective international norm in dealing with imminent human rights 
violence, that it is broadly supported in words as well as means rather than regarded as a 
western imposed concept. All in all, it calls upon the international community, which in ideal 
cases would involve all (likeminded!) states and organizations. 
On the note of  the hope that the international community may ever arrive at a stage 
where the underlying norms of the responsibility to protect are fully internalized into state 
practice, regardless of other interests, a very critical stance was taken by: Xenia Avezov 
from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), when writing on the 
current human rights situation in Syria and the stance of the international community as 
regards:  
 
“the main obstacle to intervention in Syria is that no one wants to do it. Harsh 
lessons from Afghanistan, compounded by economic difficulties, have made the 
United States and other Western countries wary of costly long-term commitments, 
especially those without fairly assured and significant benefits.  Inaction in the 
Syrian conflict is symptomatic of a growing divide between the principled, normative 
international debate on R2P—which assumes that we will always intervene when it is 
needed to protect civilians—and the reality that intervention remains a matter of 
choice.  
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While it is politically incorrect to say so, intervention is often guided by a calculation 
of economic, political, and human costs to the intervener. So long as the 
international community segregates normative discussions about intervention from 
these cost calculations, protecting civilians from mass atrocity crimes will continue 
to pose major challenges. “   
(AVEZOV, 2013) 
The debate on Syria is clearly about whether to intervene or not. It is beyond the point of 
prevention or a petition for support from the international community by a national 
government to aid the latter in upholding human rights guarantees.  
Furthermore in connection to the above quote, in itself it makes sense that states make 
calculations of economic, political and human costs of intervention but also may led to 
conclude that a redirection of funds and measures towards a prevention of human right 
violations is in the end the best outcome for a cost benefit analysis. 
  
3. The notion of a responsibility to prevent 
The nascent doctrine of the responsibility to protect and the difficulty of deciding on 
intervention when faced with ongoing human rights violations moved the discussion towards 
increased interest and agreement on the importance of prevention in living up to expectations 
of RtoP. Initially prevention is one of the RtoP  pillars which increasingly is put forward as 
the main one  and seemingly most easily implementable pillar of the responsibility to 
protect. Although on the one hand the focus on prevention lessens the need for tough and 
difficult to execute decisions involving often military means and SC deliberation, on the 
flipside prevention is very broad which may also weaken the strength of responsibility to 
protects.  
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We refer back to the coining of an international (legal) duty to protect when the 
international community is faced with (imminent) mass atrocities. International concerted 
response to such situations has often been identified as the main difficulty in interstate 
relations, not the existence or absence of early warning mechanisms or other instruments to 
identify violence. 
One can make a case however of the valid intention to prevent us from even reaching 
such a point and the importance of prevention of conflict, violence and human rights 
violations at an earlier stage. Here one enters into the root causes paradigm of conflict, of 
greed and of grievances, but also one has to keep in mind on the consensus reached on 
responsibility to protect involves the limiting definition of mass atrocities. The 2005 World 
Summit specified goals and this specification made the norm more robust and clarified what 
crisis situations were that states and international  had a responsibility to protect 
(HUISINGH, 2013:16). 
Although root causes can be identified and many theories have tried to do so, when 
restricting RtoP to prevention of mass atrocities we have to be aware of how the possibility 
of mass atrocities become evident once they are imminent. Furthermore, as we have seen 
also, the clear identification of what constitutes a genocide, is debated, the same account to a 
lesser extent for crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Often these crimes are not 
even clearly to be qualified after it occurred, let thus alone beforehand. But also the 
contention of other defining elements of these crimes such as ‘on  massive scale’ make the 
direct clear link between taking measures in the framework of responsibility to protect to 
prevent such crimes from happening difficult.  
Nonetheless, in response to the coining of RWP by Brazil, the in 2012 appointed 
Special Advisor to the Security General on the Prevention of Genocide Adama Dieng argues 
how prevention is always the best policy. In the development of an appropriate strategy for 
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prevention,  he calls for understanding of the nature of the problem and  the root causes of 
the conflicts that generate mass atrocity crime. He further argues how these conflicts usually 
result from mismanagement of diversity, manifested in intolerance of differences defined by 
nationality, race, ethnicity, religion or by political factors and points to the importance of 
management of diversity towards inclusivity, equality and respect for fundamental rights and 
civil liberties (DIENG). This is also underlines by the UNSG who emphasised the 
importance of building societies which accepts and values diversity and in which different 
communities coexist peacefully (A/67/399, 2013:2). 
Pitfalls of prevention strategies however are that such strategies performed by 
outsiders can internationalize a conflict, with the fear of ending in military intervention. 
Other pitfalls include the breaching of sovereignty and unintentionally magnifying conflict 
(HUISINGH, 2013:14).  
The intention of prevention and the responsibility to protect however is that states 
first try to implement preventive policies on their own and then if necessary seek themselves 
support to be able to live up to their obligations. In terms of internationalization of conflict, 
very few conflicts manage to stay fully internal anyways.  
Nevertheless, intervention for preventive reasons could serve as an excuse in certain 
situations. Furthermore, even if intervention occurs by invitation of a state government this 
may not necessarily be approved and regarded as having positive effects in the eyes of the 
majority of the population.13 
Taking things even further, the political and legal effects of a norm on responsibility 
to prevent has been advocated. The Emergence of R2prev as a norm would work on two 
planes, redefining sovereignty as responsibility and broader general development focused on 
13 The farreaching role of the USA in internal matters of Colombia in terms of combating narcotrafficking has 
been labelled intervention by invitation by Tokatlian. The negative effects of these practices are no secret. 
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preventing conflict and mass atrocities rather than reaction was argued (HUISINGH, 
2013:12)  
The question raised in terms of prevention is whether to include economic factors in 
addition to the reached consensus on the necessity of building civilian protection and rule of 
law. How far can and should one go in prevention efforts? There is no agreement on this. 
Differences o opinion between states are to be discerned, Brazil advocated a focus on socio-
economical factors, while others want to focus on the rule of law and human rights. In term 
of limiting the application of RtoP, t is realistic to expect a state to protect its own 
population, and thus not too much to ask (HUISINGH, 2013:32). However. broader 
application of RtoP can harm shared reached consensus in 2005. 
The success of the prevention aspect of RtoP has to been seen in the longer term. 
Legal obligation and legitimacy do not necessarily imply compliance, interest and power 
may still determine state actions (HUISINGH, 2013:33). Though the SG sees the role of 
regional organisations as less obvious when it comes to structural prevention, they can 
contribute to the development of norms, standards and institutions promoting tolerance, 
transparency, accountability and a constructive management of diversity (HUISINGH, 
2013:25).  
In the case of r2prev it is argued how institutionalization, norms cascade, clarification 
and specification of the norm happen at same time and cannot clearly be separated 
(HUISINGH, 2013:34). Finnemore and Sikkink’s work on norms would therefore, more so 
apply to constraining norms, forbidding certain behavior.  But RtoPrev is a prescribing 
norm, leaves open space for contestation and as an international norm needs consensus every 
time it wants to take a step forward (HUISINGH, 2013:34). These contentions are similar to 
those on RtoP. On the one hand RtoP is a constraining norm, reminding state that they are 
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not to commit mass atrocities. On the other hand, RtoP is a prescribing norm in seeking 
interstate cooperation.  
RtoP is a top-down norm, if a norm, in the sense that it derives from an agreement on 
the international level that is supposed to trickle down to have effects at the local level (at 
least in terms of measures to address prevention). Different from theories that study norm 
development from the insight of how domestic actors pressure their representatives to see 
through with negotiation processes at the international level.  
Norms may have different challenges when they prescribe either to ´refrain from´, 
´require´ or ´authorise´. An emerging norm on RtoP and the norm of non refoulement are 
different in this aspect. For a norm to consolidate, it needs clarity and transparency and 
regular interpretation across different cases. The question is how is dealt with challenges and 
violations. Inclusive participation of many actors is needed to strengthen broad application 
and legitimacy of the norm.  
RtoP is considered a political instrument, or in the opinion of some authors, an 
emerging (political) norm. How to translate political norms into legal norms, needs to reflect 
shared understandings, fulfil internal requirements of legality and be supported by practice 
of legality.  
So far RtoP considered a political concept or norm, and also encouraged to be 
understood as such rather than a legal norm. A development into a legal duty is tempting as 
it would increase the responsibility and accountability of states for not acting to halt mass 
atrocities, but it still difficult to develop.  
RtoP could also be regarded as developing into soft law, no treaty signed on RtoP but 
the summit outcome document where states expressed acceptance of RtoP concept and other 
processes in international politics can by interpreted, applied and developed in the light of 
good faith with the purpose of RtoP.  
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The intention of RtoP is to place human rights over state sovereignty, there is a great 
importance of the second pillar. Even if states act on RtoP out of self interest under the 
banner of human rights, these norms are advanced in the breach. Not to argue that the goal 
sanctifies measures, but one can discern a tendency of how slowly through such state 
practice the view is promoted that human rights prevail over the non-intervention and other 
sovereignty principles. By invoking human rights imperatives even as an excuse, it has the 
capacity of becoming a self fulfilling prophecy. The increasing focus on incurring 
responsibility as a state, because of control, backfires in terms that when a state intervenes, 
also afterwards, and increasingly in the act, the practices applies to intervene or to take 
certain measures become subjected to scrutiny. This may make states more hesitant to 
intervene, but also signals the importance of human rights. 
The confidence placed by the UN Secretary General for prospects of prevention efforts is 
reflected in the words of his last report, stating how it is tragic that part of the brutal legacy 
of the twentieth century could have been prevented, making referene to the situation in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Sri Lanka, the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic 
(A/67/929, 2013). 
 
B) A responsibility to protect bridging refugee protection gaps, strengths and  
weaknesses 
Erika Feller, director of international protection at UNHCR, distinguished how the 
challenge concerning the viability of asylum is the gap, the disconnection between rights and 
responsibilities. The key to ensuring international protection needs to balance rights and 
responsibilities, it involves a better apportion of responsibilities, sharing burdens, and 
enabling states to identify to whom they owe protection, with what content and to whom 
they do not (HURWITZ, 2009:167). We remember how a right to have rights is crucial to 
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have human rights protection guaranteed, and someone, i.e. at present most often state, needs 
to provide this right to have rights.  
Balancing would therefore involve also not requesting the impossible. From the latter 
definition one can conclude that likely the balancing is an ongoing process and thus a certain 
gap, the smaller the better, will always exist. The balancing between rights and 
responsibilities refers to the same principle as the difference between standards and 
implementation. 
We recall here too how we quoted the argument that the reintegration into society of one 
displaced person, eventually will lead to the displacement of another, which also reflects the 
above mentioned argument that the refugee or the forcibly displaced will always exist, 
although our understanding of who is or what makes a refugee may change. Nevertheless, 
consequences of flight should be mitigate and responses must be found to prevent people 
from falling into the gaps between rights and implementation of these rights, for prolonged 
periods. 
The new ‘responsibility to protect’ is a nascent doctrine at best and cannot be considered 
a substitute for the freedom of movement that provides refugees with the protection of 
asylum (LONG, 2012:17). Using the responsibility to protect to strengthen compliance on 
the implementation of norms in the international refugee regime has to be applied with 
caution as not to undermine a well established framework of norms and rules in this regard.  
Nevertheless, we have seen how that framework definitely has weak spots, emerging also 
from changing state practices and changing international context. RtoP could thus be 
complementary, emphasising existing norms and statal commitment to protect their 
populations, drawing attention and thus possible funding, and reminding states of the need to 
share responsibilities on cross border problems. Increased commitment is necessary, as well 
for hosting refugees as for material nod financial support. 
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 Furthermore, we can make a  connection to the argument that international human 
rights institutions are not designed primarily to regulate policy externalities, but to hold 
governments accountable for purely internal activities (MORAVCSIK, 2003:217). Human 
rights regimes are not generally enforced by interstate action, but may empower individual 
citizens to bring suit to challenge domestic activities of their own government 
(MORAVCSIK, 2003:217). When looking at the responsibility to protect it does raise these 
questions and creates some basic lines of thinking that civil society can build forth on. RtoP 
is about awareness and (in theory) about accountability. 
Particularly the underlying normative lines of thinking of the responsibility to 
protect, are to be compared to those underlying the international refugee regime and in the 
end envisages to strengthen human rights protection. 
The European Court at Straatsburg is a case in point of where individuals can hold 
their states accountable. But not everyone can file claims at the Court, access to justice and 
the more general rule of law are particularly difficult for persons in protection gaps, such as 
refugees who have not been reintegrated into some society (yet). Often it is precisely the 
vulnerable who do not have access to such instruments. The ‘victim’ is often stripped of its 
agency, while no one better than the person him or herself can contribute to finding a 
solution to the situation one finds himself in.  
The more interconnected and globalized our world, the more access becomes key for 
far-reaching inclusion and exclusion, whether we speak about money, internet or visa. 
 
1. A responsibility to protect bridging refugee protection gaps, reflected in EU refugee 
policy 
The CEAS reflects burden sharing with fellow EU members, as opposed to burden or 
responsibility sharing with any country as is seeked for at the international level within the 
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international refugee regime (UCARER, 2006:233). As regard RtoP the idea is to devise 
regional implementation of international norms. If burden sharing on a regional level, 
particularly in this case, the EU, is worked out, or not, lessons can be drawn in more general 
terms.  
In the absence of effective EU responsibility sharing instruments in addition to 
existing gaps in the international maritime regime causes some states to receive greater 
numbers of asylum seekers due to their geographical position. These states therefore are 
increasingly unwilling to even temporarily host these persons and prefer to halt them before 
arrival, rather than devising ways to share responsibility for hosting refugees. EU member 
states showed only political willingness to cooperate to strengthen their border controls 
(VANDVIK, 2008:33). 
Along the same lines is argued how EU institutions agree on common plans or action 
when the aim is to exclude persons, but when there is a need to reach a global and 
comprehensive approach to the whole issue from root causes of movement of people 
onwards, consensus seems to be far away and states draw out the principle of sovereignty 
which leads to prevalence of national imperatives (NAZARSKI, 2008:39). Schengen meant 
to facilitate free circulation inside the EU, the result has been stronger control over EU 
external borders. Furthermore the institutionalization of containment measures have led to 
the reasoning of how North African states have become de facto schengen members (LEVY, 
2010:114).  
The quality of protection afforded by EU asylum law will lose part of its relevance if 
the persons to whom such legislation applies are excluded from ever reaching the member 
states territories. The CEAS risks becoming meaningless if people who need asylum are a 
priori excluded from access to the EU (VANDVIK, 2008:27). Both the EU and the member 
114 
 
states should recognize that the power to prevent access to the territory carries with it the 
responsibility to protect those in need (VANDVIK, 2008:35).  
It has been argued that the Kosovo crisis could have been the push towards a 
supranational refugee agency and more effective burden sharing in the EU. It was a potential 
turning point in history of refugee policy in Europe, when history eventually did not turn 
(LEVY, 2010:99). Problems of enforcing cooperation between equal sovereign states at an 
international level are precisely the result of the fact that there is no supranational body to do 
so. Within the EU however, the partial transfer of state sovereignty to a supranational body 
could have been a resourceful opportunity. Only when a balanced and stable system is in 
place there then can be spoken about sharing responsibility and the possibility of burden 
sharing (referring to the ceas) (VANDVIK, 2008:40). More powers for supranational bodies 
could have provided this stability but at the same time question accountability towards 
checks from the national representations and the fear of possible exceptional measures.   
Nonetheless, rather than stepping up in responsibility sharing on refugees, the effects 
of EU practice have been to weaken asylum norm and nonrefoulement, also to diminish and 
externalize burden, rather than sharing nor within the EU nor beyond (UCARER, 2006:237).  
The package of non-entree policies (safe third countries practices, pre-screening, the 
farming out of border controls to the private sector, extra-territorializationtc) that prevents 
spontaneous and mass flows from reaching borders of countries to claim asylum has even 
been labeled neo-refoulement (LEVY, 2010:94). With the latter is meant to express how the 
measures are no direct refoulement as it does not concern people to be send back from a  
territory of arrival to the territory where they came from, however, effectively the end result 
is the same. They have just be halted before arrival at a new territory. The human cost is well 
known, as thousands have perished in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Sahara 
(LEVY, 2010:114). 
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On the contrary, it is also claimed that the measures taken in the light of working 
towards a CEAS, have been somewhat successful in assigning the responsible state for 
processing the asylum claim, somewhat successful in readmission agreements with states of 
origin and transit. These practices however, may shift responsibility for assessing asylum 
claim to countries outside the EU. Less successful have measures been in redistributive 
mechanisms for countries with disproportionate numbers of asylum claims, either for other 
states or EU institutions (UCARER, 2006:220).  
The EU was accused of hypocritical policymaking, which has made it very difficult 
for academic analysts to give a balanced account of the effects of the CEAS programmed, 
which either way is still a work in progress. Its major aims were control spontaneous 
movement into the EU and prevention of secondary movement inside the EU (LEVY, 
2010:105-106). Either way in EU policy ideas and norms indeed matter. A major violation of 
legal obligations remains unthinkable for the EU as regards the self constructed normative 
image of the EU (LEVY, 2010:96-98) 
While politicians devise ways of shifting and shirking responsibilities, the judiciary is 
forming a line of thinking of broadening responsibilities and more inclusive duties. The 
European NGO ECRE has insisted how EU Member states’ obligations under international 
and European refugee and human rights law do not stop at the physical boundaries of the EU 
and can be engaged  by actions states carry out outside their national and EU borders, 
directly or through agents (VANDVIK, 2008:28).  
Court rulings work towards the insight that when states have effective control over 
persons, even outside the physical borders of their territory, they may incur direct 
responsibility.  This consideration also includes actions to divert refugees, or by aiding a 
third state or private party in doing so. States also have to ensure that chain refoulement does 
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not occur. There is a high threshold here however, in terms of the nature and extent of the 
powers of the state in case. (VANDVIK, 2008:31).  
To a certain extent this development can be linked to developments in terms of 
protection for idp’s. The fact that the plight of idp’s increasingly becomes part of the 
international agenda adapts the interpretation of the jurisdiction of states, instead of linked to 
territory, to notions of control. Examples of judicial instruments that refer to jurisdiction 
rather than territory are the ICCPR, CAT and CERD (VANDVIK, 2008:29)  
It is interesting however the assertion that control implies responsibility, not only 
moral and political responsibility, but thus increasingly also legal. Notwithstanding how 
tempting a presumption of irresponsibility may be to policy makers to rid themselves of 
legal responsibilities, they can’t get rid of political and moral responsibilities, in addition, 
there is legal duty. Control implies responsibility thus access to asylum, reception centers 
ensure that obligations respected guarantees against chain refoulement and the reception of 
medical treatment (VANDVIK, 2008:32).  
In this light of legal instruments, there exists the gap that the EU as such is not liable 
under international law (VANDVIK, 2008:28).  The supranational character is therefore a 
facilitating but also a complicating factor in strengthening refugee protection.  
Nonetheless, these states have to deal with the fact that ‘they’, i.e. the persons using 
their right to life and to seek asylum, will try time and again because of persecution or living 
in very harsh conditions (NAZARSKI, 2008:39). Therefore turning the blind eye and 
shirking responsibilities won’t solve anything for anyone in the longer term.  
The EU and its member states are bound by the Geneva Convention, but must also 
grapple with the phenomenon of mixed flows that encompass refugees, economic migrants 
and many categories in between (HADDAD, 2010:98). EU migration and asylum policy is 
complex, illustrated with ever changing political priorities, public opinion and real world 
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events, which impact on state responses to migratory and refugee flows. The differing 
visions on protection and responsibility within the EU can co-exist, complement each other 
and could reinforce the RtoP principle, provided that the protection imperative stays 
(HADDAD, 2010:99). 
Prevention not only reflects the containment policies that are being devised to halt 
persons from arriving at the European borders. Even the imperative to rescue persons in peril 
at high seas can be used as pretext to undertake interception (VANDVIK, 208:32). 
Prevention can this be used as a negative pretext to preempt. Ist is unclear whether all states 
on a trajectory should be held responsible for not hosting the refugee. Importantly, states 
cannot be forced to uphold humanitarianism.  
Cooperation has not always been easy, not even on containment. At a certain point 
for example African states refused to play their part in European game of remote control 
migration (LEVY, 2010:102). Also it has been brought to the fore how Italia receives more 
irregular immigrants from Germany than of the south (LEVY, 2010:104). This may indicate 
how the public debate on these issues is distorted. 
Prevention however also involves lessening the need to leave home in the first place. 
Root causes of flight or reasons that induce migration are distinct themes and statal response 
to these types of groups are also different. Nevertheless, the refugee and the migrant have 
features in common and it is not always easy to make an objective distinction between 
refugees and migrants. States committed themselves openly to protect refugees, the 
protection of migrant is safeguarded to a lesser extent.  
The status of a refugee who has left his plac of origin out of fear of persecution 
becomes and economic migrant with time. (LEVY, 2010:114). This has to be explained as 
not undermining the persons well founded fear of persecution but makes clear how 
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insufficient reception conditions in receiving countries will oblige the persons to move on, 
i.e. undertake a secondary movement.  
Regarding the EU policy, it was stated how there is an approach destined at the end 
of the process instead of considering refugee movement as the result of a complex situation 
in which Europe itself plays a relevant role.  
It has been claimed that while the obscurity of legal reasoning or institutionalized 
rights language may mask power struggles, national priorities and ideological influences 
behind the formation of the CEAS, human rights, even without illusions are important to 
understand the motivations being EU policy making and the unintended outcomes of the 
politics of the exceptional (LEVY, 2010:119). The author refers to the fact that the so called 
exceptional measures that were devised by the EC over the first decade after the year 2000 in 
terms of extra territorial protection would have involved an increased supranational effort 
and the step forward to achieving something towards the CEAS. 
The refugee might not cease to exist, but if conditions that may induce migration are 
better addressed, and broader legal migration opportunities are created too, arguably mixed 
migration flows are more easily sorted out. Through addressing root causes of migration, and 
opening opportunities for legal (temporary) migration, the refugee will claim to be a refugee 
and the migrant will identify him or herself as a refugee. Conflating irregular immigration 
with asylum seekers has come to the detriment of overall protection.  
A lesser focus on security in European policy making regarding controlling the 
movement of persons was identified after 2010 and more focus on migration-development 
and asylum-migration nexus (LEVY, 2010:93). The securiticised debate could return to 
normal politics. It was a recognition of the realities of global migration (LEVY, 2010:96) 
Furthermore, it recognized circular migration (LEVY, 2010:112). 
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Sami Nair argued in this light how the EU is not clearly open nor closed to 
immigration. The EU issues a strategy and vision and proactive policies concentrated on the 
causes of migration (NAIR, 2006:46). He emphasizes how stricter frontiers will not end 
immigration, but have led to more definitive migration, which blocks the logic of the migrant 
of coming and going. Better entry procedures he regards necessary therefore and visa as 
well, otherwise people will look for alternatives that are not fully in line with the law (NAIR, 
2006:191). The fact that asylum seekers are segregated from labor markets is not helpful 
either (LEVY, 2010:105). 
In a broader light, poverty and a lack of employment prospects can be linked to 
migration and forced displacement. The EU asylum policy can be situated between the area 
of legal migration, which remains the domain of national sovereignty, and the area of illegal 
immigration where joint cooperation is established (HADDAD, 2010: 91). Foremost, the 
cautionary words are in place that regulating immigration is perfectly lawful under 
international law and the determination of abusive policies is not an easy matter 
(HURWITZ, 2009:211).   
Nevertheless, with barely any legal migration routes into the EU from third countries, 
refugees and migrants are being forced into irregular ways of traveling (VANDVIK, 
2008:27). Immigration control efforts so far have had effect of diversion of migratory flows 
towards longer and more dangerous routes. Argue in this light that right to control one’s own 
borders in time of peace should not be realized to the detriment of human lives. Irregular 
immigration is a security issue and humanitarian one (VANDVIK, 2008:38). The grant of 
asylum is the last recourse of prevention. 
Rather than seeking solutions for the persons that has already become a refugee, or at 
least is displaced, through either local integration, resettlement or voluntary repatriation, a 
good way to address this situations is to prevent the flight in the first place. Along these lines 
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also has been argue to what extent the ‘solution’ that may be for offer, are real solutions has 
been questioned, based on the argument that moving one refugee movement by reinstalling 
the individuals in the citizen-state-territory-hierarchy will inevitably lead to the creation of a 
new refugee movement (HADDAD, 2003:321-322). From this insight however, one must 
also conclude that the figure of the refugee will continue to exist. This means to say, even if 
root causes are addressed, there will be refugees. 
Cooperation between EU countries and third states could involve different areas such 
as development, social affairs and employment and justice and home affairs. Cooperation 
could involve state of origin, first asylum, resettlement and asylum (UCARER, 2006:222).  
The victim should be reframed however, not the industrialized states are the victims. 
Also in the debate the notion of sharing a burden must be reframed again to sharing a 
collective responsibility towards refugees. 
However difficult, Hurwitz explains how states have a duty to cooperate in various 
spheres of International Relations in order to maintain international peace and security. From 
this duty of cooperation derive the principles of burden sharing and solidarity. The 
importance of solidarity is connected to the coming to the fore of newly independent states 
in the 1960s and a ‘new morality in international law’, which emphasizes that those nations 
that have the necessary means are expected to assist those that do not (HURWITZ, 
2009:138-139). 
Levy argued how even if Member states use human rights to achieve the reverse, they 
are strategically necessary (LEVY, 2010:118). Although it is not specified for whom they 
are strategically necessarily, from the context one can conclude he refers to the guarantees of 
rule of law. Levy argues that it is impossible to understand the dynamics behind the Geneva 
regime in the EU without accepting that even if honoured in the breach, burden sharing, non 
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refoulement and the sanctity of international law remain shared aspirations (LEVY, 2010: 
119). 
Porous borders and differentiated citizenship have been advocated by Seyla 
Benhabib, there is a need for porous borders for immigrants and the right of every human 
being to have rights, to be recognized before the law without regard to their condition of 
political membership (BENHABIB, 2005:15). She places this within the context of the 
superseded capacity of the Westphalian nation state to influence decisions and results, and 
how the territorially bounded concepts do no keep up with the material functions that have to 
be fulfilled, but maintain the monopoly over practices. Globalization erodes the power of the 
state to guarantee outcomes and to act independently (WEISS, 2007:94).  
The borders of political communities, and thus the regulations of the condition of 
membership have to be redefined in different ways of belonging, either for example sub 
national or supranational. (BENHABIB, 2005:13-16). A right to have rights may not be 
allencompassing enough, according to Benhabib the challenge ahead is to develop an 
international regime that separates the right to have rights from the national condition of the 
individual (BENHABIB, 2005:58). In a certain way the UN Secretary Genral tries to include 
this line of thinking into the way he advocates and envisions RtoP, by emphasising how the 
refrence to populations in the World Summit Outcome document does refer not only to 
citizens but to all populations within state borders (A/67/399, 2013:2). 
Obstacles to the exercising of the freedom of movement are intrinsically linked to 
inequalities between states and regions, to the maintaining of restrictive interpretation of 
state sovereignty and citizenship and eventually to forsaking on the universality of 
fundamental rights. (CERIANI CERNADAS, 2009:203). The right to freedom of movement 
is crucial for any person to seek (international) protection and the guarantee of the 
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individual’s human rights. In order to provide protection therefore, states first need to take 
responsbility to advance towards strenghtening freedom of movement. 
 
Chapter conclusion 
Failed attempts to protect populations from massive human rights violations have 
almost at every instance been accompanied by refugee flows. The memory of halfhearthy 
attempts by the international community to guarantee people’s life and dignity, or the 
absence of any attempt at all, resulted in the international refugee regime, after the two 
World Wars, and more recently in the concept of the responsibility to protect after well 
known cases of massive human rights violations of the 1990’s. Furthermore, the Kosovo 
crisis strengthened momentum in the European Union for the need of revising EU asylum 
policy. However, the results of these new attempts remains to be seen. 
The status in interstate relations of these new attempts and therefore the level of 
compliance also remains to be seen. State practice is important in the consolidation of and 
emerging and arguably desired mode of behaviour that may eventual achieve the status of 
legal duty. Emerging principles such as the responsibility to protect may be characterised as 
soft law. As such it may influence the interpretation, application and development of other 
rules of law. In order to advance these emerging principles, norm entrepreneurs are crucial, 
but not sufficient and different levels of governance need to be included. 
The principle of RtoP still needs a lot of fine tuning however, to clearer represents an 
answer to the initial dilemma that brought it into existence: what to do when states commit 
massive human rights violations towards its own population, and who does so? Behind this 
pressing question lie greater questions of how to prevent even having to decide upon the 
before mentioned situation, of how to prevent outbreaks of violence and how to protect 
people that may become subjected to this. It is important in this light to constructively 
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engage with non-western proposals to gain greater legitimacy. The claim of defending 
western universal values will not take the concept very far, nor a proclaimed impartiality. 
One has to be partial, namely taking side of the victims.  
Intervention remains a matter of choice, this is critical, but not because they may be 
used for suspicious western interests. Not only do preventive measures have to lessens the 
tension, or mismanagement of diversity that may lead to human rights violations, also 
preventive measure should not have the adverse effects of containing the freedom of 
movement, obliging people to remain in the state or region of origin and thus instead of 
granting protection through asylum inducing the need for a envisioned intervention.  
Prevention may be the best policy once the calculations of states of economic, 
political and human costs result that such policy is in their own best interest. In that sense 
there is still a long way to go.  
For refugees there still exists a disconnection between rights and responsibilities and 
the extent to which within the European Union similarities can be discerned between RtoP 
and refugee policy, they seem not for the better. Measures taken in the light of the Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS) more so have shifted and shirked responsibilities for 
protecting than shared them. Assigning another European Union Member state as first state 
of asylum (and thus responsible for addressing the claim) or any external state of transit as 
safe third country may clarify responsibility, but does not achieve much in terms of human 
rights guarantees, nor burden sharing.  
It is worrisome if even a regional and quite supranational organization such as the EU 
does not achieve internal responsibility sharing on receiving and hosting refugees. Even 
more difficult seem the prospects of cooperation with other states, not on the notion of 
limiting the movement of persons towards the EU, but rather on promoting it. Only as such 
the EU can act on its responsibility to protect. Granting refuge to those who need it is the 
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easiest way to implement the responsibility to protect and therefore migrants must dare to 
present themselves as such and a right to leave one’s country and to seek asylum must be 
safeguarded as the norm of nonrefoulement respected. 
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General conclusion 
 
Over the past decades the limits and checks on state sovereignty have increasingly 
become accepted by the majority of actors in the international community, in favour of 
human rights of individuals and of communities as a whole. Invoking state sovereignty as 
legitimising the commission of human rights violations towards a state’s own population 
ceases to be an effective shield from outside scrutiny and interference. Although the 
prospective duty of the international community to act when faced with the (imminent) 
commission of mass atrocities is often advocated, timely and effective response to halt such 
violations is not yet a guarantee nor managed by smooth mechanisms. 
In contemporary political history the 1990’s provided clear examples of the human 
suffering resulting when responsibility to provide protection was not effectively taken by the 
international community. From the aftermath of this decade emerged a proposal to address 
this, it is what we know now as the responsibility to protect (RtoP), meaning that states have 
a primary responsibility to protect their populations from mass atrocities, and if they are 
unwilling or unable, the international community should provide support, either through 
peaceful means or eventually the use of force. 
States to a lesser extent have started to define themselves through the defense of their 
physical state borders, but rather do so by controlling their populations, its insiders and 
outsiders, and the movement of persons in a broader sense, a process that becomes detached 
from the actual territory, and borders of the state. 
Physical borders thus become softer through a different emphasis in state control 
towards controlling populations, and furthermore through more transparency as state have to 
justify treatment of its inhabitants. Nonetheless, the physical state border remains a crucial 
element for the figure of the refugee fleeing from persecution. 
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Today’s human rights abuses are tomorrows refugee movements and therefore, if a 
state does not effectively fulfill its commitments in safeguarding human rights of its 
population, the person may seek international protection and in doing so become a concern 
for the international community. This concern has to be solved by the international refugee 
protection regime, which is a set of rules, norms and decision making procedures and builds 
forth on understandings of asylum and burden sharing. The refugee has de facto lost 
connection to a territory and belonging to a political community alike. The international 
community approach to this individual is mainly to seek to reestablish the link of the refugee 
to some territory, either through voluntary repatriation (once time is fit), local integration in 
the host state, or resettlement to a third state. 
The concept of state sovereignty is a social construction, which has been developed 
through practice. Therefore it can be reconceptualised. For example in the 1990s the 
imperative to understand (state) sovereignty as responsibility was indicated. RtoP starts from 
the same premise. However, since the prospect of an application of RtoP was coined, it has 
been fiercely criticised in international affairs, particularly the advent of external 
intervention. So far RtoP has been inconsistently applied, if at all. However, RtoP has 
become a social fact. It does not create new legal duties but envisions stronger commitment 
to implement existing duties. What makes an idea interesting is the way it relates to the 
economic and political problems of today, and this may be crucial for the advocacy of RtoP. 
RtoP clearly departs from a statal view, it also is to be regarded as a political 
instrument. It is still questionable to what extent RtoP may strengthen responsibility towards 
refugees on the territory of other states, which is one of the main weaknesses in the current 
international refugee regime. There are no exiting legal commitment towards protecting 
refugees on other states territory now, and as RtoP does not create new legal obligations its 
effect on bridging this gap may be limited.  Nevertheless, the strengthening of commitment 
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of states towards implementing existing legal obligations can also help to bridge such 
protection gaps. 
In this sense there are parallels between the difficulties of refugee protection and the 
situations for which RtoP in first instance was brought into being, namely the ineffective 
responses of the international community when faced with mass atrocity. Furthermore, the 
underlying norms of RtoP and the refugee regime are very similar, in the first place  
emphasizing responsibilities of a state toward the own population (and here it is important to 
note a difference between population and citizens) and second place emphasising the 
necessity of responsibility sharing between states in fulfilling these obligations towards 
humans in general. 
RtoP according to its narrow definition as deriving from the 2005 World Summit is 
only applicable when the international community faces one of the four following crimes on 
a widespread basis: crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, genocide and war crimes. 
Refugee protection in a narrow sense is not directly included in the RtoP framework and 
there are important distinctions that can be made between a refugee and a person suffering 
from the before mentioned crimes. 
 However, in broader terms RtoP builds forth on insights on the vulnerability of 
forcibly displaced persons, for example who now are commonly known as internally 
displaced person’s (idp’s). Furthermore, refugees are the persons most at risk of the four 
crimes. Therefore, it makes sense to apply a responsibility to protect to the problems of 
refugees, but maybe not RtoP literally. Either way, providing refugee protection is an easy 
manner to implement RtoP and for states to live up to their promises. However, there is a 
need for caution not to weakening the existing international refugee protection regime , 
which even with weaknesses is well established and does provide protection. Furthermore, 
RtoP does not in any sense cover all scenarios of refugee flight.  
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Nevertheless, for pragmatic reasons the international community should focus on 
addressing a problem that actually exists, focus on the vulnerable populations, on alleviating 
or preempting the suffering of the victims instead  of losing oneself in the reservations of 
states regarding one or another concept. RtoP can be regarded as a responsibility of states to 
protect their populations including refugees and in that manner serve as a framework to 
address state responses to bridge refugee protection gaps. 
State commitments towards refugees derive to a large extent from the 1951 Geneva 
Refugee Convention, its additional 1967 protocol and human right instruments. The 
emergence of the international refugee regime was characterised as a recognition by the 
international community of a collective responsibility to protect refugees. Nonetheless such 
acknowledgement and the according signing of treaty instruments, states are not always that 
forthcoming in providing refugee protection, nor in sharing responsibities with other states in 
doing so. 
The Refugee Convention defines to grounds for recognition as a refugee and accords 
rights to the individual refugee. However, the individual eventually needs a state to 
guarantee these rights, i.e. to guarantee the right to have rights. Increasingly states develop 
practices to define individual refugees as part of a group, and also focus in their refugee 
status determination procedures on state capacity in order to determine if the individual 
involved could receive protection elsewhere, rather than looking at individual particularities 
of the case. 
The mandate of the refugee agency of the UN, UNHCR grants it the responsibility to 
find permanent solutions to the problem of refugees. The work of UNHCR is meant to be 
non-political. Recognition of a collective responsibility for refugees has resulted in limited 
real commitment in implementation. Since the 1970’ s the refugee problem became seen as a 
permanent problem and a burden. What is interesting about UNHCR’s role to strengthen 
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refugee protection is how international organisations can teach states new behaviour, this 
accounts for regional organisations as well. In this sense the Un could teach states new 
behaviour. 
The great majority of refugees are hosted in the global south. State practices of 
containment and limiting the right of peoples of freedom of movement such as for example 
interception  (at sea),visa restrictions and carrier sanctions may breach and demonstrate lack 
of good faith in implementing treaty obligations guaranteeing human and particular refugee 
rights. Also geography, poverty and conflict are factors of why refugees have difficulties of 
escaping their state or region of origin. 
Was the year 1999 important for the promotion of RtoP, it also was a potential 
turning point for a different approach in the EU refugee policies. EU member states to a 
certain extent are committed to realizing a Common European Asylum Framework (CEAS). 
Implementation of the CEAS was faced with similar difficulties as the international refugee 
protection regime. The Dublin regulation  and ‘safe country’ understandings in European 
politics can be understood as ways to devise a more pragmatic approach to responsibility 
sharing, emphasising what state should take its responsibility for a refugee case and also 
institutionalizing a regime to level the number of physically present refugees o respective 
territories and to divide financial and material  costs between different states. This policy has 
an internal EU aspect and an external EU aspect. 
Lack of supranational enforcement however makes effective implementation 
impossible. Also are the refugees concerned stripped of their agency to decide for 
themselves upon their country of refuge. Furthermore, by beforehand labeling states as 
‘safe’, the assessment of each individual case is not guaranteed.  
Interpretations of safety in more general sense are changing. Temporary protection is an 
increasingly applied instrument by states to refugee claimants than the grant of full refugee 
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status. This practice has far reaching consequences for the additional socio-economic rights 
which are accorded to a refugee in the Geneva Refugee Convention, but cannot claimed by 
the person receiving temporary protection. A right to temporary stay is not the same as a 
right to belong. 
Such measures are taken in the light of statal concerns about what they consider 
irregular secondary movements and mixed movements. However, the freedom of movement 
has to be seen in the broader content of north-south relations.  
The mentioned practices may breach the guarantee of non-refoulement, of not 
returning a  person to a state where his or her life or freedom is at severe risk. Furthermore, it 
may risk violating the right to leave any country including one’s own is limited and de fact 
therefore also the right to seek and enjoy asylum. Interesting in this lights are legal 
development that follow a reasoning of tying state responsibility to the notion of control 
(over a person or population), and the notion of possibly incurring indirect responsibility. 
Therefore, even if we have concluded that even if for addressing mass atrocity 
crimes, an issue is who has to act and in what manner, and the same account for deciding 
who has to take responsibility to protect refugees, allocating responsibility may have adverse 
effects. Safe country practices designate a state as responsible for receiving certain refugees, 
addressing their claims and or hosting them, or to reaccept their nationals, based either on 
the fact that the country is considered a safe country of origin, a safe country of passage of 
the state where the persons has entered the EU. The application of these concepts in EU 
refugee policy has gone hand in hand with containment policies. As these practices were 
implemented to address statal preoccupations rather than to address refugee protection gaps, 
they have had adverse effect. Notions of control have become disattached from physical 
borders and in that light progressive legal developments of incurring responsibility based on 
control are interesting and may in the long term strengthen refugee protection. 
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In the short term it may make states wary to intervene in cases of mass atrocities, 
because states may be hesitant knowing that they may be held responsible for their actions in 
the future. However, arguably the same occurs with inaction. Eventually this may lead to the 
acknowledgement that even the best refugee protection, or most effective humanitarian 
intervention is no substitute for human rights protection at home and the latter is where 
resources should be dedicated. 
A memory of failed attempts marks the imperative to devise different approaches, 
which may derive from, or promote new norms in international affairs. We have taken a 
stance on characterising these norms as being moral, political or legal. Increasingly an 
interest is taken in the influence of soft law in understanding statal behaviour in International 
Relations. Soft law can consist of certain types of state behaviour regarded as ‘good’, or 
nonbinding declarations, which may influence the interpretation, application and 
development of other rules of law. 
Under what conditions a political norm may become a legal one in international law 
depends on reciprocity and interaction, which has to be undertaken and maintained by actors 
collectively. The difficulty in interstate relations often concerns eventual compliance with 
norms. How can inappropriate action be punished, inaction turned into action and ineffective 
action be transformed? All these questions are relevant for the implementation of the RtoP 
doctrine. 
In allocating and enforcing compliance or responsibility one can think of 
geographical proximity, special capacities in terms of expertise or strength,  or the existence 
of special ties. In refugee protection, these factors often already play a role in allocating 
responsibility, particularly the first and the latter element. We have seen however how 
labeling countries as safe may not be the most effective parameter to allocate responsibility, 
particularly for individual cases.  
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 If other states have difficulty to hold each other responsible, maybe then the 
individual citizens can challenge domestic activities of their own states. However one must 
be conscious of the limits of human rights language, the means are limited, and there must be 
space for agency of the persons directly involved to consent to what is claimed to be for the 
good of all. One must be realistic and not claiming to be impartial when it is impossible to be 
so. Often precisely the individual that needs to claim its rights does not have access to rule of 
law institutions precisely because of being excluded from basic citizenship rights. 
The dilemmas that RtoP seeks to address are not necessarily new, although the 
balance of priorities tends to bend over in the favor of human rights to the detriment of state 
sovereignty. States are given some agency in this process, they are most commonly held 
accountable for the obligations they have committed themselves to by signing documents 
and declarations. Moreover, states are support to progressively pledge adherence to more 
commitments. This development may be seen as limiting the critique that RtoP is a Western 
concept.  
Alternatives and adjustments of RtoP have been proposed such as Responsibility 
while Protecting (RwP). Coining alternatives will not necessarily increase the consensus 
reached on the 2005 interpretation of RtoP. Nonetheless it may be regarded as a sign of 
southern involvement in constructively engaging to advance the norms underlying RtoP the 
imperative to address some of the dilemmas faced in international politics. Southern 
constructive engagement on refugee responses may therefore be very valid and instructive. 
To be effective the collective responsibility to protect refugees must be a shared 
commitment, and here is a lot to gain.The issue of responsible protecting has also been taken 
up by the UNSG in his 2012 report on RtoP however (A/67/929, 2012). 
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The non-indifference clause in the constitution of the African Union is interesting in 
this regard, as are mechanisms devised to address protection issues for internally displaced 
persons, as set forth in the Kampala Convention, but also present in national laws.  
Much of the debate surrounds principles and norms, but intervention for human rights 
purposes remains a matter of choice and states will place their considerations in the light of 
economic, political and human costs, so will the UN in its current set-up. Intervention in any 
regard not the best instrument for human rights protection, nor are human rights ideally 
enforced by interstate action. Pragmatic solutions for problems that are actually being faced 
by individuals deserve interest over discussions around morality and norms. 
RtoP when applied as a framework of a responsibility to protect can serve as a 
catalyst for reform and innovation in the refugee protection regime. The two underlying 
norms have and can so be strengthened, i.e. the norm of asylum which involves the state 
providing protection to refugees reaching its territory, but also guaranteeing human rights 
and thus not creating refugees or forced displacement and the second norm which is 
nowadays called burden sharing, but should be framed back to responsibility sharing to 
indicate what is really the issue that no state should bear the overwhelming physical, 
economic and political responsibility for the world’s refugees without receiving proportional 
support. 
In terms of responsibility to protect one can even go as far as envisaging a 
responsibility to prevent, along these lines economic factors can be included. Furthermore, it 
would involve better management of diversity, which otherwise often results in conflict and 
in turn the possibility of refugees and RtoP situations. The universal human rights discourse 
tells us how increasingly there is recognition that differences between humans are morally 
irrelevant. However this can only be the case when inclusivity, equality, and respect for 
fundamental rights and civil liberties are guaranteed.  
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The challenge concerning the viability of asylum is the gap, which is the 
disconnection between rights and responsibilities. To ensure international protection, rights 
and responsibilities need to be balanced, to identify to whom protection is owed and to 
whom not. Such balancing is an ongoing process. 
Forced displacement will not be eradicated any time soon. Therefore, consequences 
must be addressed, i.e. solutions must be found for the individual refugee, respecting the 
individual agency and assessment of the individual case. As such the responsibility to 
prevent will also be applied in preventing refugees from falling in between established 
norms/rights and their implementation. The latter at present regularly happens for prolonged 
periods, one only has to look at refugee settlements, urban refugees, or refugees in 
industrialised states without fully recognized citizenships. Broader discussions on 
responsibilities to protect can redirect funding and raise attention and awareness, although it 
always remains questionable to what extent actors indeed will come forward with promised 
funding and to what extent awareness will lead to action.  
Global dilemmas also play out in the EU context. Internal EU responsibility sharing 
on refugee policy is not strongly established, but has rather been defined as shifting and 
shirking responsibilities for refugees.   
EU refugee policy in relation with non member states is sometimes bases on consent 
of the states involved, at least more so than based on the consent of the refugee or asylum 
claimant involved. However, the ceas risks to become meaningless if people are a priori 
excluded from access to the EU. The ability to control populations increasingly implies 
responsibility, not only legal and political but also moral. Progressive developments of 
international law may even point in the direction of future accountability for inaction when 
faced with human rights violations, particularly when a state had sufficient information 
regarding the situation in question. Court rulings regarding genocide and indirect 
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refoulement are to be mentioned here, this may also extend to the RtoP doctrine. Future 
developments could work towards a responsibility for staying disengaged when faced with 
mass atrocities.   
RtoP understood broadly does not have to reemplace existing refugee protection, but 
both regimes can coexist and reinforce each other to the better protection of the victims. The 
difference between both regimes is that the refugee regime is built on a restraining norm 
(non-refoulement) and the RtoP regime (not fully but to a large extent) deals with 
proscribing norms (provision of assistance and support). The first is more easily dealt with.
 If one decides to take a broad stance, and include before mentiond economic factors, 
refugee movement and many of the EU concerns can be seen as a result of a complex 
situation in which Europe itself plays a relevant role. As stricter border control will not end 
immigration nor the existence of (potential) refugees, they may just choose to identify 
themselves differently to fool authorities. Migrants will claim to be refugees, and refugees 
will be idp’s instead as they will be made impossible for them to leave their countries or 
origin. States may have a habit to control their borders but in times of peace should not come 
to the detriment of human lives. Acknowledge need to address root causes of conflict and 
migration and create better entrance procedures opportunities for legal migration. 
 Furthermore, the state has to recognize that it can no longer can guarantee outcomes. 
There is increased need for cooperation and mutual consent and an understanding of how 
borders of political communities are being redefined. Even if working towards porous border 
and different ways of belonging, belonging is important. The practice to lock people In , 
indirectly creates the more likely necessity of intervention and the tendency of creating safe 
havens of providing temporary protection while brokering political solutions to conflict. 
In order therefore to provide stronger protection to refugees, Protection must not be 
narrowed down to the minimum, but be inclusive in all its aspects. 
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At a certain point of this thesis was quoted how the manner in which states 
collectively respond to refugees serves as a barometer of wider change in the state system. 
The wider change in the state system is how human rights gain prevalence over state 
sovereignty. However, as we have seen, particularly in the EU context, the before said does 
not mean that states forsake on their control, they restate their sovereign power by 
controlling populations rather than physical state borders, which has important implication 
for the main guarantees that the international refugee regime provides to refugees, especially 
the freedom of movement, measures that keep people trapped in their states, regions of 
origin or other state designated as safe. 
RtoP is understood as a broader framework of the existence of a state responsibility 
to protect that builds forth on the notion that states have a primary responsibility to protect 
their populations, including refugees, and in second instance, if states are unwilling or unable 
to do so, seek or receive support from other states in fulfilling these commitments. The same 
understandings are reflected in the international refugee protection regime as asylum and 
burden sharing.  
Imperative is however how these commitments have to be understood as 
commitments towards the victims, towards the refugees. Therefore, if a state forsakes on 
providing sufficient protection, either a proper citizen or a passenger, the solution is not to 
place political claims on the state to better its practices and meanwhile keeping persons from 
fleeing that state, or sending them back to where they came from, in order to point out to a 
state that these persons are his responsibility. Vulnerable populations are not a burden to be 
shared but a responsibility.   
RtoP can be used as a political instrument, to emphasise the collective responsibility 
to protect refugees that states have already committed themselves to through ratifying the 
Geneva Refugee Convention, the additional protocol or the norm of non-refoulement which 
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can be regarded as international customary law. However there Is also a need for awareness 
of the fact that minimum understandings of safety in the longer run will not be effective, just 
as RtoP needs to redirect more focus on the pillar or prevention and as regards refugee policy 
states need to adjust their understandings to more realistic interpretations of the 
interconnectedness of people’s imperatives to leave their home.  
Both regimes have in common that states need to constructively step up the sharing 
of responsibilities to find solutions which in a timely manner restore the victim’s belonging 
to a community and his or her agency.   
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